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Abstract
This thesis analyzes three topics in macroeconomics: Mortgage default, demographic
change and factor misallocation.
The ﬁrst chapter asks which theories of mortgage default are quantitatively consis-
tent with observations during the U.S. mortgage crisis. Diﬀerent default models are
simulated for the path of observed house prices and their predictions are compared
to observed default rates. The double-trigger hypothesis attributing mortgage default
to the joint occurrence of negative equity and a life event like unemployment explains
this data well. A structural partial-equilibrium model with liquidity constraints and
unemployment risk provides micro-foundations for this hypothesis. The model implies
that subsidizing homeowners can mitigate a mortgage crisis at a lower cost than bailing
out lenders.
The second chapter investigates the macroeconomic eﬀects of population aging in the
United States during the coming decades. In particular we analyze the role of endoge-
nous human capital formation during this process. We build a large-scale overlapping
generations model with endogenous human capital accumulation and calibrate it such
that it replicates observed life-cycle earnings proﬁles. We then simulate a realistic de-
mographic transition. Our key ﬁnding is that human capital adjustments may act as a
quantitatively important mitigation mechanism that dampens the macroeconomic and
adverse welfare eﬀects of demographic change.
The third chapter estimates the degree of capital and labor misallocation between the
agricultural and non-agricultural sector in diﬀerent countries. The framework employs
the ﬂexible Translog production function and performs non-linear regressions on cross-
country panel data observed during 1967-1992. The ﬁndings are that in developing
countries marginal products of labor are higher in non-agriculture than in agriculture.
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The reverse holds for capital allocation. Industrialized countries are closer to an eﬃcient
factor allocation. A sensitivity analysis reveals that using Cobb-Douglas production
functions leads to much higher estimates of misallocation.
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Preface
This thesis analyzes three topics in macroeconomics: Mortgage default, demographic
change and factor misallocation.
The ﬁrst chapter “Mortgage Default during the U.S. Mortgage Crisis” asks which the-
ories of mortgage default are quantitatively consistent with observations in the United
States during 2002-2010. Theoretical models are simulated for the observed time-
series of aggregate house prices and a realistic microeconomic house price distribution.
Their predictions are then compared to actual default rates on prime ﬁxed-rate mort-
gages. An out-of-sample test discriminates between estimated reduced forms of the
two most prominent theories. The test reveals that the double-trigger hypothesis at-
tributing mortgage default to the joint occurrence of negative equity and a life event
like unemployment outperforms a frictionless option-theoretic default model. Based
on this ﬁnding a structural partial-equilibrium model with liquidity constraints and
idiosyncratic unemployment shocks is presented to provide micro-foundations for the
double-trigger hypothesis. In this model borrowers with negative equity are more likely
to default when they are unemployed and have low liquid wealth. The model explains
most of the observed strong rise in mortgage default rates. A policy implication of the
model is that subsidizing homeowners can mitigate a mortgage crisis at a lower cost
than bailing out lenders.
The second chapter “Demographic Change, Human Capital and Welfare” investigates
the macroeconomic eﬀects of population aging in the United States during the com-
ing decades. In particular we analyze the quantitative role that endogenous human
capital formation may play as an adjustment mechanism to demographic change. We
build a large-scale overlapping generations model with endogenous human capital ac-
cumulation and calibrate it such that it replicates past observed life-cycle earnings
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proﬁles. In this model we then simulate a realistic demographic transition based on
observed demographic data and projections for the future. The projected demographic
changes will reduce the share of the working-age population. Analyses based on stan-
dard models with a ﬁxed human capital proﬁle predict that these changes will increase
the capital-labor ratio. Hence, rates of return to capital decrease and wages increase,
which has adverse welfare consequences for current cohorts who will be retired when
the rate of return is low. This chapter argues that adding endogenous human capital
accumulation to the standard model dampens the macroeconomic and adverse welfare
eﬀects of demographic change. We ﬁnd that this adjustment channel is quantitatively
important. The standard model with exogenous human capital predicts welfare losses
up to 12.5% (5.6%) of lifetime consumption, when contribution (replacement) rates
to the pension system are kept constant. These numbers reduce to approximately
8.7% (4.4%) when human capital can endogenously adjust.
The third chapter “Factor Misallocation in Dual Economies” estimates the degree of
capital and labor misallocation between the agricultural and non-agricultural sector in
diﬀerent countries. First it is shown how the observed average product ratio between
the two sectors is linked to the unobserved marginal product ratio. The degree of misal-
location is then estimated by non-linear regressions using a panel data set of developed
and developing countries observed during 1967-1992. The econometric approach allows
for general production functions, so the paper employs the ﬂexible Translog form. The
ﬁndings are that in developing countries marginal products of labor are higher in non-
agriculture than in agriculture. The reverse holds for capital allocation. Industrialized
countries are closer to an eﬃcient factor allocation. A sensitivity analysis reveals that
using the more restrictive Cobb-Douglas form would lead to much higher estimates of
misallocation.
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1 Mortgage Default during the
U.S. Mortgage Crisis
1.1 Introduction
After the collapse of the house price boom in the United States residential mort-
gage delinquencies of both prime and subprime loans have increased substantially.
The widespread rise in default rates and resulting losses of mortgage-backed-securities
marked the onset of the recent ﬁnancial and economic crisis. These events highlight
key research questions on mortgage default. What are the economic mechanisms driv-
ing mortgage default? And what explains the strong rise in mortgage default rates in
recent years?
This paper examines how well theoretical models of mortgage default can quantitatively
explain the rise in default rates in the Unites States between 2002 and 2010. Theoretical
models are simulated for the observed time-series of aggregate house prices and a
realistic microeconomic house price distribution. Their predictions are then compared
to data on default rates of prime ﬁxed-rate mortgages. In the ﬁrst part of the paper the
observed variation in default rates and aggregate house prices is used to discriminate
between the two major mortgage default theories - the frictionless option-theoretic
default model and the “double-trigger” hypothesis.
The traditional frictionless option-theoretic literature, sometimes also called the “ruth-
less” default model, assumes that borrowers default on their mortgage in order to max-
imize their ﬁnancial wealth. In this framework negative equity is a necessary, but not
suﬃcient, condition for default. Instead there exists a threshold level of negative eq-
uity or the house price such that a rational wealth-maximizing agent will exercise the
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default option as in Kau, Keenan, and Kim (1994), among others. This theory assumes
that the borrower has access to a perfect credit market for unsecured credit such that
default is unaﬀected by liquidity considerations and income ﬂuctuations. Quercia and
Stegman (1992) and Vandell (1995) provide a survey and further references.
Another prominent idea on mortgage default is the double-trigger hypothesis. This
theory also views negative equity as a necessary condition for default. But it attributes
default to the joint occurrence of negative equity and a life event like unemployment
or divorce. The double-trigger hypothesis is well-known among mortgage researchers.
But it is usually discussed only in words or stylized models as in Gerardi, Shapiro,
and Willen (2007), Foote, Gerardi, and Willen (2008) and Foote, Gerardi, Goette,
and Willen (2009), among others, and has not been presented as a structural dynamic
stochastic model.
These two microeconomic theories are tested on their aggregate predictions. The pro-
cedure speciﬁes reduced form models of the two theories, estimates them on part of
the data and then tests the estimated models on out-of-sample predictions. The result
of this test is that the double-trigger hypothesis outperforms the frictionless default
model. The frictionless theory is excessively sensitive to changes in aggregate house
prices and predicts a far too strong rise in default rates. In contrast, the double trigger
hypothesis is consistent with the evidence. The economic reason is that default rates
have increased roughly in proportion to the number of borrowers who experience any
level of negative equity as predicted by the double-trigger theory. In contrast, the
predictions of the frictionless theory are based on the number of homeowners expe-
riencing extreme levels of negative equity and this has increased by much more than
actual default rates. This is an important result in itself given the disagreement in the
literature. It is also an important step towards developing mortgage default models
that can be used for policy and risk analysis because such analysis needs to be based
on models that are empirically accurate.
Based on this ﬁnding the second part of the paper aims at providing a micro-foundation
for the double-trigger hypothesis. A structural dynamic stochastic partial-equilibrium
model of mortgage default featuring liquidity constraints and idiosyncratic unemploy-
ment shocks is presented. The liquidity constraint forces unemployed borrowers who
have exhausted their buﬀer stock savings to make painful cuts to consumption. This
magniﬁes the cost of servicing the mortgage such that unemployment becomes a trigger
event for default. In addition the model includes a direct utility ﬂow of owning a house.
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This is an important feature to generate double-trigger behavior because it prevents
employed agents from defaulting after a strong fall of house prices. The model then
attributes default to the joint occurrence of negative equity and the liquidity prob-
lems caused by unemployment. The model is calibrated, estimated and assessed on
its power to predict out-of-sample. A comparison to observed default rates reveals
that the model can quantitatively explain most of the rise in mortgage default as a
consequence of falling aggregate house prices.
One beneﬁt of the structural model is that it can be used for policy analysis. This is
exempliﬁed by analyzing two possible policies in a mortgage crisis that neutralize the
losses lenders incur from mortgage default. One could either bail out the lenders or
mitigate the liquidity problems of homeowners who would otherwise default such that
they stay in their houses. An implication of the structural model is that a subsidy
policy to homeowners is the cheaper option when liquidity problems play a key role in
default decisions.
From a macroeconomic perspective the ﬁnding that the structural and reduced-form
double-trigger model can explain the rise in default rates by the dynamics of aggregate
house prices is important. This points towards the existence of systematic macroeco-
nomic risk in the mortgage market. The main alternative explanation is that lending
standards and loan quality deteriorated sharply before the crisis. This paper presents
evidence that at least in my data set on prime mortgages this is an unlikely explanation
for the rise in default rates because average loan characteristics are fairly stable over
time.
As a background to the paper it is important to know that loan-level data that links
an individual borrower’s repayment history to the history of individual house prices
and employment status does not exist. This makes it diﬃcult to distinguish empirically
between diﬀerent theories at the individual level. This paper takes a diﬀerent approach
and tests the aggregate predictions of diﬀerent theories. Along this line the key and
unique feature of the paper is that it includes a realistic microeconomic house price
distribution around the aggregate trend. This means that an empirically successful
model is required to be consistent with both the aggregate house price trends and the
moments of the observed microeconomic distribution. In contrast, the prior empirical
literature relies on regional house price indices as explanatory variables and thus very
likely omits part of the microeconomic house price variation from its regressions.
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One of the main contributions of the paper is to compare simulations from theoretical
mortgage default models directly to empirical observations. Most of the prior literature
has in contrast been divided into theoretical work that does not discuss the explanatory
power of the theories on the one hand, and reduced-form regressions on the other.
The structural model of the paper builds on previous work by Campbell and Cocco
(2003, 2011) and Corradin (2009) who also model liquidity constraints in a mortgage
framework.1 These models are similar to the structural model presented in this paper,
but these papers do not compare the models to the data. Their focus is also diﬀer-
ent, for example Campbell and Cocco (2011) are mainly concerned with theoretical
diﬀerences between ﬁxed- and variable rate mortgages. In contrast, my paper adds
the macroeconomic perspective. It shows how variation in the time-series of aggregate
house prices can explain the rise in default rates during recent years within a structural
model. My analysis also reveals that in addition to liquidity constraints it is important
to allow for a direct utility ﬂow from owning a house as explained above. Otherwise
the model remains too close to a ruthless default model and cannot match the data
well.
There is also a recent literature that uses equilibrium models to examine the role
various institutional features like bail-out guarantees or mortgage product innovation
and falling house prices played for the mortgage crisis. Examples include Chatterjee and
Eyigungor (2011), Corbae and Quintin (2011), Jeske, Krueger, and Mitman (2011) and
Garriga and Schlagenhauf (2009). In contrast to this line of research, my paper focusses
in more detail on the household decision to default and discriminating between the two
default theories. While the other papers simulate the eﬀect of a relatively stylized
fall in house prices on aggregate foreclosures, I feed detailed time-series of observed
house prices into the simulation and try to explain diﬀerences in default behavior of
diﬀerent loan cohorts. Another important advantage of my simulation framework for
house prices is that it is based closely on the procedures and estimates of the FHFA
and thus requires the theories to be also consistent with the dynamics observed in
microeconomic house price data.
A vast number of empirical papers have studied the determinants of mortgage default
typically estimating hazard models on loan-level data. The pre-crisis literature is sur-
veyed by Quercia and Stegman (1992) and Vandell (1995) and an example is the study
1In modeling liquidity constraints the structural model also builds on the buﬀer-stock saving frame-
work of Zeldes (1989), Deaton (1991) and Carroll (1997).
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by Deng, Quigley, and Van Order (2000). The U.S. mortgage crisis has then caused
an enormous increase in empirical work on mortgage default.2 These papers present a
wealth of evidence that negative equity or falling house prices are strong determinants
of default. Some studies have also investigated the role of life events as triggers for
default and found that state unemployment or divorce rates can explain default. My
paper is motivated by these empirical results. But it uses a very diﬀerent methodology
and thus provides complementary evidence on the relative merit of the two theories.
The empirical literature also ﬁnds a great heterogeneity in default behavior for borrow-
ers with the same level of negative equity (Quercia and Stegman 1992). The structural
model I present here can rationalize this fact because in that model the default thresh-
old of negative equity depends on liquid wealth and employment status. Individual
heterogeneity in these variables, which are unobserved in all standard mortgage data
sets, may then account for the heterogeneity in default behavior of borrowers with the
same level of negative equity. The theoretical model also suggests that interaction ef-
fects between negative equity and variables measuring liquidity are of key importance
for default as has been found empirically by Elul, Souleles, Chomsisengphet, Glennon,
and Hunt (2010).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 describes the data and empirical facts on
mortgages and house prices. The test between the two theories based on reduced-form
models is presented in section 1.3. The structural model is developed in section 1.4
and parameterized in section 1.5. The results of the structural model are presented in
section 1.6. Section 1.7 discusses the alternative explanation for the rise in default rates
that loan quality deteriorated sharply and shows that there is no strong evidence for
this in my data set. The structural model is applied for policy analysis in section 1.8.
For reasons explained in the data section most of the paper concentrates on loans with
a high loan-to-value ratio, but section 1.9 discusses an extension to lower loan-to-value
ratios. Section 1.10 concludes.
2Studies within this extensive literature diﬀer by research question, estimation method, analyzed data
set and results. A detailed literature review that would do justice to these diﬀerent contributions is
unfortunately beyond the scope of this paper. Examples of this empirical research include Amromin
and Paulson (2009), Bajari, Chu, and Park (2010), Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2011), Elul,
Souleles, Chomsisengphet, Glennon, and Hunt (2010), Foote, Gerardi, Goette, and Willen (2008),
Foote, Gerardi, Goette, and Willen (2009), Foote, Gerardi, and Willen (2008), Gerardi, Lehnert,
Sherlund, and Willen (2008), Gerardi, Shapiro, and Willen (2007), Ghent and Kudlyak (2010),
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2011), Jagtiani and Lang (2010), Mayer, Pence, and Sherlund
(2009) and Mian and Suﬁ (2009), among others.
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1.2 Data and Empirical Facts
This section presents the data on mortgages default rates and house prices and the key
facts the paper attempts to explain. It also describes how the simulation procedure for
house prices is based on empirical evidence.
1.2.1 Mortgage Data
In this paper, I use aggregate data on mortgage characteristics and payment histories
in the United States. The data set contains information that was aggregated from the
large loan-level data base of Lender Processing Services (LPS), also known as McDash
data. “Aggregate” here simply means that my data contain the average value of a
certain characteristic for all loans in the data base that satisfy a set of conditions that
I can specify. These conditioning variables allow the selection of sub-samples from the
full data base and tracking diﬀerent loan cohorts over time.
The data cover the time period from January 2002 until June 2010 at a monthly
frequency and the analysis is focussed on loans originated between 2002 and 2008. I
restrict the sample to prime, ﬁrst, ﬁxed-rate, 30-years mortgages that have a standard
amortization schedule (are not balloon mortgages). I focus on only one mortgage type
because the structural model would have to be recomputed for each diﬀerent mortgage
contract. The selection is motivated by the fact these are the most common mortgage
contracts. The data base contains around 23 million loans with these characteristics
in 2010.3
I further focus the analysis on loans with a loan-to-value ratio (LTV) above 95%, which
depending on the year represents about 20 − 30% of all loans that satisfy the above
restrictions. Looking at loans with diﬀerent LTVs separately allows to generate a more
accurate home equity distribution in the model. This is important due to the highly
non-linear relationship between default decisions and negative equity. Furthermore, the
loans with a high LTV default most frequently, so it makes sense to focus an analysis
of mortgage default on them. But the main reason for concentrating on this group is a
3Amromin and Paulson (2009) estimate that the LPS data cover about 60% of the prime market
between 2004 and 2007. Elul, Souleles, Chomsisengphet, Glennon, and Hunt (2010) report that
the LPS data cover about 70% of all mortgage originations in 2005 and 2006. But coverage varies
by year with lower coverage in earlier years.
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data problem. In the LPS data only the LTV of the ﬁrst mortgage is observed, but not
the combined LTV of the ﬁrst and a possible second mortgage.4 Since the combined
mortgage amount should be relevant for a borrower’s decision to default the fact that
second mortgages are unobserved is a problem for empirical work. This is a particular
concern for structural models because of the strong role that theoretical approaches
place on negative equity. In order to mitigate this data problem I thus focus on ﬁrst
mortgages with a very high LTV because these borrowers should be least likely to have
a second mortgage on their home. However I also investigate whether and how the
conclusions of the paper generalize to loans with a LTV of the ﬁrst mortgage between
75% and 84% in section 1.9.
The data set contains aggregate information on contract characteristics by month of
origination like the mortgage rate or credit scores. Furthermore, aggregate statistics
on payment behavior are observed each month and broken down by the age of the
loan. This allows tracking the payment behavior of diﬀerent cohorts of loans (deﬁned
by month of origination) over time. Speciﬁcally, each of these cells (deﬁned by time
period and loan age) contains how many active loans are delinquent or in foreclosure
and how many are terminated through foreclosure or prepayment. Following much of
the recent empirical literature cited in the introduction, I deﬁne a loan to be in default
when it is 60 days or more past due, i.e. two payments have been missed. Accordingly,
cumulative default rates for a loan cohort are constructed as the share of active loans
that are 60 days or more delinquent or in foreclosure times the share of initial loans
that are still active plus the share of initial loans where foreclosure has already been
completed.
1.2.2 House Prices
Information on house prices comes from the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).
The monthly national and census division level repeat-purchase house price indices be-
tween 1991 and 2010 deﬂated by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) are used as measures
of aggregate real house price movements. Estimates of the moments of the microeco-
nomic house price distribution within a census division around the respective aggregate
4Elul, Souleles, Chomsisengphet, Glennon, and Hunt (2010) provide evidence that second mortgages
are frequent and signiﬁcantly aﬀect the combined loan-to-value ratio. They report that on average
26% of all borrowers have a second mortgage and this adds on average 15% to the combined LTV.
Unfortunately, they do not report a break-down of these statistics by the LTV of the ﬁrst mortgage.
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trend are used to generate a realistic house price distribution in the simulation. This
is important because otherwise theoretical models cannot explain any default during
times of positive aggregate house price growth.
Throughout the paper the evolution of the real house price 푃푖푡 of an individual house
푖 in period 푡 is modeled as
ln(푃푖푡) = ln(푃푖,푡−1) + 푔
푎푔푔
푡 + 푔
푖푛푑
푖푡 (1.1)
where the house price growth rate has two components, an aggregate component 푔푎푔푔푡
that is common to all houses and an individual component 푔푖푛푑푖푡 speciﬁc to the individual
house. Such a formulation is consistent with the approach used by the FHFA to
estimate the house price index, cf. the description in Calhoun (1996).5 The general
aim is to base the simulation framework for house prices as directly as possible on the
empirical procedures and estimates of the FHFA.
In equation (1.1) a census division index was suppressed for convenience. But the
aggregate trend represented by 푔푎푔푔푡 and the moments of 푔
푖푛푑
푖푡 are in fact speciﬁc to
the census division in which the house is located. Thus, this paper uses data at the
census division level and information on the regional composition of loan cohorts in
the mortgage data. When drawing house prices the simulation draws are allocated
across census divisions such that in each cohort the simulated sample has the same
regional composition as in the mortgage data. The aggregate component 푔푎푔푔푡 represents
the growth rate of the census division real house price index. In the simulation this
component is taken directly from the data.
The individual component 푔푖푛푑푖푡 is unobserved. But the FHFA provides estimates of the
variance that are used to simulate a realistic microeconomic house price distribution.
Speciﬁcally, it is assumed that the individual component 푔푖푛푑푖푡 is independent over time
and individuals and normally distributed with mean zero and variance 푉푡. The variance
of 푔푖푛푑푖푡 depends on the time since the house was bought. This is a realistic feature of
the data and based on estimates of the FHFA. Using my own notation, cf. footnote 5,
5I use a slightly diﬀerent notation relative to the FHFA because I want to use this equation in a
dynamic optimization problem and simulations. In order to see how it is related, rewrite equation
(1.1) as
ln(푃푖푡) = ln(푃푖,0) +
푡∑
휏=1
푔푎푔푔휏 +
푡∑
휏=1
푔푖푛푑푖휏
where ln(푃푖,0) +
∑푡
휏=1 푔
푎푔푔
휏 = 훽푡 +푁푖 and
∑푡
휏=1 푔
푖푛푑
푖휏 = 퐻푖푡 give equation (1) in Calhoun (1996).
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the FHFA speciﬁes a quadratic formula in time for the variance of the total individual
part of the house price change since purchase given by
Var
(
푡∑
휏=1
푔푖푛푑푖휏
)
=
휅
3
푡 +
휆
9
푡2. (1.2)
where an adjustment has been made for the fact that this paper operates at a monthly
instead of a quarterly frequency. By the independence assumption the variance of 푔푖푛푑푖푡
is then given by
푉푡 = Var
(
푔푖푛푑푖푡
)
= Var
(
푡∑
휏=1
푔푖푛푑푖휏
)
− Var
(
푡−1∑
휏=1
푔푖푛푑푖휏
)
=
휅
3
+
휆
9
(2푡− 1).
The FHFA provides estimates of 휅 and 휆 at the census division level that I use to gen-
erate realistic distributions around the division level aggregate trends. The estimates
of 휅 are positive and those of 휆 are negative and small in absolute magnitude. This
implies that the variance of
∑푡
휏=1 푔
푖푛푑
푖휏 increases less than linearly with time and the
variance of a single 푔푖푛푑푖푡 is decreasing over time. On average across census divisions
the estimates of 휅 and 휆 imply that the shock in the ﬁrst month 푔푖푛푑푖1 has a standard
deviation of about 2.49%, while after ﬁve years the standard deviation of 푔푖푛푑푖60 is around
2.37%. Hence the standard deviation of 푔푖푛푑푖푡 decreases relatively slowly over time.
1.2.3 Empirical Facts on Default Rates and House Prices
The key empirical facts on mortgage default rates and house prices are presented in
ﬁgure 1.1. Figure 1.1(a) shows the average cumulative default rates for loan cohorts
originated between 2002 and 2008 grouped by the year of origination in my data set.
The data show clearly that loan cohorts originated later during this period defaulted
much more frequently at the same time since origination. This increase constitutes
part of the US mortgage default crisis and shows that the rise in default rates was in
no way restricted to the subprime market and adjustable rate or hybrid mortgages.
Figure 1.1(b) presents the mean real house price paths (normalized to 100 at origina-
tion) for the cohorts of loans originated between 2002 and 2008. Borrowers of loans
originated between 2002 and 2005 experienced on average rising real house prices dur-
ing the immediate time after origination and falling house prices later during the course
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Figure 1.1: Cumulative Default Rates and House Prices for Diﬀerent Origination Years
(a) Cumulative Default Rates
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(b) Mean Real House Price Paths
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of the loan. In contrast, the real value of a home of a borrower who took out a mortgage
between 2006 and 2008 decreased sharply immediately after origination.
The key research questions of the paper are motivated by the facts in ﬁgure 1.1. Can the
variation in house price paths quantitatively explain the variation in mortgage default
rates across cohorts within a structural economic model? What features should such
an empirically successful model have? Does this variation allow discrimination between
diﬀerent theoretical models of mortgage default?
1.3 Reduced Form Models
This section presents evidence on mortgage default from estimating and simulating
two highly stylized models. But these models are motivated by economic theory and
represent the simplest possible reduced forms of a frictionless option-theoretic model
and the double-trigger hypothesis. The aim is to discriminate between these diﬀerent
theories in a relatively general way that is independent of the exact speciﬁcation of
the respective structural model. Building on these results the following section then
develops a structural economic model that has hope to be empirically successful.
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1.3.1 Model Setup
The paper considers individual borrowers who took out a ﬁxed-rate 30-years mortgage.
Each loan cohort deﬁned by origination date consists of many borrowers who are in-
dexed by 푖 = 1, . . . , 푁 and observed in periods 푡 = 1, . . . , 푇 after loan origination.
Borrowers take a single decision each period and can either service the mortgage or
default on the loan and “walk away” from the house. Denote the default decision of an
individual borrower 푖 in month 푡 after origination by a set of dummy variables 푑푖푡. The
variables 푑푖푡 take the value 1 once the borrower has defaulted, and the value 0 in all
periods prior to default. Thus it is suﬃcient to present default decision rules in period
푡 for situations when the borrower has not defaulted yet.
The next two sections present the two models, the “threshold” and “shock” model.
Both models view negative equity as a necessary, but not suﬃcient, condition for
default. The individual decision rules in the two models diﬀer in how default exactly
depends on house equity, and hence the house price and the mortgage balance.
For a ﬁxed-rate mortgage the nominal mortgage balance 푀푖푡 of borrower 푖 evolves
deterministically over time according to
푀푖,푡+1 = (1 + 푟
푚)푀푖푡 −푚푖 (1.3)
where 푟푚 is the monthly mortgage rate which is constant across individuals. 푚푖 are
ﬁxed nominal monthly payments covering mortgage interest and principal. These pay-
ments are determined at the beginning of the contract and satisfy
푚푖 =
[
푇∑
푡=1
1
(1 + 푟푚)푡
]−1
푀푖0 (1.4)
where 푀푖0 is the initial loan amount and the loan has a maturity of 푇 = 360 months.
The initial loan amount is a function of the initial loan to value ratio 퐿푇푉푖 and initial
house price 푃푖0 and given by 푀푖0 = 퐿푇푉푖×푃푖0. Here borrowers are heterogenous with
respect to the LTV. It is assumed that agents take decisions based on real variables.
Thus it is useful to deﬁne the real mortgage balance as 푀 푟푒푎푙푖푡 =
푀푖푡
Π푡
where Π푡 is the
CPI and Π0 = 1. This assumption does not aﬀect the results and the conclusions are
identical when decisions are based on nominal variables.
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The real house price 푃푖푡 of an individual homeowner evolves according to equation
(1.1). House price growth has an aggregate and individual component as described
in section 1.2.2. 푃푖0 is normalized to 100. This involves no loss of generality as seen
below.
Due to the simplicity of the presented models I also add the constraint that default
is only allowed from the fourth month since origination onwards. This is completely
ad-hoc, but provides a better ﬁt of both models to the data in the early periods after
origination when default rates are essentially zero. But the comparison across models
and the conclusions drawn below do not depend on this assumption.
1.3.2 The Threshold Model
The ﬁrst model assumes that borrowers with negative equity default on their mortgage
at the ﬁrst time that the real value of equity falls below a certain threshold value.
Therefore I call this the “threshold model”. Here, I adopt the simplest possible spec-
iﬁcation with a threshold that is proportional to the initial house price and constant
over time given by 휙푃푖0 where 휙 < 0. If in period 푡 ≥ 4 the borrower has not defaulted
yet then the default decision in that period is described by
푑푖푡 =
{
1, if 푃푖푡 −푀
푟푒푎푙
푖푡 < 휙푃푖0
0, otherwise
(1.5)
This is a simple reduced-form of a frictionless option model. The corresponding struc-
tural model would derive the threshold parameter 휙 from optimizing behavior. For
example the borrower might trade oﬀ the expected future capital gains on the house
for the mortgage payments in excess of rents. Here I remain agnostic about the exact
trade-oﬀ and the value of 휙 and instead estimate it from the data.
1.3.3 The Shock Model
The second model assumes that borrowers with any level of negative equity only default
on their mortgage when they also receive a default shock in that period. I call this the
“shock model”. Again I adopt the simplest possible speciﬁcation. The probability to
receive a default shock 휓 is constant and satisﬁes 0 ≤ 휓 ≤ 1 and default shocks are
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independently and identically distributed over time. If the borrower has not defaulted
yet, the default decision in period 푡 ≥ 4 is determined by
푑푖푡 =
{
1, if 푃푖푡 −푀
푟푒푎푙
푖푡 < 0 and the default shock occurs
0, otherwise
(1.6)
This is a reduced-form of a double-trigger model. Here the default shock represents the
life event like unemployment or divorce that combined with negative equity triggers
default. The parameter 휓 represents the probability that the life event occurs. Again
휓 needs to be estimated from the data.
1.3.4 Model Simulation, Estimation and Test
Conditional on the respective model parameters 휙 and 휓 both models can be simulated
for subsequent cohorts of loans originated each year between 2002 and 2008. For
each cohort I draw 100, 000 individual histories of house prices and default shocks
with the same length in months as the respective cohort is observed in the data.6
When computing the mortgage balance the mortgage rate is kept constant within a
cohort and set equal to the respective cohort average. But borrowers within a cohort
are heterogenous with respect to the LTV which varies in steps of one percentage
point between 95% and 104%.7 The frequency of these diﬀerent loan-to-value ratios at
origination is varied across cohorts as observed in the mortgage data. This means that
possible changes to the average mortgage rate and the LTV distribution across cohorts
are taken into account in the simulation. Data on the path of inﬂation rates from the
CPI is used to compute the real mortgage balance. The decision rules are then applied
to these shock histories and paths of the real mortgage balance.
The idea of the test procedure is to use only the default data of the cohort originated
in 2002 to estimate the unknown parameters 휙 and 휓. The test of the models is then
based on out-of-sample predictions. Conditional on the parameter values estimated
from the 2002 cohort, default rates for the cohorts 2003 to 2008 are simulated from the
6The simulation procedure for individual house prices is explained in detail in section 1.2.2. For the
shock model I also draw histories from an i.i.d. uniform distribution on the interval [0, 1]. For a
given parameter 휓 the default shock occurs for the respective individual and month if the uniform
draw is smaller or equal to 휓.
7The few loans with a LTV above 104% are subsumed under the 104% LTV group.
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models. The test constitutes in comparing simulated and empirically observed default
rates and checking which estimated model gives a better ﬁt to the data.8
The model parameters are estimated by a simulated method of moments procedure.
Let 휃 stand in for the parameter to be estimated in the respective model. The idea
of the estimation is to choose 휃 such that the cumulative default rates for the 2002
cohort simulated from the model match as well as possible those observed in the data.
Collect the variables 푑푖푡 in one vector 퐷푖 = [푑푖1, . . . , 푑푖푇 ]
′ for each individual. The
mean of this vector 퐷 = 1
푁
∑푁
푖=1퐷푖 represents the empirically observed cumulative
default rate. The expected value of 퐷푖 is 퐸[퐷푖] = 퐷(휃) and denote the expected value
evaluated by simulation of 푆 individuals from the model by 퐷˜(휃). The deviation of
the model from the data is then given by 퐺(휃) = 퐷 − 퐷˜(휃). The simulated method
of moment estimator of 휃 minimizes 퐺(휃)′푊퐺(휃) where 푊 is a weighting matrix. I
weight all moments equally by using an identity matrix as the weighting matrix. 휃 is
then estimated by minimizing a least squares criterion function given by
1
푇
푇∑
푡=1
(
푑푡 − 푑˜푡(휃)
)2
(1.7)
where 푑푡 and 푑˜푡(휃) are the 푡-th element in the vectors 퐷 and 퐷˜(휃), respectively. Here
푑˜푡(휃) is evaluated using a frequency simulator such that 푑˜푡(휃) =
1
푆
∑푆
푗=1 푑˜푗푡(휃) and
푑˜푗푡(휃) represents the outcome for period 푡 of applying the decision rules to the drawn
history 푗 of the underlying shocks. The minimization problem is solved by a grid search
algorithm.
1.3.5 Results
For the threshold model the negative equity default threshold 휙 is estimated as −11.0%.
This means borrowers default as soon as they have a real value of negative equity of
11% of the initial house price. In contrast, for the shock model the default shock
probability 휓 is estimated to be 1.3% such that each period 1.3% of those borrowers
with negative equity default on their loan. The ﬁt of the two models to the cumulative
8I use a formal estimation approach to derive point estimates of the two model parameters as ex-
plained in the next paragraph. But the testing procedure I adopt is relatively informal. Neither
do I compute standard errors for the estimated parameters, nor conﬁdence bands for the model
predictions due to parameter uncertainty. I also do not provide a formal test statistic to evaluate
the diﬀerent models. This is an interesting and important area to improve the paper in a future
revision.
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default rate of the 2002 cohort is shown in ﬁgure 1.2. Both models are able to ﬁt this
data very well.
Figure 1.2: Cumulative Default Rate for 2002 Cohort: Models vs. Data
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The next step is to test the two estimated models by checking how well they perform
in predicting out-of-sample. Figure 1.3(a) shows the ﬁt of the threshold model to the
full sample of all cohorts between 2002 and 2008. The equivalent ﬁt of the shock
model is presented in ﬁgure 1.3(b). It turns out that the threshold model has severe
empirical problems. When it is forced to match default rates of the 2002 cohort, it
over-predicts default rates for the later cohorts in the simulation period by at least one
order of magnitude. The threshold model is excessively sensitive to the shifts in the
mean of the house price distribution observed in the data. In contrast, the shock model
gives a very good ﬁt to the broad dynamics in the data. However, the shock model
predicts too few defaults especially for the 2004 cohort and to some extent also for the
2003 and 2005 cohorts. This could imply that these cohorts were in fact composed of
somewhat more risky borrowers though they appear to be similar based on observed
characteristics discussed later in section 1.7.
The explanation for the diﬀerence between models is the following. The shock model
predicts that a fraction 휓 of borrowers with negative equity default each period. When
the whole equity distribution shifts left due to the fall in aggregate house prices, the
shock model predicts that the default rate should increase in proportion to the number
of borrowers who experience negative equity. It turns out that observed default rates
exhibit this pattern. But the threshold model is concerned with the (far left) tail of
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Figure 1.3: Cumulative Default Rates for Loans originated in 2002-2008: Models vs.
Data
(a) Threshold Model
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(b) Shock Model
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the equity distribution. It predicts that all borrowers with an extreme level of negative
equity below 휙 times the initial house price default. When the equity distribution shifts
left the number of borrowers with such an extreme level of negative equity increases
faster than the observed default rate. This generates the inconsistency with the data.
Two conclusions can be drawn from these results. First, an empirically successful
structural model cannot rely on a single-trigger or negative equity threshold mechanism
alone. Instead some shocks other than house price shocks must play a role. Second, in
a double-trigger model the increase in the fraction of borrowers with negative equity
caused by the mean shift in house prices is suﬃcient to explain the broad rise in default
rates. Together with the evidence on the stability of loan characteristics presented
in section 1.7 this supports a hypothesis featuring a strong explanatory role of the
macroeconomic house price movements for the rise in default rates and against the
pool of borrowers becoming more risky per se.
Motivated by these results, the next main section presents a structural model fea-
turing idiosyncratic unemployment risk and liquidity constraints. This serves several
purposes. First, the model aims at providing micro-foundations for the double trigger
hypothesis. This means to provide conditions under which a rational agent exhibits
double-trigger default behavior. Second, it allows a check of whether unemployment
shocks can quantitatively play the role of the trigger events. One can also check
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whether the strong explanatory role of aggregate house prices survives in such a struc-
tural framework. Third, such a model can be used for policy analysis.
1.3.6 Robustness Checks
This section reports a battery of robustness checks that were performed to scrutinize
these results. I ﬁnd that the results are robust across all the modiﬁcations considered
here. Graphs equivalent to ﬁgure 1.3 for each of the performed scenarios are available
upon request.
Instead of estimating the models on the 2002 cohort with low default rates, I also
estimate them on the 2008 cohort with very high default rates. This does not aﬀect
the good ﬁt of the shock model. But now the threshold model greatly undershoots the
default rates of early cohorts and also still overshoots the 2006 and 2007 cohort. Thus
the comparison across models is unaﬀected.
Another robustness check replaces the out-of-sample test with an in-sample test. Here
I estimate the two models on all cohorts and then examine the ﬁt within that sample.
The threshold model still has considerable problems to match the data. It generally
undershoots earlier cohorts and the early months after origination for all cohorts and
at the same time still overshoots the late months of the 2006 and 2007 cohorts. In
contrast, the shock model gives an excellent ﬁt to the data. The conclusions across
models are essentially unchanged.
I also examine the role of the variation in mortgage rates and the distribution of loan-to-
value ratios across cohorts in three alternative speciﬁcations. In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation,
I keep the within cohort LTV distribution ﬁxed across cohorts according to the average
frequency. The second speciﬁcation abstracts from within cohort heterogeneity such
that everyone has the same LTV according to the respective within cohort average. The
third speciﬁcation is the same as the second except that the LTV and mortgage rate are
not varied across cohorts. All these changes have very modest eﬀects on both models
and leave the conclusions across models unaﬀected. This implies that the double-
trigger model attributes the rise in default rates to the variation in aggregate house
prices and not the changes in contract characteristics across cohorts. It also suggests
that abstracting from this heterogeneity across cohorts in the structural model is not
too restrictive.
30
In section 1.2.2 it was assumed that the individual house price shocks are normally
distributed. The major argument supporting this choice is that by the central limit
theorem the sum of individual shocks converges asymptotically to a normal distribution
anyway. But since the analysis also covers periods where 푡 is still small, I perform an
additional check here. Instead of using a normal distribution for the individual shocks
I specify them as being uniformly distributed on the interval [−푏푡, 푏푡]. The parameter
푏푡 is then chosen such that the variance of the uniformly distributed shock in period 푡
in the respective census division is identical to the one used in the standard framework.
I ﬁnd that the results are almost identical.
Another potential concern is that the simplicity of the presented reduced-form models
with only one constant parameter somehow biased the results against the frictionless
option model. There is also no strong reason why the default threshold parameter
휙 and default shock probability 휓 should be constant over the course of a loan. It
turns out that the results are robust to changing this assumption. As a check I have
performed a scenario where the respective default parameter depends fully on the
month since origination 푡. The constant parameters in the model are then replaced
with 휙푡 and 휓푡 that are allowed to diﬀer each period from 푡 = 1, . . . , 푇 when ﬁtting the
models to the 2002 cohort. Under these circumstances both models use all degrees of
freedom of the data and perfectly match the 2002 cohort. The cumulative default rates
simulated for the other cohorts then inherit the non-smoothness of the ﬁrst diﬀerences
of the cumulative default rate of the 2002 cohort. But subject to that qualiﬁcation
the conclusions on the out-of-sample ﬁt remain essentially unchanged. The threshold
model still greatly overshoots. The shock model generates default rates of the right
magnitude, but predicts slightly lower default rates for some months compared to the
benchmark speciﬁcation.
1.4 Structural Model
This section introduces a theoretical model of the repayment decision of a homeowner
who ﬁnanced the home purchase with a ﬁxed-rate mortgage. Each period the borrower
chooses non-housing consumption and whether to stay in the house and service the
mortgage or leave the house and terminate the mortgage. The mortgage can be termi-
nated either by selling the house and repaying the mortgage or defaulting on the loan
by ”walking away”. The homeowner faces uncertainty on the future price of the house,
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unemployment shocks and a borrowing constraint for unsecured credit. One period
corresponds to one month. Throughout this section an individual index 푖 is suppressed
for convenience.
1.4.1 Mortgage Contract
The household took out a ﬁxed rate mortgage with outstanding nominal balance 푀0
and nominal mortgage rate 푟푚 to ﬁnance the purchase of a house of price 푃0 in period 0.
Mortgage interest and principal have to be repaid over 푇 periods in equal instalments
of nominal value 푚 that are ﬁxed at the beginning of the contract and satisfy equation
(1.4). Over time the outstanding nominal mortgage balance 푀푡 evolves according to
equation (1.3) as long as the household services the mortgage.
1.4.2 Preferences and Choices
Preferences are speciﬁed as in Campbell and Cocco (2003), but allow for a direct utility
beneﬁt of owning a house. Household decisions over the length of the mortgage contract
are determined by maximizing expected utility given by
푈 = E0
푇∑
푡=1
훽푡−1
(
퐶1−훾푡
1− 훾
+ 휃ℐ(표푤푛푡)
)
+ 훽푇
푊 1−훾푇+1
1− 훾
(1.8)
which is derived from consumption 퐶푡 in periods 1 to 푇 and remaining wealth 푊푇+1
at the end of the contract. The ﬂow utility function is assumed to be of the CRRA
form where 훾 denotes the parameter of relative risk aversion and the inverse of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. 훽 is the time discount factor. ℐ(표푤푛푡) is an
indicator variable that is one if the agent owns a home in period 푡 and zero otherwise.
휃 is a direct utility beneﬁt from being a homeowner. This could reﬂect for example
an emotional attachment to the house or the beneﬁt that an owner cannot be asked
to move out by a landlord as may happen to a renter. The speciﬁcation of the utility
function implicitly assumes that consumption and the size of the house are separable
in the homeowner’s utility function.9
9Following Campbell and Cocco (2003), the speciﬁcation in equation (1.8) implicitly assumes that the
borrower maximizes utility only over the course of the mortgage contract because the continuation
value is largely arbitrary. Ideally the model should be extended to the full life-cycle and include a
period after the end of the mortgage contract. This will be implemented in a future revision.
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In each period the homeowner has to decide how much to consume and on staying
or leaving the house. If the agent wants to leave this can be done by either selling
the house (and repaying the current mortgage balance) or defaulting on the loan by
”walking away”.10 It is assumed that a homeowner who leaves the house will rent a
house of the same size for the rest of life.
1.4.3 Constraints
The dynamic budget constraint depends on the borrower’s house tenure choice. For a
homeowner who stays in the house it is given by
퐴푡+1 = (1 + 푟)(퐴푡 + 푌푡 −
푚
Π푡
+ 휏푟푚
푀푡
Π푡
− 퐶푡) (1.9)
where 퐴푡 denotes real asset holdings and 푌푡 real net labor income in period 푡. The
real interest rate on savings 푟 is assumed to be constant over time. 푚 is the nominal
payment to service the mortgage. But the nominal mortgage interest 푟푚푀푡 is tax
deductable and 휏 is the tax rate. All nominal variables need to be deﬂated by the
current price level for consumption goods Π푡 to arrive at a budget constraint in terms
of real variables. The presence of Π푡 generates the “mortgage tilt eﬀect”. This means
that due to inﬂation the real burden of the mortgage is highest at the beginning of the
contract and then declines over time. It is assumed that the inﬂation rate 휋 is constant
over time and Π푡 thus evolves according to Π푡+1 = (1 + 휋)Π푡.
In case the house is sold at the current real price 푃푡, the homeowner needs to repay
the current outstanding nominal mortgage balance 푀푡 and can pocket the rest. The
budget constraint then reads as
퐴푡+1 = (1 + 푟)(퐴푡 + 푌푡 − 푅 + 푃푡 −
푀푡
Π푡
− 퐶푡). (1.10)
Here 푅 is the real rent for a property of the same size. It is assumed that an agent
who terminates the mortgage through prepayment or default needs to rent for the rest
of life.11 Real rents are assumed to be proportional to the initial house price and then
10The model does not include a mortgage termination through reﬁnancing for computational reasons.
Otherwise the mortgage balance becomes a separate state variable. This is unlikely to be a major
limitation because reﬁnancing is only feasible when the borrower has positive equity in the house.
Thus it does not directly compete with the default decision in a negative equity situation.
11Thus a change of housing status from owning to renting is irreversible. This assumption simpliﬁes
the computational solution of the model, but could also be a potential limitation. The assumption
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constant over time as
푅 = 훼푃0. (1.11)
This speciﬁcation involves both a highly realistic feature of rents and an approximation.
The realistic feature is that during the period of study real rents remained almost
constant, while real house prices ﬁrst increased and then decreased enormously. The
speciﬁcation implies that after origination the rent-price ratio decreases when real
house prices increase. Such a negative relationship between the rent-price ratio and
real house prices exists in the data provided by Davis, Lehnert, and Martin (2008)
not only during the recent period, but at least since 1975. In this paper I take these
observations as given and specify the exogenous variables of the model accordingly. But
explaining this pattern is an important area for future research. However a fully realistic
speciﬁcation would also require to make 훼 cohort-speciﬁc. But I use an approximation
for computational reasons such that 훼 is constant across cohorts and calibrated to a
suitable average.
In contrast, if the agent decides to default on the mortgage by ”walking away” or is
already a renter the budget constraint is given by
퐴푡+1 = (1 + 푟)(퐴푡 + 푌푡 −푅− 퐶푡). (1.12)
It is assumed that for reasons not explicitly modeled here the household faces a bor-
rowing constraint for unsecured credit given by
퐴푡+1 ≥ 0. (1.13)
Together with the budget constraints above this implies that the amount of resources
available for consumption in a period depend on the house tenure choice.
Remaining wealth at the end of the contract for a homeowner is given by 푊푇+1 =
퐴푇+1 + 푌푇+1 + 푃푇+1 and for a renter by 푊푇+1 = 퐴푇+1 + 푌푇+1.
that after selling or defaulting the household rents a property of the same size is also a possible
limitation. This prevents downsizing of the house after a default which could play an important
role in the default decision of borrowers in the real world. However I have also experimented with
a ﬁxed and exogenous downsizing factor after mortgage termination and this left the explanatory
power of the model largely unchanged or even improved it a bit.
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1.4.4 Labor Income Process
The household’s real net labor income 푌푡 is subject to idiosyncratic unemployment
shocks and exogenously given by
푌푡 =
⎧⎨⎩(1− 휏)푌0 if employed휌(1− 휏)푌0 if unemployed (1.14)
where 푌0 is initial real gross income, 휏 is the tax rate and 휌 is the net replacement
rate of unemployment insurance. Over time employment status evolves according to
a Markov transition process with the two states “employed” and “unemployed” and
constant job separation and ﬁnding probabilities. Employed agents lose their job with
probability 푠 and stay employed with probability (1 − 푠). Unemployed agents ﬁnd a
job with probability 푓 and stay unemployed with probability (1− 푓).
There are several reasons why I focus on income ﬂuctuations due to unemployment risk
here. First, unemployment involves a severe fall in labor income from one month to
another. This makes it a very plausible cause for short run liquidity problems. Second,
other frequently used speciﬁcations of income processes as for example in Campbell
and Cocco (2003) are typically calibrated for yearly frequencies. Thus, they are not
directly applicable to a monthly framework. In any case, most of the income variation
from month to month probably comes from unemployment spells and it therefore seems
preferable to use such a process explicitly. Third, this allows the model to be related
more closely to the double-trigger hypothesis and the empirical literature that has
provided evidence that default is correlated with state unemployment rates.
I also abstract from deterministic changes to labor income like a life-cycle proﬁle and
keep the labor income of employed and unemployed agents constant over time. The
reason is that I do not have any demographic information on the borrowers in my data
set.
1.4.5 House Price Process
Real house prices are exogenous and evolve over time as speciﬁed in section 1.2.2
and equation (1.1). It is assumed that homeowners view the aggregate component
푔푎푔푔푡 of house price appreciation to be stochastic and distributed according to an i.i.d.
normal distribution with mean 휇 and variance 휎2. This process for the aggregate house
35
price component is only used for forming agents’ expectations. In the simulation the
realizations of 푔푎푔푔푡 are those observed in the data. For the individual component agents
know that 푔푖푛푑푡 is distributed normally with mean zero and time-varying variances that
depend on the parameters 휅 and 휆 as speciﬁed in section 1.2.2. In order to reduce the
computational burden when computing policy functions the parameters 휇, 휎, 휅 and 휆
are not varied across the nine census divisions. Instead they are set equal to national
averages, cf. section 1.5.2 on the calibration. But the realizations in the simulation of
the model of course come from the division speciﬁc data and distributions.
1.4.6 Initial Conditions
The homeowner solves the dynamic stochastic optimization problem conditional on ini-
tial asset holdings 퐴0, initial employment status, an initial loan-to-value ratio 퐿푇푉 =
푀0
푃0
and a debt to (gross) income ratio 퐷푇퐼 = 푚
푌0
.12 The initial house price 푃0 is
normalized to 100. 퐿푇푉 and 퐷푇퐼 then uniquely determine 푀0 and 푌0.
1.4.7 Computation
The borrower’s optimization problem is characterized by four state variables (liquid
wealth 푋푡 = 퐴푡 + 푌푡, employment status 퐿푡, house price 푃푡 and time 푡) and two
choice variables (consumption 퐶푡 and the mortgage termination choice). Note that
for a ﬁxed-rate mortgage the mortgage balance 푀푡 evolves deterministically over time
and is thus captured by the state variable 푡. The solution proceeds backwards in time.
The continuous state and control variables are discretized and the utility maximization
problem in each period is solved by grid search. Expected values of future variables are
computed by Gaussian Quadrature. Between grid points the value function is evaluated
using cubic interpolation.
1.4.8 Model Simulation
The model presented above is a dynamic stochastic partial-equilibrium model that
maps contract characteristics at origination and realizations of the stochastic processes
12The name debt to income ratio is part of standard mortgage terminology, but can be easily misun-
derstood. It means the ratio of the monthly mortgage payment to gross income.
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for house prices and employment status into default decisions. I simulate the model for
subsequent cohorts of loans originated each month between January 2002 and December
2008 from the respective origination month until June 2010. For each cohort I draw
20, 000 individual house price and employment histories with the same length in months
as the respective cohort is observed in the data. House price histories are drawn
as explained in section 1.2.2 and employment histories are drawn from the two-state
Markov process speciﬁed in section 1.4.4.
Accordingly, within a cohort borrowers face the same aggregate house price movements
(except for the diﬀerences between census divisions), but diﬀerent individual house
price and employment shocks. Diﬀerences between cohorts are generated from diﬀerent
paths of aggregate house prices depending on the date of origination.
1.5 Parametrization
The structural model is parameterized in two steps. First the mortgage contract, house
price expectations, rents, labor income, interest and inﬂation rates are calibrated to
data on the respective variables, i.e. to data other than default rates. Then due to
identiﬁcation concerns the preference parameters are divided into a set that is calibrated
ad-hoc and another that is estimated such that the model ﬁts the cumulative default
rates of the 2002 loan cohort. All parameter values are summarized in table 1.1 below.
The model is solved at a monthly frequency. But a few parameters are presented at
their yearly values if it is more convenient for comparison.
1.5.1 Contract Characteristics
This paper restricts attention to 30-years (푇 = 360 months) ﬁxed-rate mortgages. I
use average characteristics at origination of the loans in my data set to determine
the loan-to-value ratio, mortgage rate and debt-to-income ratio. The average initial
loan-to-value ratio of these loans is 98.2%, so I set 퐿푇푉 = 98.2% . The nominal
mortgage rate 푟푚 is set to 6.4% per annum which is the average mortgage rate for
newly originated loans in my data set. The debt-to-income ratio 퐷푇퐼 is set to 40% as
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in the data.13 Naturally, all of these parameters could be changed in order to model
diﬀerent mortgage contracts.
1.5.2 House Price Expectations
As explained before, when computing policy functions the parameters 휇, 휎, 휅 and
휆 are not varied across the nine census divisions. Instead they are set according to
national averages in order to reduce the computational burden. The monthly house
price index from the FHFA at the national level between 1991 and 2010 deﬂated by
the Consumer Price Index (CPI) is used to estimate the parameters 휇 and 휎 of the
aggregate component. I ﬁnd that at a monthly frequency 휇 = 0.065% and 휎 = 0.55%.
These values imply expected yearly aggregate real house price growth of 0.8% and
a yearly standard deviation of 1.9%. This calibration procedure implies that agents
in the model have expectations on real aggregate house price growth that on average
were correct in the years 1991 to 2010 as far as the mean and standard deviation are
concerned.
The parameters 휅 and 휆 are determined as a simple average of the ones estimated by the
FHFA for each of the nine census divisions. This gives 휅 = 0.00187 and 휆 = −4.51퐸−6
and implies that the individual house price growth shock 푔푖푛푑푖푡 in the ﬁrst month after
house purchase is expected to have a standard deviation around 2.5%.
1.5.3 Income Process
The average tax rate 휏 is set to 16% and the net replacement rate of unemployment
insurance 휌 to 62%. This is based on the OECD Tax-Beneﬁt calculator for the United
States. Speciﬁcally, the average loan amount, mortgage rate and debt-to-income ratio
are used to determine the average gross income of the borrowers in the data set. Based
on gross income the calculator reports the net income in work and out of work which
13The data on the DTI is the only mortgage variable in the whole paper that is based on a somewhat
diﬀerent loan selection. The reason is that the DTI was not available in the tool that was used
to aggregate and extract information from the LPS loan-level data set. Instead LPS provided me
with a separate tabulation where it was not possible to use the same selection criteria. Speciﬁcally,
the DTI information is for the same LTV class as the rest of the data, but it does not only cover
prime, ﬁxed-rate, 30-years mortgages. However the vast majority of loans in the LPS data are
prime, ﬁxed-rate mortgages and the modal maturity of these loans is 30 years, so this information
should at least be a good approximation to the actual loan pool I consider.
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then determine the average tax and net replacement rates. These calculations take
taxes, social security contributions, in-work and unemployment beneﬁts into account.
Precise numbers especially for the tax rate also depend on the demographics of the
household. I have used the average values for a married couple with one earner and no
children.
Data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics on the national unemployment rate and
median unemployment duration are used to compute time-series of monthly job ﬁnding
and separation probabilities. This is done using steady state relationships. Since the
data on median unemployment duration is reported in weeks, I ﬁrst transform it to
months by multiplying the weekly value by 12/52. The resulting median duration 푑 in
months is of course in general not an integer value. Given that I operate in discrete time
I use an approximation to the relationship between median duration and the monthly
ﬁnding probability 푓 in steady state given by
(1− 푓)푑−1푓 + (푑− 푑)(1− 푓)푑푓 = 0.5 (1.15)
where 푑 is the next integer number lower than or equal to 푑. If the median duration
in months is an integer value then the second term in equation (1.15) is zero. If it is
not an integer value then the second term gives an approximation to the number of
unemployed who ﬁnd a job between month 푑 and 푑+ 1 for a given ﬁnding probability
푓 .
The steady state relationship between the unemployment rate 푢 and job ﬁnding prob-
ability 푓 and job separation probability 푠 in the ﬂows approach to unemployment is
well known and given by
푢 =
푠
푠+ 푓
. (1.16)
Equations (1.15) and (1.16) are then solved for the time-series of 푓푡 and 푠푡 implied by
the time-series of the unemployment rate 푢푡 and median duration 푑푡.
14
I then set 푠 = 1.8% and 푓 = 31% which are the average values of the computed monthly
ﬁnding and separation probabilities for the period from 1990 to 2010. These values
imply a steady state unemployment rate around 5.7%.
14As a check on this procedure I predict the unemployment rate from the dynamic equation of
unemployment 푢푡+1 = 푢푡+푠푡(1−푢푡)−푓푡푢푡 using the computed time series of ﬁnding and separation
probabilities as inputs. It turns out that this gives an excellent ﬁt to the path of the actual
unemployment rate.
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1.5.4 Other Prices
Nominal interest rates for 1-year Treasuries and changes to the Consumer Price Index
(CPI) are used to compute real interest rates and inﬂation rates. Based on this data
between 1990 and 2010 the real interest rate 푟 is set equal to 1.4% and the inﬂation
rate 휋 equal to 2.7% on an annual basis. The initial rent-price ratio parameter 훼 is set
equal to 4.0% on a yearly basis which is the average rent-price ratio between 2002 and
2008 in the data provided by Davis, Lehnert, and Martin (2008).
Table 1.1: Model Parameters
Contract Contract length in months T 360
characteristics Mortgage rate (yearly) 푟푚 6.4%
Initial loan-to-value ratio 퐿푇푉 98.2%
Initial debt-to-income ratio 퐷푇퐼 40%
House price Mean of aggregate component 휇 0.065%
process Standard deviation of aggregate component 휎 0.55%
Linear coeﬃcient in individual component 휅 0.00187
Quadratic coeﬃcient in individual component 휆 -4.51E-6
Income Job separation probability 푠 1.8%
process Job ﬁnding probability 푓 31%
Tax rate 휏 16%
Net replacement rate of unemployment insurance 휌 62%
Other Real interest rate (yearly) 푟 1.4%
prices Inﬂation rate (yearly) 휋 2.7%
Rent-price ratio (yearly) 훼 4.0%
Preferences CRRA coeﬃcient 훾 4
Discount factor (yearly) 훽 0.9
Utility beneﬁt of owning 휃 0.18
1.5.5 Initial Conditions
Initial assets and employment status are unobserved. But it seems reasonable that
borrowers were employed when they got their loan, so I assume that. With respect
to initial assets 퐴0, I use the computed policy functions to set initial assets equal to
the buﬀer-stock desired by a borrower in period 1 who is employed and faces a house
value equal to 푃0. Thus I shut down possible eﬀects from borrowers ﬁrst converging to
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their desired buﬀer-stock and being more vulnerable to income shocks during the time
immediately after origination.
1.5.6 Preferences
Ideally the three preference parameters 훽, 훾 and 휃 would all be estimated such that
the model gives the best ﬁt to the data on default rates. But it is well known that
dynamic discrete choice models are not fully identiﬁed, cf. the discussion and refer-
ences in Magnac and Thesmar (2002). Furthermore, given the complexity of the model
estimating several parameters would be computationally costly. Faced with this situ-
ation I decide to calibrate the parameters 훽 and 훾 ad-hoc and estimate only 휃. I also
investigate how much the results depend on the speciﬁc choice of 훽 and 훾.
The parameters 훽 and 훾 appear in most dynamic economic models and estimating them
is the aim of a vast empirical literature. But unfortunately these empirical studies have
not produced reliable estimates. For the discount factor 훽 on a yearly basis the survey of
Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002) shows that empirical estimates cluster
over the full range between 0 and 1. For the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
which is the inverse of 훾, Guvenen (2006) reviews empirical estimates ranging from
around 1 to 0.1, which implies values of 훾 ranging from 1 to 10.
My impression is that many economists regard values of 훽 below 1, but not too much
below 1, and values of 훾 between 1 and 4, possibly even up to 10, as reasonable. But
strong views on speciﬁc parameter values are probably not warranted given the empir-
ical evidence. The large variation in estimates could also reﬂect that preferences are
not stable across choice situations and individuals. With respect to the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution Guvenen (2006) argues that conﬂicting estimates can be rec-
onciled if the rich have a high and the poor have a low elasticity. I follow his argument
and since the average borrowers in my data set belong to the lower half of the income
distribution, I set a relatively high value of 훾 = 4. This implies an intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution of 0.25. For 훽 I choose a value of 0.9 at a yearly frequency in order
to be below, but still close to 1. Compared with assumptions in many macroeconomic
studies this might appear as a low value. But adapting Guvenen’s argument to 훽, this
does not necessarily conﬂict with other studies. The reason is that I am analyzing
a particular pool of borrowers who are not rich and were only able to make a very
small down-payment. This could be due to the fact that they are very impatient. The
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other agents in the economy who are net savers and lenders could then have a higher
discount factor more in line with the macro literature. In any case these are only the
benchmark values and I also investigate the sensitivity of the main results to these
parameter choices.
Given values of 훽 and 훾, the preference parameter 휃 representing the direct utility
beneﬁt from owning the house is estimated by the simulated method of moments. The
procedure is identical to the one used earlier for the reduced-form models, cf. section
1.3.4. Again the parameter is chosen such that cumulative default rates simulated
from the model match those observed in the data using only information from loans
originated in 2002. This yields an estimated value for 휃 of 0.18. The remaining data is
used to test the ability of the estimated model to predict out of sample.
1.6 Results
This section explains the repayment policy function of a homeowner and the basic
mechanism generating default over the life-cycle of a loan in the model. Then the
main results how well the model ﬁts the rise in default rates across loan cohorts are
presented. Finally, a sensitivity analysis explores how the model depends on certain
preference parameters.
1.6.1 The Repayment Policy Function
The repayment policy function of a borrower in the model is presented in ﬁgure 1.4 as
a function of house equity, liquid wealth, employment status and time. Several features
are noteworthy. First, negative equity is a necessary condition for default. Instead,
with positive equity selling is strictly preferred to defaulting because the borrower is
the residual claimant of the house value after the mortgage balance has been repaid.
Second, negative equity is not suﬃcient for default. There are many combinations
of state variables where a borrower with negative equity prefers to stay in the house
and service the mortgage. In a negative equity situation the basic trade-oﬀ of the
borrower is the following (postponing the role of the borrowing constraint until the
next paragraph). The cost of staying in the house is that the borrower needs to make
the mortgage payment, which is higher than the rent for an equivalent property. The
42
Figure 1.4: Repayment Policy Function
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(b) Unemployed in 푡 = 1
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(c) Employed in 푡 = 20
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(d) Unemployed in 푡 = 20
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Notes : Repayment choice as a function of the state variables liquid wealth, house equity, employ-
ment status and time. Blue region: Default. Green region: Sell. Red region: Stay.
beneﬁt of staying is that the borrower receives the utility beneﬁt of owning a house
and keeps the option to default, sell or stay later. Speciﬁcally, there are possible future
states of the world with positive equity. But the probability of reaching these states
depends on the current house price. This establishes a default threshold level of the
house price. Of course, when making this decision the rational borrower will also need
to discount these future gains and take risk aversion into account.
Third and importantly, the level of negative equity at which the borrower exercises the
default option depends on non-housing state variables: liquid wealth and employment
status. Speciﬁcally, a borrower who is unemployed and/or has low liquid wealth will
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default at lower levels of negative equity. There are two reasons for terminating the
mortgage in these states. One is that current borrowing constraints may bind and the
borrower terminates the mortgage to increase current consumption. The other reason is
that in these states it becomes very likely that borrowing constraints bind in the future
and the agent is forced to terminate the mortgage then. But an anticipated future
mortgage default creates an incentive to default already today to save the diﬀerence
between the mortgage payment and the rent in the meantime. This also explains why
unemployment, which is persistent, shifts the default frontier to the right.
Fourth, over time the default region shrinks. This is mainly due to the eﬀect of inﬂation
that diminishes the real diﬀerence between the eﬀective mortgage payments and rents.
This has two implications. First, a liquidity constrained borrower cannot increase cur-
rent consumption much by a mortgage default. Second, staying in the home eventually
dominates renting in all states because the real value of the mortgage payment falls
below the real rent.
1.6.2 Default over the Loan Life-Cycle
In this section I compare model results and data on the cohort of loans for which I have
the longest time dimension in order to get an impression of default behavior over the
life-cycle of a loan. Figure 1.5 presents the average cumulative default rate for loans
originated in 2002. This is the cohort on which the model is estimated. Accordingly,
the dynamics of default over the life-cycle of this cohort are captured relatively well
by the model. But the model predicts too many defaults in the ﬁrst months after
origination and too few in the very late months. I will discuss the reasons for this in
more detail in the next section.
Though this cohort faces growing average house prices during the immediate time after
origination as seen in ﬁgure 1.1(b), some individuals experience falling house prices and
negative equity as a consequence of individual house price shocks. Households with
negative equity default when prolonged stretches of unemployment have exhausted
their buﬀer stock savings, cf. the default region of the state space in ﬁgure 1.4. Even-
tually, the cumulative default rate levels oﬀ due to two reasons. First, borrowers who
are still active have amortized their mortgages suﬃciently such that most have positive
equity. Second, due to the mortgage tilt eﬀect the diﬀerence between the real mortgage
payment and real rents shrinks over time such that a default becomes less appealing.
44
Figure 1.5: Cumulative Default Rates of 2002 Cohort: Structural Model vs. Data
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1.6.3 The Rise in Cumulative Default Rates
The next step is to compare the default behavior of diﬀerent cohorts during the time
period of the U.S. mortgage crisis. Figure 1.6 presents average cumulative default rates
for cohorts of loans originated each year between 2002 and 2008.
Figure 1.6: Cumulative Default Rates of 2002-2008 Cohorts: Model vs. Data
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When average house price appreciation slows down and eventually becomes negative
as witnessed in ﬁgure 1.1(b) a higher fraction of borrowers experience negative equity
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which translates into more frequent default. The model can explain the broad pattern
in the data and attributes the rise in cumulative default rates across cohorts to the
diﬀerent aggregate house price paths. The model is particularly successful in the early
months after loan origination, but has problems to explain default in later months. In
the model this is due to the eﬀect of inﬂation, the mortgage tilt eﬀect. This eﬀect
diminishes the diﬀerence between real mortgage payments and rents over time. The
model is sensitive to this diﬀerence and reacts too strongly compared to the data. It is
also noteworthy that the model inﬂation rate is constant and calibrated to the average
inﬂation rate between 1990 and 2010 which is 2.7%. But in the ﬁnal years of the
simulation period inﬂation was much lower. For example on average between 2008 and
2010 it was 1.4% with 0.1% in 2008, 2.7% in 2009 and 1.5% in 2010. It is likely that
the model would perform better for these actual inﬂation rates.
1.6.4 Role of Inﬂation
In this section I conﬁrm that the role of inﬂation in the model and how I calibrated
it are responsible for the poor performance of the model during periods long after
origination. I simply change the inﬂation rate 휋 ad-hoc to 1% instead of 2.7% in the
benchmark calibration. All other parameters are unchanged, but 휃 is reestimated at a
value of 0.33 to ﬁt the 2002 cohort. Figure 1.7 presents these results. The ﬁt of the
model improves and is now comparable to the one of the reduced-form double-trigger
model, cf. ﬁgure 1.3(b).
There are at least two possible ways to interpret the results in sections 1.6.3 and 1.6.4
on the role of inﬂation for the ﬁt of the model. One possibility is that in the real world
borrowers do not fully understand or underestimate the eﬀect of inﬂation. This could
be the reason why the model with a rational agent does not explain default so well in
periods long after origination. It could also be that moving away from policy functions
that are conditional on a constant inﬂation rate would improve the ﬁt of the model.
The other possible interpretation is that unemployment and liquidity problems are not
able to explain default in periods long after loan origination. Instead other reasons like
marital break-up that were excluded from the structural model could be responsible
for default in these periods. This paper only analyzes whether and how unemployment
shocks could act as the trigger event in a structural model and found that they could
deﬁnitely play an important role. But assessing the role of other life events and a
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Figure 1.7: Performance of the Model for a low Inﬂation Rate
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decomposition of actual default rates into the diﬀerent causes within the double-trigger
paradigm is an important area for future research.
1.6.5 Dependence on Preference Parameters
All results from theoretical models depend in some way on parameters and the model
presented here is no exception. Unfortunately, it is not easy to provide an exact
characterization of the parameter space for which the agents in the model exhibit
double-trigger default behavior because of the lack of a closed-form solution. But this
section computes results for some examples of alternative parameter values for 훽 and
훾 in order to get an idea how the model behaves in diﬀerent parts of the parameter
space.
The benchmark preference parameter values are 훽 = 0.9 and 훾 = 4. Here I consider
all combinations of 훽 ∈ {0.85, 0.9, 0.95} and 훾 ∈ {2, 4, 6}. For each of these (훽, 훾)-
combinations the parameter 휃 is reestimated in order to ﬁt the 2002 cohort. All other
parameters are as in the benchmark calibration. The resulting values of 휃 for all
combinations of 훽 and 훾 are presented in table 1.2.
The results for the diﬀerent parameter combinations are presented in ﬁgure 1.8. The
graphs are ordered such that 훾 increases horizontally from 2 (left) to 6 (right) and 훽
increases vertically from 0.85 (top) to 0.95 (bottom). These results show that the model
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Table 1.2: Dependence of the estimated Value of 휃 on 훽 and 훾
훾 = 2 훾 = 4 훾 = 6
훽 = 0.85 0.09 0.27 0.50
훽 = 0.90 0.05 0.18 0.36
훽 = 0.95 -0.02 0.07 0.20
works as well or better than in the benchmark calibration for higher values of 훾 and/or
lower values of 훽. These parameter changes make the agent less willing to substitute
intertemporally and/or more impatient to consume today. This worsens the liquidity
problem caused by unemployment. The model can only feature double-trigger behavior
when being employed and being unemployed are suﬃciently diﬀerent. In contrast, for
lower values of 훾 and higher values of 훽 temporary income reductions can more easily
be smoothed out. The model then implies that a sizeable portion of employed agents
default in all cohorts. This brings the model close to a frictionless option model and
the model then inherits all the problems of such a speciﬁcation witnessed already in
section 1.3.
1.7 Discussion of an Alternative Explanation
All mortgage default theories hypothesize that default by a borrower is a function of
the house price. This paper has presented further evidence that supports this view.
However there is a competing explanation in the public and academic debate for the rise
in default rates observed in ﬁgure 1.1(a). This explanation is that lending standards
deteriorated sharply before the mortgage crisis. If this were true then the increase in
mortgage default rates across cohorts could be due to a worsening of the loan quality.
This would then also confound the empirical relationship between default rates and
house prices that I use to test mortgage default theories. Thus, this section presents
evidence that loan quality is fairly stable across cohorts in my data set.
First of all I only look at data on prime ﬁxed-rate mortgages. Therefore a shift to-
wards more risky lending as far as it manifests itself in a shift from prime to subprime
lending or from ﬁxed to variable rate or hybrid mortgages is ruled out by construc-
tion. These compositional eﬀects might or might not be signiﬁcant contributors to
the overall mortgage crisis, but they do not aﬀect my analysis. We see clearly from
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Figure 1.8: Sensitivity to Preference Parameters 훽 and 훾
(a) 훽 = 0.85 & 훾 = 2
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(b) 훽 = 0.85 & 훾 = 4
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(c) 훽 = 0.85 & 훾 = 6
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(d) 훽 = 0.9 & 훾 = 2
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(e) 훽 = 0.9 & 훾 = 4
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(f) 훽 = 0.9 & 훾 = 6
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(g) 훽 = 0.95 & 훾 = 2
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(h) 훽 = 0.95 & 훾 = 4
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(i) 훽 = 0.95 & 훾 = 6
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ﬁgure 1.1(a) that even without such compositional eﬀects mortgage default rates have
increased substantially.
Another concern is that the loan-to-value ratio (LTV) might have increased over time
leaving a smaller buﬀer before borrowers experience negative equity. I only consider
loans that have a LTV above 95% and thus limit this possibility to shifts within that
class of loans. Within this class the average LTV is basically constant across cohorts
and only ﬂuctuates mildly around the average value of 98.2% as seen in the ﬁrst row of
table 1.3. In the reduced-form models I even controlled for changes to the distribution
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of LTVs and found that the observed changes are irrelevant for the models considered
here.
The second row of table 1.3 reports the average FICO credit score at origination of the
diﬀerent loan cohorts. These are very stable as well. To the extent that these credit
scores are good measures of creditworthiness a signiﬁcant deterioration in loan quality
is not observable here.
Table 1.3 also contains information on the average mortgage rate that diﬀerent cohorts
face. A higher mortgage rate might make the loan as such less attractive to the bor-
rower. There is some variation in this variable across cohorts. But the mortgage rate
and default rates seem to be fairly uncorrelated across cohorts.
The average debt-to-income (DTI) ratio representing the share of the required mortgage
payment in gross income is presented in the last row of table 1.3.15 This has increased
over time indicating that borrowers in later cohorts need to devote more of their gross
income to service the mortgage. But the increase was quite modest.
Table 1.3: Average Loan Characteristics at Origination by Loan Cohort
Cohort 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Average
Loan-to-value ratio in % 98.2 98.3 98.2 98.3 98.4 98.1 97.8 98.2
FICO credit score 676 673 669 670 668 670 678 672
Mortgage rate in % 6.9 6.0 6.1 6.0 6.6 6.7 6.2 6.4
Debt-to-income ratio in % 39 40 40 40 40 42 42 40
These statistics show that there is no strong evidence in favor of a deterioration of
lending standards over time in my data set of prime ﬁxed-rate mortgages with a LTV
above 95%.16 I conclude that this loan pool and time period indeed constitute a good
testing ground for mortgage default theories.
15Footnote 13 also applies here.
16This conclusion might be speciﬁc to the prime market. For example Demyanyk and Van Hemert
(2011) present evidence that loan quality deteriorated in the subprime market. But Amromin and
Paulson (2009) also note that it is less obvious that a similar deterioration was present in the prime
market. A particular advantage of my descriptive statistics is that they are based on all loans in
the LPS data base satisfying my sample selection criteria. In contrast, other empirical studies
using LPS data typically work with a 1% random sample such that their descriptive statistics are
based on far fewer observations.
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One limitation of the paper is that it does not fully control for variation in contract
characteristics across and within cohorts for computational reasons and the fact that
I only have aggregate data. The evidence presented here suggests that this is not a
major limitation because the diﬀerent origination characteristics are quite stable. The
reduced-form models also took variation of the mortgage rate and LTV distribution
across cohorts into account and found that it cannot explain the rise in default rates.
It would be interesting to extend my framework in future research such that one can
analyze how contract characteristics aﬀect default rates within cohorts.
1.8 Analysis of two Bailout Policies
This section discusses an application of the presented structural model for policy anal-
ysis. I study a situation where the government is concerned about a destabilization
of the ﬁnancial system due to the losses that mortgage lenders incur from mortgage
default. Assume that the government decides to neutralize all these losses by a suit-
able bailout policy. The question is then: Should the government bail out lenders or
homeowners?
In case lenders are bailed out the government needs to cover the negative equity of
defaulters, i.e. by how much the outstanding mortgage balance exceeds the value of
the collateral. In contrast, the government could also give subsidies to homeowners
who would otherwise default such that they continue to service the mortgage. This
policy might well be cheaper because homeowners are willing to accept some negative
equity and thus bear some of the losses on the house value unless they face severe
liquidity problems. The subsidies then only have to overcome the temporary liquidity
shortage to neutralize the losses for lenders. However it is also possible that subsidizing
homeowners simply delays default to a later period such that the subsidy policy ends
up being more expensive in the long run. These opposing eﬀects make a quantitative
analysis desirable.
The two policies are compared by calculating the average cost per borrower who would
default in absence of an intervention. For the bailout of lenders this simply amounts
to the average negative equity of a defaulter which can readily be computed during the
simulation. For the subsidy to homeowners one needs to modify the standard simula-
tion procedure. Each period default decisions of borrowers given their liquid wealth,
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negative equity and other state variables are determined. Then for each potential de-
faulter the subsidy required to make the borrower stay in the house is computed. When
doing this the standard policy functions are used. This means borrowers will consume
out of the subsidy, but further negative incentive eﬀects are ruled out. The total sum
of all subsidies to a cohort is divided by the number of defaulters without any inter-
vention to make it comparable to the other bailout policy. The required real payment
streams of both policies are compared by calculating present discounted values using
the real interest rate 푟.
In order to account for the delayed default eﬀect of the subsidy policy it is important
to follow a cohort up to the point where the model does not predict any more default.
Therefore this analysis will only be done for the 2002 cohort with the longest time
horizon. Of course, this calculation can only be as accurate as the model captures
actual default behavior. Since by construction the model explains the 2002 cohort
relatively well this is an additional reason to focus on it. I ﬁnd that bailing out lenders
implies average real present discounted costs of 5.82% of the initial house price per
borrower who defaults. In contrast subsidizing homeowners on average only costs
0.52% of the initial house price in real present discounted value terms. Bailing out
lenders is thus 11 times more expensive than subsidizing homeowners. This is a huge
diﬀerence.
A couple of comments on these results are in order. First, these are partial-equilibrium
results. But it seems that general equilibrium eﬀects of subsidizing homeowners would
also be more favorable because keeping borrowers in their houses avoids downward pres-
sure on house prices due to foreclosure sales. Second, both homeowners and lenders
would probably prefer the subsidy to homeowners because borrowers like to stay in
their houses and lenders do not have to deal with foreclosures and housing sales which
will cause additional administrative costs for them. Finally, in reality one would of
course need to take negative incentive eﬀects into account. While both policies have
negative incentive eﬀects on lenders, the bailout of homeowners would also have neg-
ative incentive eﬀects on borrowers. The subsidy could for example make unemployed
borrowers more reluctant to accept a new job and prolong their unemployment spells
which would make the subsidy less favorable. Investigating the quantitative role of
this eﬀect by including an explicit job search with endogenous job acceptance into
the model is an interesting avenue for future research. There might also exist practi-
cal problems of implementing a subsidy to homeowners in a fashion as assumed here.
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But one feasible policy could be to increase unemployment beneﬁts for unemployed
mortgage borrowers during a mortgage crisis such that they have enough resources to
continue their mortgage payments. In any case these calculations show that there is
potential for improving on policies that simply bail out the lenders both in terms of
costs to taxpayers, but possibly also in terms of what lenders and borrowers would
prefer.
1.9 Extension to lower Loan-to-Value Ratios
So far the paper focussed on loans with a LTV above 95% because these borrowers
should be least likely to have a second mortgage on their home, cf. the discussion in
section 1.2.1. The question arises whether the results of the paper also generalize to
loans with a lower LTV. This section provides some evidence on this by repeating the
reduced-form analysis of section 1.3 for loans with a LTV of the ﬁrst mortgage between
75% and 84%. Due to the discussed data problems this section is necessarily somewhat
tentative. Nevertheless, some very interesting results emerge.
First I take the data for the loans with a LTV of the ﬁrst mortgage between 75% and
84% at face value and assume that no one has a second mortgage. Accordingly the
LTV varies within cohorts in steps of one percentage point between 75% and 84%.
Changes to the distribution of loans over this support across cohorts observed in the
mortgage data are again taken into account. The mortgage rate is again kept constant
within a cohort and set equal to the respective cohort average. When estimating the
models on the 2002 cohort I ﬁnd that neither of the two models can capture this data
well. Both models undershoot the cumulative default rate even for the most extreme
parameter values where 휙 = 0 and 휓 = 1. The reason is that the equity buﬀer
generated by the down-payment is substantial for these borrowers. Because the 2002
cohort faced strongly increasing average house prices immediately after origination,
too few borrowers in the simulation experience negative equity compared to observed
default rates. It is important that both models fail if we take this data at face value.
One can draw two possible conclusions from these results. Either we need a completely
new theory of default for these loans or it is crucial to take second mortgages into
account. I present evidence on the second explanation next.
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Elul, Souleles, Chomsisengphet, Glennon, and Hunt (2010) report that 26% of all
borrowers have a second mortgage and this adds on average 15% to the combined
LTV. But they neither report a break-down of these statistics by the LTV of the ﬁrst
mortgage nor when borrowers take out the second mortgage. Faced with this situation
I model a very simple form of intra-cohort heterogeneity taking these estimates of the
frequency and size of second mortgages into account. I assume that 74% of borrowers
have only one mortgage with a distribution of LTVs as in the mortgage data. But 26%
of borrowers in each cohort independently of the LTV of the ﬁrst mortgage also have a
second mortgage adding 15% to the combined LTV. This implies that the support of
the LTV distribution is expanded and also includes values between 90% and 99%. It is
assumed that borrowers got the second mortgage at the same time as the ﬁrst one and
pay the same mortgage rate on both. Admittedly, these are very crude assumptions.
This exercise can only provide preliminary evidence until better data is available and
should be regarded with considerable caution.
For this setup the reduced-form models are estimated again on the 2002 cohort. This
yields estimates of 휙 = −7.7% and 휓 = 2.4%. The estimated models are again tested
on their ability to predict out-of-sample. Figure 1.9 presents the results for all cohorts.
The threshold model overshoots the data again. In contrast, the shock model provides
an excellent ﬁt to the data. Thus the double-trigger theory also provides a better
explanation for this data under the maintained assumptions on second mortgages.
Due to the discussed data problems I would personally put a lower weight on these
results compared to the benchmark results. But these results are at least suggestive
that the main conclusions on the relative merit of the two theories may well extend to
loans with a lower LTV.
1.10 Conclusions
This paper has presented simulations of theoretical default models for the observed
path of aggregate house prices and a realistic microeconomic distribution. Theoretical
predictions were then compared to data on default rates on prime ﬁxed-rate mortgages
to assess the explanatory power of the theories.
A test has been developed that examined whether estimated reduced forms of the
frictionless option model and the double trigger hypothesis are able to predict out-of-
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Figure 1.9: Reduced-Form Results for Borrowers with a First Mortgage LTV of 75−84%
taking Second Mortgages into account
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(b) Shock Model
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sample. This test revealed that the frictionless default theory is too sensitive to the
mean shifts in the house price distribution observed in recent years. In contrast, the
double-trigger hypothesis attributing default to the joint occurrence of negative equity
and a life event is consistent with the data.
Based on this ﬁnding a structural dynamic stochastic model with liquidity constraints
and unemployment shocks was presented to provide micro-foundations for the double-
trigger hypothesis. In this model the liquidity problems associated with unemployment
can act as a trigger event for default. Accordingly, the level of negative equity at which
individual borrowers default on their mortgage depends on non-housing state variables:
liquid wealth and employment status. The model is broadly consistent with the data
and explains most of the rise in mortgage default rates as a consequence of aggregate
house price dynamics.
The structural model was used to analyze two bailout policies in a mortgage crisis.
This revealed that in order to neutralize losses for lenders subsidizing homeowners is
much cheaper than bailing out lenders when liquidity problems are a key determinant
of mortgage default. A related policy question to which the model can be applied is
how the design of unemployment insurance can help to prevent mortgage default.
The results of the reduced form and structural model as well as further supporting
evidence on loan characteristics show that mortgage default has a strong macroeco-
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nomic component resulting from aggregate house price dynamics. This suggests that
the recent events should not be attributed entirely to a deterioration of loan quality.
Instead, they hint at the existence of systematic macroeconomic risk in the mortgage
market.
An important goal for future research is to develop an explanation of the house price
boom and bust and the mortgage crisis in general equilibrium. This paper has presented
a model where default rates match the data reasonably well taking house prices as given.
It remains to provide a model that matches house prices as well as quantities in the
housing and mortgage market. Obviously this represents a great challenge. But the
model presented here may serve as a building block for that more general model.
56
2 Demographic Change, Human
Capital and Welfare1
2.1 Introduction
As in all major industrialized countries, the population of the United States is aging
over time. This process is driven by increasing life expectancy and a decline in birth
rates from the peak levels of the baby boom. Consequently, the fraction of the working-
age population will decrease, and the fraction of elderly people will increase. Figure
2.1 presents two summary measures of these demographic changes: the working-age
population ratio is predicted to decrease from 84% in 2005 to 75% in 2050, while the old-
age dependency ratio will increase from 19% in 2005 to 34% in 2050. These projected
changes in the population structure will have important macroeconomic eﬀects on the
balance between physical capital and labor. Speciﬁcally, labor is expected to be scarce
relative to physical capital, with an ensuing decline in real returns on physical capital
and increases in gross wages. These relative price changes have adverse welfare eﬀects,
especially for individuals close to retirement because they receive a lower return on
their assets accumulated for retirement and cannot proﬁt from increased wages.
This paper argues that a strong incentive to invest in human capital emanates from
the combined eﬀects of increasing life expectancy and changes in relative prices, par-
ticularly if social security systems are reformed such that contribution rates remain
constant. In general equilibrium, such endogenous human-capital adjustments sub-
stantially mitigate the eﬀects of demographic change on macroeconomic aggregates
and individual welfare.
1This chapter draws on work that was carried out jointly with equal share by Alexander Ludwig,
Edgar Vogel and me. The chapter contains material from our article published in the Review of
Economic Dynamics (Ludwig, Schelkle, and Vogel 2012) and the online appendix to that article.
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Figure 2.1: Working-Age and Old-Age Dependency Ratio
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Notes: Working-age population ratio (WAPR, left scale): ratio of population of age 16 − 64 to total
adult population of age 16− 90. Old-age dependency ratio (OADR, right scale): ratio of population
of age 65− 90 to working-age population.
Source: Own calculations based on Human Mortality Database (2008).
The key contribution of our paper is to show that the human-capital adjustment mech-
anism is quantitatively important. We add endogenous human-capital accumulation to
an otherwise standard large-scale OLG model in the spirit of Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ
(1987). The central focus of our analysis is then to work out the diﬀerences between
our model, with endogenous human capital adjustments and endogenous labor sup-
ply, and the “standard” models in the literature, with ﬁxed (exogenous) productivity
proﬁles.
We ﬁnd that the decrease of the return to physical capital induced by demographic
change in a model with endogenous human capital is only one-third of that predicted in
the standard model. Welfare consequences from increasing wages, declines in rates of
return, changes to pension contributions and beneﬁts induced by demographic change
are substantial. When human capital cannot adjust, some of the agents alive in 2005
will experience welfare losses up to 12.5% (5.6%) of lifetime consumption with con-
stant pension contribution (replacement) rates. However, importantly, we ﬁnd that
these maximum losses are only 8.7% (4.4%) of lifetime consumption when the human
capital adjustment mechanism is taken into account. Ignoring this adjustment channel
thus leads to quantitatively important biases in the welfare assessment of demographic
change.
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Our work relates to a vast number of papers that have analyzed the economic conse-
quences of population aging and possible adjustment mechanisms. Important examples
in closed economies with a focus on social-security adjustments include Huang et al.
(1997), De Nardi et al. (1999) and, with respect to migration, Storesletten (2000). In
open economies, Bo¨rsch-Supan et al. (2006), Attanasio et al. (2007) and Kru¨ger and
Ludwig (2007), among others, investigate the role of international capital ﬂows dur-
ing a demographic transition. We add to this literature by highlighting an additional
mechanism through which households can respond to demographic change.
Our paper is closely related to the theoretical work on longevity, human capital, tax-
ation and growth2 and to Fouge`re and Me´rette (1999) and Sadahiro and Shimasawa
(2002), who also quantitatively investigate demographic change in large-scale OLG
models with individual human-capital decisions. In contrast to their work, we focus
our analysis on relative price changes during a demographic transition and therefore
consider an exogenous growth speciﬁcation.3 We also extend their analysis along vari-
ous dimensions. We use realistic demographic projections instead of stylized scenarios.
More importantly, our model contains a labor supply-human capital formation-leisure
trade-oﬀ. It can thus capture eﬀects from changes in individual labor supply, i.e.,
human capital utilization, on the return to human-capital investments. As has al-
ready been stressed by Becker (1967) and Ben-Porath (1967), it is important to model
human-capital and labor supply-decisions jointly in a life-cycle framework. Along this
line, a key feature of our quantitative investigation is to employ a Ben-Porath (1967)
human-capital model and calibrate it to replicate realistic life-cycle wage proﬁles.4
Furthermore, we place particular emphasis on the welfare consequences of an aging
population for households living through the demographic transition.
2See, for example, de la Croix and Licandro (1999), Boucekkine et al. (2002), Kalemli-Ozcan et al.
(2000) Echevarria and Iza (2006), Heijdra and Romp (2008), Ludwig and Vogel (2009) and Lee
and Mason (2010). Our paper is also related to the literature emphasizing the role of endogenous
human-capital accumulation for the analysis of changes to the tax or social-security system, as in
Lord (1989), Trostel (1993), Perroni (1995), Dupor et al. (1996) and Lau and Poutvaara (2006),
among others.
3Whether the trend growth rate endogenously ﬂuctuates during the demographic transition or is
held constant is of minor importance for the questions we are interested in. This is shown in our
earlier unpublished working paper. The results are available upon request.
4The Ben-Porath (1967) model of human capital accumulation is one of the workhorses in labor
economics used to understand such issues as educational attainment, on-the-job training, and
wage growth over the life cycle, among others. See Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999) for a
review. Extended versions of the model have been applied to study the signiﬁcant changes to the
U.S. wage distribution and inequality observed since the early 1970s by Heckman, Lochner, and
Taber (1998) and Guvenen and Kuruscu (2009).
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we present our quantitative model.
Section 2.3 describes the calibration strategy and our computational solution method.
Our results are presented in Section 2.4. Finally, Section 2.5 concludes the paper.
An appendix contains robustness checks, a description of our demographic model and
technical details.
2.2 The Model
We employ a large-scale OLG model a` la Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987) with endoge-
nous labor supply and endogenous human-capital formation. The population structure
is exogenously determined by time- varying demographic processes for fertility and
mortality, the main driving forces of our model.5 In a perfectly competitive environ-
ment, ﬁrms produce with a standard constant returns to scale production function. We
assume that the U.S. is a closed economy.6 Agents contribute a share of their wages
to the pension system, and retirees receive a share of their average indexed past yearly
earnings as pensions. Technological progress is exogenous.
2.2.1 Timing, Demographics and Notation
Time is discrete, and one period corresponds to one calendar year 푡. Each year, a
new generation is born. Birth in this paper refers to the ﬁrst time households make
their own decisions and is set to the age of 16 (model age 푗 = 0). Agents retire at
an exogenously given age of 65 (model age 푗푟 = 49). Agents live at most until age 90
(model age 푗 = 퐽 = 74). At a given point in time 푡, individuals of age 푗 survive to age
푗 + 1 with probability 휑푡,푗 , where 휑푡,퐽 = 0. The number of agents of age 푗 at time 푡 is
denoted by 푁푡,푗 , and 푁푡 =
∑퐽
푗=0푁푡,푗 is the total population in 푡.
5We do not model endogenous life expectancy, fertility or endogenous migration and assume that all
exogenous migration is completed before agents begin making economically relevant decisions (cf.
Appendix 2.B). Thus, we also abstract from potential feedback eﬀects of social-security policies
on fertility, as studied by Ehrlich and Kim (2007).
6For our question, the assumption of a closed economy is a valid approximation. As documented in
Kru¨ger and Ludwig (2007), demographically induced changes in the return to physical capital and
wages from the U.S. perspective do not diﬀer much between closed- and open-economy scenarios.
The reason is that demographic processes are correlated across countries and, in terms of speed of
the aging processes, the U.S. is somewhere in the middle with respect to all OECD countries.
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2.2.2 Households
Each household comprises one representative agent who makes decisions regarding
consumption and saving, labor supply and human-capital investment. The household
maximizes lifetime utility at the beginning of economic life (푗 = 0) in period 푡,
max
퐽∑
푗=0
훽푗휋푡,푗
1
1− 휎
{푐휙푡+푗,푗(1− ℓ푡+푗,푗 − 푒푡+푗,푗)
1−휙}1−휎, 휎 > 0, 휙 ∈ (0, 1), (2.1)
where the per-period utility function is a function of individual consumption 푐, labor
supply ℓ and the time invested in formation of human capital, 푒. The agent is endowed
with one unit of time, thus, 1 − ℓ − 푒 is leisure time. 훽 is the pure time-discount
factor, 휙 determines the weight of consumption in utility, and 휎 is the inverse of the
inter-temporal elasticity of substitution with respect to the Cobb-Douglas aggregate of
consumption and leisure time. 휋푡,푗 denotes the (unconditional) probability to survive
until age 푗, 휋푡,푗 =
∏푗−1
푖=0 휑푡+푖,푖, for 푗 > 0 and 휋푡,0 = 1.
Agents earn labor income (pension income when retired) as well as interest payments
on their savings and receive accidental bequests. When working, they pay a fraction 휏푡
from their gross wages to the social-security system. The net wage income in period 푡 of
an agent of age 푗 is given by 푤푛푡,푗 = ℓ푡,푗ℎ푡,푗푤푡(1−휏푡), where 푤푡 is the gross wage per unit
of supplied human capital at time 푡. There are no annuity markets, and households
leave accidental bequests. These are collected by the government and redistributed in
a lump-sum fashion to all households. Accordingly, the dynamic budget constraint is
given by
푎푡+1,푗+1 =
⎧⎨⎩(푎푡,푗 + 푡푟푡)(1 + 푟푡) + 푤푛푡,푗 − 푐푡,푗 if 푗 < 푗푟(푎푡,푗 + 푡푟푡)(1 + 푟푡) + 푝푡,푗 − 푐푡,푗 if 푗 ≥ 푗푟, (2.2)
where 푎푡,푗 denotes assets, 푡푟푡 are transfers from accidental bequests, 푟푡 is the real interest
rate, the rate of return to physical capital, and 푝푡,푗 is pension income. Initial household
assets are zero (푎푡,0 = 0), and the transversality condition is 푎푡,퐽+1 = 0.
2.2.3 Formation of Human Capital
The key element of our model is the endogenous formation of human capital. House-
holds enter economic life with a predetermined and cohort invariant level of human
capital ℎ푡,0 = ℎ0. Afterwards, they can invest a fraction of their time into acquiring
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additional human capital. We adopt a version of the Ben-Porath (1967) human-capital
technology7 given by
ℎ푡+1,푗+1 = ℎ푡,푗(1− 훿
ℎ) + 휉(ℎ푡,푗푒푡,푗)
휓 휓 ∈ (0, 1), 휉 > 0, 훿ℎ ≥ 0, (2.3)
where 휉 is a scaling factor, the average learning ability, 휓 determines the curvature of
human-capital technology, 훿ℎ is the depreciation rate of human capital, and 푒푡,푗 is time
invested in human-capital formation.
The costs of investing in human capital in this model are only the opportunity costs of
foregone wage income and leisure. We understand the process of accumulating human
capital to be a mixture of knowledge acquired by formal schooling and on-the- job
training programs after schooling is complete. Human capital can be accumulated
until retirement age, but an agent’s optimally chosen time investment converges to
zero some time before retirement.
2.2.4 The Pension System
The pension system is a simple balanced-budget, pay-as-you-go system that resembles
key features of the U.S. system. Workers contribute a fraction 휏푡 of their gross wages,
and pensioners receive a fraction 휌푡 of their average indexed past yearly earnings.
8
The level of pensions in each period is given by 푝푡,푗 = 휌푡푤푡+푗푟−푗ℎ¯푡+푗푟−푗
푠푡,푗
푗푟−1
, where
푤푡+푗푟−푗ℎ¯푡+푗푟−푗
푠푡,푗
푗푟−1
are average indexed past yearly earnings (AIYE)9, 푤푡+푗푟−푗ℎ¯푡+푗푟−푗
are average earnings of all workers in the period when a retiree of current age 푗 reaches
retirement age 푗푟, and ℎ¯푡 is deﬁned as ℎ¯푡 =
∑푗푟−1
푗=0 ℓ푡,푗ℎ푡,푗푁푡,푗
∑푗푟−1
푗=0 푁푡,푗
. We refer to ℎ¯푡 as the
average (hours weighted) human-capital stock. The sum up to age 푗 of past individual
earnings of an agent relative to average economy-wide earnings in the respective year
is given by 푠푡,푗 =
∑푗
푖=0
ℓ푡−푗+푖,푖ℎ푡−푗+푖,푖
ℎ¯푡−푗+푖
. This links pensions to individuals’ past earnings.
7This functional form is widely used in the human-capital literature, cf. Browning, Hansen, and
Heckman (1999) for a review.
8The U.S. system applies an additional bend-point formula to pensions, which results in intra-
generational redistribution. However, in our model, without intra-cohort heterogeneity, we do not
take this feature of the actual system into account. For descriptions of the current U.S. system,
see Diamond and Gruber (1999) and Geanakoplos and Zeldes (2009).
9Our concept of AIYE is an approximation to the “average indexed monthly earnings” (AIME) in
the current U.S. system where only the 35 years of working life with the highest individual earnings
relative to average earnings are counted for the calculation of AIME. We ignore this feature for
computational reasons and count all years of working life.
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Using the above formula for 푝푡,푗, the budget constraint of the pension system is given
by
휏푡푤푡
푗푟−1∑
푗=0
ℓ푡,푗ℎ푡,푗푁푡,푗 = 휌푡
퐽∑
푗=푗푟
푁푡,푗푤푡+푗푟−푗ℎ¯푡+푗푟−푗
푠푡,푗
푗푟 − 1
∀푡. (2.4)
Below, we consider two opposite scenarios of parametric adjustment of the pension sys-
tem to demographic change. In our ﬁrst scenario (“const. 휏”), we hold the contribution
rate constant, 휏푡 = 휏¯ , and endogenously adjust the replacement rate to balance the
budget of the pension system. In the other extreme scenario (“const. 휌”), we hold the
replacement rate constant, 휌푡 = 휌¯, and endogenously adjust the contribution rate.
2.2.5 Firms
Firms operate in a perfectly competitive environment and produce one homogeneous
good, according to the Cobb-Douglas production function
푌푡 = 퐾
훼
푡 (퐴푡퐿푡)
1−훼, (2.5)
where 훼 denotes the share of capital used in production. 퐾푡, 퐿푡 and 퐴푡 are the stocks
of physical capital, eﬀective labor and the level of technology, respectively. Output can
be either consumed or used as an investment good. We assume that labor inputs and
human capital of diﬀerent agents are perfect substitutes, and eﬀective labor input 퐿푡
is accordingly given by 퐿푡 =
∑푗푟−1
푗=0 ℓ푡,푗ℎ푡,푗푁푡,푗 . Factors of production are paid their
marginal products, i.e., 푤푡 = (1− 훼)
푌푡
퐿푡
and 푟푡 = 훼
푌푡
퐾푡
− 훿푡, where 푤푡 is the gross wage
per unit of eﬃcient labor, 푟푡 is the interest rate, and 훿푡 denotes the depreciation rate
of physical capital. Total factor productivity, 퐴푡, is growing at the exogenous rate of
푔퐴푡 : 퐴푡+1 = 퐴푡(1 + 푔
퐴
푡 ).
2.2.6 Equilibrium
Denoting current period/age variables by 푥 and following period/age variables by 푥′,
a household of age 푗 solves the maximization problem at the beginning of period 푡
푉 (푎, ℎ, 푡, 푗) = max
푐,ℓ,푒,푎′,ℎ′,푠′
{푢(푐, 1− ℓ− 푒) + 휑훽푉 (푎′, ℎ′, 푠′, 푡+ 1, 푗 + 1)} (2.6)
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subject to equations (2.2) and (2.3), and the constraints ℓ ∈ [0, 1), 푒 ∈ [0, 1).
Deﬁnition 1. Given the exogenous population distribution and survival rates in all
periods {{푁푡,푗, 휑푡,푗}
퐽
푗=0}
푇
푡=1, an initial physical capital stock and an initial level of av-
erage human capital, {퐾0, ℎ¯0}, and an initial distribution of assets and human capital,
{푎푡,0, ℎ푡,0}
퐽
푗=0, a competitive equilibrium of the economy is deﬁned as a sequence of indi-
vidual variables {{푐푡,푗 , ℓ푡,푗, 푒푡,푗, 푎푡+1,푗+1, ℎ푡+1,푗+1, 푠푡+1,푗+1}
퐽
푗=0}
푇
푡=1, sequences of aggregate
variables {퐿푡, 퐾푡+1, 푌푡}
푇
푡=1, government policies {휌푡, 휏푡}
푇
푡=1, prices {푤푡, 푟푡}
푇
푡=1 and trans-
fers {푡푟푡}
푇
푡=1 such that
1. given prices, bequests and initial conditions, households solve their maximization
problem, as described above,
2. physical capital and eﬃciency units of labor are paid their marginal products, i.e.,
푤푡 = (1− 훼)
푌푡
퐿푡
and 푟푡 = 훼
푌푡
퐾푡
− 훿,
3. per-capita transfers are determined by
푡푟푡 =
∑퐽
푗=0 푎푡,푗(1− 휑푡−1,푗−1)푁푡−1,푗−1∑퐽
푗=0푁푡,푗
, (2.7)
4. government policies are such that the budget of the social-security system is bal-
anced every period, i.e., equation (2.4) holds ∀푡, and household pension income
is given by 푝푡,푗 = 휌푡푤푡+푗푟−푗ℎ¯푡+푗푟−푗
푠푡,푗
푗푟−1
,
5. markets clear every period:
퐿푡 =
푗푟−1∑
푗=0
ℓ푡,푗ℎ푡,푗푁푡,푗 (2.8a)
퐾푡+1 =
퐽∑
푗=0
푎푡+1,푗+1푁푡,푗 (2.8b)
푌푡 =
퐽∑
푗=0
푐푡,푗푁푡,푗 +퐾푡+1 − (1− 훿)퐾푡. (2.8c)
Deﬁnition 2. A stationary equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium at which per-capita
variables grow at the constant gross rate of 1 + 푔¯퐴 and aggregate variables grow at the
constant gross rate (1 + 푔¯퐴)(1 + 푛).
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2.2.7 Thought Experiments
We take as an exogenous driving process a time-varying demographic structure. Com-
putations begin in year 1750 (푡 = 1), assuming an artiﬁcial initial steady state10. We
then compute the model equilibrium from 1750 to 2500 (푡 = 푇 = 751) when the new
steady state is assumed and reached11 and report simulation results for the main pro-
jection period of interest, from 2005 (푡 = 256) to 2050 (푡 = 301). We use data during
our calibration period, 1960 − 2004 (from 푡0 = 211 to 푡1 = 255), to determine several
structural model parameters (cf. section 2.3).
Our main objective is to compare the time paths of aggregate variables and welfare
across two model variants for two social-security scenarios. Our ﬁrst model variant
is one in which households adjust their human capital, and our second variant is one
in which human capital is held constant across cohorts. Therefore, our strategy is
to ﬁrst solve for transitional dynamics using the model described above. Next, we
use the endogenously obtained proﬁle of time invested in human-capital formation
to compute an average time investment and associated human-capital proﬁle, which
is then fed into our alternative model in which agents are restricted with respect to
their time-investment choice. We do so separately for the two opposite social-security
scenarios described in subsection 2.2.4. The average time investment is computed as
푒¯푗 =
1
푡1−푡0+1
∑푡1
푡=푡0
푒푡,푗 for our calibration period (푡0 = 211 and 푡1 = 255). In the
alternative model, we then add the constraint 푒푡,푗 = 푒¯푗 . The human-capital proﬁle is
then obtained from (2.3) by iterating forward on age.12
10The artiﬁcial initial steady state and long phase-in period are only used to generate suitable starting
values for our main projection period. Bar and Leukhina (2010) provide an explicit model of the
demographic transition and economic development that began in 17th Century England.
11In fact, changes in variables that are constant in steady state are already numerically irrelevant
circa the year 2400.
12By imposing the restriction of identical time-investment proﬁles for all cohorts (instead of, e.g.,
imposing the restriction only on cohorts born after 2005), we shut down direct eﬀects from changing
mortality on human capital and indirect anticipation eﬀects of changing returns. This alternative
model is a “standard” model of endogenous labor supply and an exogenously given age-speciﬁc
productivity proﬁle—as used in numerous studies on the consequences of demographic change—
with the only exception being that the time endowment is age-speciﬁc. By setting the time
endowment to 1− 푒¯푗 rather than 1, we avoid re-calibration across model variants. For details, see
below.
65
2.3 Calibration and Computation
To calibrate the model, we choose model parameters such that simulated moments
match selected moments in NIPA data and the endogenous wage proﬁles match the
empirically observed wage proﬁle in the U.S. during the calibration period 1960−2004.13
The calibrated parameters are summarized in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Model Parameters
Preferences 휎 Inverse of Inter-Temporal Elasticity of Substitution 2.00
훽 Pure Time Discount Factor 0.993
휙 Weight of Consumption 0.401
Human Capital 휉 Scaling Factor 0.16
휓 Curvature Parameter 0.65
훿ℎ Depreciation Rate of Human Capital 0.8%
ℎ0 Initial Human Capital Endowment 1.00
Production 훼 Share of Physical Capital in Production 0.33
훿¯ Depreciation Rate of Physical Capital 3.8%
푔¯퐴 Exogenous Growth Rate 1.8%
2.3.1 Demographics
Actual population data from 1950 − 2004 are collected from the Human Mortality
Database (2008). Our demographic projections beyond 2004 are based on a popula-
tion model that is described in detail in Appendix 2.B.14 Prior to 1950, we keep the
population structure constant, as in 1950.
13We perform this moment matching in the endogenous human-capital model and the constant
contribution-rate scenario. We do not recalibrate model parameters across social-security sce-
narios or for the alternative human-capital model because simulated moments do not diﬀer much.
Furthermore, we are interested in how our welfare conclusions are aﬀected by imposing various con-
straints on the model—either through our social-security scenarios or by restricting human-capital
formation—and any parametric change in this comparison would confound our welfare analysis.
14The key assumptions of this model are as follows: First, the total fertility rate is constant at 2004
levels of 2.0185, until 2100, when fertility is adjusted slightly to keep the number of newborns con-
stant for the remainder of the simulation period. Second, life expectancy monotonically increases
from a current (2004) average life expectancy at birth of 77.06 years to 88.42 years in 2100, when
it is held constant. Third, total migration is constant at the average migration for 1950− 2004 for
the remainder of the simulation period. These assumptions imply that a stationary population is
reached in about 2200.
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2.3.2 Household Behavior
The parameter 휎, the inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution, is set to
2. In Appendix 2.A, a sensitivity analysis shows that our main quantitative results
are robust when we change the predetermined parameter 휎 to 1 or 3, respectively.
The time-discount factor 훽 is calibrated to match the empirically observed capital-
output ratio of 2.8 which requires 훽 = 0.993. The weight of consumption in the utility
function, 휙, is calibrated such that households spend one-third of their time working,
on average, which requires 휙 = 0.401.
2.3.3 Individual Productivity Proﬁles
We choose values for the parameters of the human-capital production function such that
average simulated wage proﬁles resulting from endogenous human-capital formation
replicate empirically observed wage proﬁles. Data for age-speciﬁc productivity are
collected from Huggett et al. (2010)15. We ﬁrst normalize ℎ0 = 1 and then determine
the values of the structural parameters {휉, 휓, 훿ℎ} by indirect inference methods (Smith
1993; Gourieroux et al. 1993). To this end, we run separate regressions of the data
and simulated wage proﬁles on a third-order polynomial in age, given by
log푤푗 = 휂0 + 휂1푗 + 휂2푗
2 + 휂3푗
3 + 휖푗 . (2.9)
Here, 푤푗 is the age-speciﬁc productivity, and 휖푗 is a residual. Denote the coeﬃcient
vector determining the slope of the polynomial estimated from the actual wage data by
−→휂 = [휂1, 휂2, 휂3]
′ and the one estimated from simulated human capital proﬁles during
1960 − 2004 by
−→
휂ˆ = [휂ˆ1, 휂ˆ2, 휂ˆ3]
′. The latter coeﬃcient vector is a function of the
structural model parameters {휉, 휓, 훿ℎ}. Finally, the values of our structural model
parameters are determined by minimizing the distance ∥−→휂 −
−→
휂ˆ ∥. See subsection 2.3.6
for further details.
Figure 2.2 presents the empirically observed productivity proﬁle and the estimated
polynomials. Our coeﬃcients16 and the shape of the wage proﬁle are in line with
others reported in the literature, especially with those obtained by Hansen (1993) and
15We thank Mark Huggett for sending us the data.
16The coeﬃcient estimates from the data are 휂0: -1.6262, 휂1: 0.1054, 휂2: -0.0017 and 휂3: 7.83e-06.
We do not display the polynomial proﬁle estimated from simulated data in Figure 2.2 because it
perfectly tracks the polynomial obtained from the data.
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Altig et al. (2001). The estimate of 훿ℎ = 0.008 is reasonable (Arrazola and de Hevia
(2004), Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999)), and the estimate of 휓 = 0.65 is in
the middle of the range reported in Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999).17
Figure 2.2: Wage Proﬁles
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Notes: Observed proﬁle: average life-cycle wage proﬁles collected from Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron
(2010). Polynomials: predicted wage proﬁle based on estimated polynomial coeﬃcients of (2.9). Both
proﬁles were normalized by their respective means.
2.3.4 Production
We calibrate the capital share in production, 훼, to match the income share of labor in
the data, which requires that 훼 = 0.33. We estimate a series of TFP and actual depre-
ciation using NIPA data. We HP-ﬁlter these data series and then feed them into the
model for the period 1950 to 2004. Thereafter, both parameters, 푔 and 훿, are held con-
stant at their respective means. The average growth rate of total factor productivity,
푔¯퐴, is calibrated to match the growth rate of the Solow residual in the data. Accord-
ingly, 푔¯퐴 = 0.018. Finally, we calibrate 훿¯ (and thereby scale the exogenous time path
of depreciation, 훿푡) such that our simulated data match an average investment-output
ratio of 20%, which requires 훿¯ = 0.038.
17In a sensitivity analysis, we have shown that the estimate of the average time-investment productiv-
ity, 휉 = 0.16, depends on the predetermined value of ℎ0, whereas the other parameters are rather
insensitive to this choice. We have also found that parameterizations with a diﬀerent value for ℎ0
yield the same results for the eﬀects of demographic change on aggregate variables and welfare.
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2.3.5 The Pension System
In our ﬁrst social-security scenario (“const. 휏”), we ﬁx contribution rates and adjust
replacement rates of the pension system. We calculate contribution rates from NIPA
data for 1960− 2004 and freeze the contribution rate at the 2004 level for all following
years. When simulating the alternative social-security scenario with constant replace-
ment rates (“const. 휌”), we feed the equilibrium replacement rate obtained in the
“const. 휏” scenario into the model and hold it constant at the 2004 level for all re-
maining years. Then the contribution rate endogenously adjusts to balance the budget
of the social-security system.
2.3.6 Computational Method
For a given set of structural model parameters, the solution of the model is determined
by outer- and inner-loop iterations. On the aggregate level (outer loop), the model
is solved by guessing initial time paths of four variables: the capital intensity, the ra-
tio of bequests to wages, the replacement rate (or contribution rate) of the pension
system and average human capital for all periods from 푡 = 1 until 푇 . On the indi-
vidual level (inner loop), we begin each iteration by guessing the terminal values for
consumption and human capital. We then proceed by backward induction and iterate
over these terminal values until the inner-loop iterations converge. In each outer loop,
disaggregated variables are aggregated each period. We then update aggregate vari-
ables until convergence, using the Gauss-Seidel-Quasi-Newton algorithm developed in
Ludwig (2007).
To calibrate the model in the “const. 휏” scenario, we consider additional “outer outer”
loops to determine structural model parameters by minimizing the distance between
the simulated average values and their respective calibration targets for the calibra-
tion period 1960 − 2004. To summarize the description above, the parameter values
determined in this way are 훽, 휙, 훿, 휉, 휓 and 훿ℎ.
2.4 Results
Before using our model to investigate the eﬀects of future demographic change, we show
how well it can replicate observed individual life-cycle proﬁles of the past. Next, we
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turn to the analysis of the transitional dynamics for the period 2005 to 2050, whereby
we focus especially on the developments of major macroeconomic variables and the
welfare eﬀects of demographic change.
2.4.1 Backﬁtting
We ﬁrst examine consumption proﬁles. We recognize that our model fails to replicate
the empirically observed cross-sectional consumption proﬁle in the 1990 Consumer Ex-
penditure Survey18, cf. Figure 2.3(a). The increase of consumption over the life cycle
is too steep, and the peak is too late compared to the data. Because the decrease
of consumption after the peak is solely caused by falling survival rates in a model
without idiosyncratic risk, we cannot expect to match this dimension of the data (cf.
Hansen and I˙mrohorog˘lu (2008), Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Kru¨ger (2007)). As shown
in Ludwig et al. (2007), in a model without human-capital adjustments, omitting id-
iosyncratic risk has only a negligible eﬀect on welfare calculations. This is because
welfare calculations are based on diﬀerences in consumption proﬁles, and the exact
shape of the consumption proﬁle is therefore less important. However, verifying the
robustness of this ﬁnding in a model with endogenous human capital such as ours re-
quires the introduction of idiosyncratic risk. We leave this extension for future research,
mainly for technical reasons.19
We next examine asset proﬁles. Figure 2.3(b) shows household net worth data from
the Survey of Consumer Finances for a cross-section in 1995, obtained from Bucks
et al. (2006), and the corresponding cross-sectional asset proﬁle in the model. Our
18The empirical proﬁle is based on the observations on non-durable consumption for 1990 in the data
set of Aguiar and Hurst (2009). We equalize the data using the traditional OECD scale that
attributes weights of (1.0, 0.7, 0.5) to the ﬁrst adult, further adults (above age 16) and children, re-
spectively. We then estimate a third-order polynomial in age on the adult-equivalent consumption
data and show the predicted proﬁle in the ﬁgure.
19Introducing idiosyncratic risk into our large model with two continuous-state variables would render
computation of the transition path practically infeasible. However, to address the sensitivity of
our welfare results with respect to the consumption proﬁle, we have performed an additional
sensitivity check, whereby we introduce lump-sum transfers that redistribute resources from aged
individuals to young individuals within a household, such that the present value of lifetime resources
is unaﬀected. This increases savings at younger ages. Our calibration then oﬀsets this increase
in savings via a lower 훽. This yields a ﬂatter consumption proﬁle. The total eﬀect of lump-sum
transfers on the consumption proﬁle, therefore, mimics the eﬀects of precautionary savings. This
sensitivity analysis shows that our ﬁndings continue to hold in a model that achieves a better ﬁt of
the consumption proﬁle and is otherwise as close as possible to our benchmark model. The results
are available upon request.
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Figure 2.3: Cross-Sectional Proﬁles
(a) Consumption
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(d) Wages
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Notes: Model and data proﬁles for consumption, assets, labor supply and wages. All proﬁles are
cross-sectional proﬁles for 1990, except for the asset proﬁle, which is for 1995. Consumption, asset
and wage proﬁles are normalized by their respective means. Hours data are normalized by 76 total
hours per week.
Data Sources: Based on CEX consumption data collected from Aguiar and Hurst (2009), SCF net
worth data obtained from Bucks et al. (2006), hours worked data from McGrattan and Rogerson
(2004) and PSID wage data.
model matches the broad pattern in the data. Observed discrepancies are threefold:
First, as borrowing constraints are absent from our model, initial assets are negative,
whereas they are positive in the data. Second, the run-up of wealth until retirement
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age is stronger in our model than it is in the data.20 Third, decumulation of assets is
stronger as well. This last fact is due to the fact that our model neither has health
risks, as in De Nardi et al. (2009), nor explicit bequest motives, cf., e.g., Attanasio
(1999).
Our model does a good job of matching the cross-sectional hours proﬁle observed in
1990 Census data collected from McGrattan and Rogerson (2004); see ﬁgure 2.3(c).21
Given our preference speciﬁcation, the inverse u-shape of hours worked translates into
a u-shaped pattern of Frisch labor-supply elasticities over the life-cycle. This implic-
itly captures higher elasticities at the extensive margin at the beginning and end of
the life-cycle, cf., e.g., Rogerson and Wallenius (2009). Using a Frisch elasticity con-
cept with constant (variable) time invested in human-capital formation22, we ﬁnd that
agents of age 30-50 have an average elasticity of 0.8 (1.3). The hour-weighted aver-
age Frisch elasticity across all ages, a “macro” elasticity, is approximately 1.1 (1.9).
20The asset proﬁles are generated by normalizing actual assets at each age by mean assets. However
one could object that this may not be the most natural approach when assets can sometimes be
negative as is the case in our model. Taking this eﬀect into account would improve the ﬁt of our
model to the data around the middle of the life-cycle.
21The hours data are normalized, with total hours per week equal to 76. This might appear to be a
low number for total available hours, but such a magnitude is needed to make the McGrattan and
Rogerson (2004) hours data broadly consistent with the common belief that agents spend about
one-third of their time working and the standard practice of macroeconomists to calibrate their
models (which we have followed). The McGrattan and Rogerson (2004) data only contain average
hours for certain age bins, e.g., average hours for persons of age 15-24. We associate the average
hours with the age mean of that age bin, e.g., associate the value for ages 15-24 with age 20 and
then use cubic interpolation to construct the empirical hours proﬁle for all other ages. A similar
procedure is used to construct the empirical asset proﬁle.
22The Frisch (or 휆-constant) elasticity of labor supply holds the marginal utility of wealth constant.
First we compute this elasticity using the standard formula. In the context of our model, this
means holding time invested in human-capital formation constant. It is then given by
휖
푗
ℓ,푤 =
1− 휙(1 − 휎)
휎
1− ℓ푗 − 푒푗
ℓ푗
,
see Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999) for a derivation. But we also report a Frisch labor-
supply elasticity that allows time invested in human-capital formation to vary. In the spirit of the
Frisch elasticity concept, we hold the marginal utility of human capital constant in addition to the
marginal utility of wealth. This Frisch elasticity is then given by
휖˜
푗
ℓ,푤 =
1− 휙(1− 휎)
휎
1− ℓ푗 − 푒푗
ℓ푗
+
1
1− 휓
푒푗
ℓ푗
.
As usual, an interior solution is assumed here. If we use this concept, then the labor-supply
elasticity is higher because the second term is positive, i.e., agents invest less in human-capital
formation when they face a higher wage today, and the marginal utility of human capital remains
unchanged.
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These numbers are higher than the standard microeconomic estimates reported in the
literature, which are typically approximately 0.5. See, e.g., Domeij and Flode´n (2006).
However, these standard estimates are based on prime-age, full-time employed, male
workers. In contrast, Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999) report that the scarce
empirical estimates for females are much higher than for males. Our model is a unisex
model and should, accordingly, represent both sexes. Furthermore, Imai and Keane
(2004) argue that standard estimates are downward-biased by not considering endoge-
nous human-capital accumulation explicitly and thereby not correctly accounting for
the true opportunity cost of time.23 We therefore regard our value of the Frisch elas-
ticity as very reasonable. In Section 2.A of the appendix, a sensitivity analysis further
shows that our main quantitative results are robust to using a higher value of 휎, which
implies a lower Frisch elasticity.
Finally, Figure 2.3(d) shows the cross-sectional wage proﬁle observed in PSID data
in 1990. Our model matches the broad pattern observed in the data.24 We have also
investigated the ﬁt of our model to cross-sectional data on wages and hours in the years
1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000. The model proﬁles are broadly consistent with the data at
all those points in time.
2.4.2 Transitional Dynamics
We divide our analysis of transitional dynamics into two parts. First, we analyze
the behavior of several important aggregate variables from 2005 to 2050. Second, we
investigate the welfare consequences of demographic change for generations already
alive in 2005 and for households born in the future. Throughout, we demonstrate how
the design of the social-security system aﬀects our results.
Aggregate Variables
The evolution of policy variables in the two social-security scenarios is presented in
Figure 2.4. In the “const. 휏” scenario, pensions become less generous over time, which
23Imai and Keane (2004) make this argument in the context of a learning-by-doing model, but similar
biases might be present in our model. We are unaware of any attempt to estimate the Frisch
elasticity with varying time invested empirically in a framework such as ours, which would require
inclusion of the marginal utility of human capital in the set of conditioning variables.
24The wage data were selected using the same criteria as in Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2010). To
smooth the data, we show a centered average of ﬁve subsequent PSID samples.
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Figure 2.4: Evolution of Policy Variables
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(b) Replacement Rate
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Notes: Pension system contribution and replacement rates for the two social-security scenarios. “const.
휏”: constant contribution-rate scenario. “const. 휌”: constant replacement-rate scenario. “endog.
h.c.”: endogenous human-capital model. “exog. h.c.”: exogenous human-capital model.
is represented by a decrease in the replacement rate, from approximately 73% (74%)
in 2005 to 41% (42%) in 2050 for the endogenous (exogenous) human-capital model.
In contrast, in the “const. 휌” scenario, the generosity of the pension system remains at
the 2005 level, implying that contribution rates have to increase from approximately
12% in 2005 to 21% in 2050 in both human-capital models.25
Figure 2.5 reports the dynamics of four major macroeconomic variables for the two
model variants—with endogenous and exogenous human capital—in the “const. 휏”
social-security scenario, and Figure 2.6 does so in the “const. 휌” scenario.
In Figures 2.5(a) and 2.6(a), we show the evolution of the rate of return to physical
capital for the diﬀerent models.26 In the “standard” models with endogenous labor
25As explained in Section 2.2.4, our model of the pension system abstracts from the fact that in the
United States, only the 35 years of working life with the highest individual earnings relative to
average earnings are counted for the calculation of average indexed past earnings. This leads us to
overstate the replacement rate but does not directly aﬀect the level of pensions. Furthermore, we
assume a balanced budget, whereas the U.S. system runs a social-security trust fund that collects
excess paid-in contributions. This biases upward the replacement rate and the level of pensions.
26There are two reasons for the small level diﬀerences in 2005 across the various scenarios. First, our
calibration targets are averages for the period 1960−2004. Second, as already discussed in Section
2.3, we do not recalibrate across scenarios. Such level diﬀerences in initial values can be observed
in all of the following ﬁgures.
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supply only, the rate of return decreases from an initial level of approximately 8.1%
in 2005 to 7.1% in the “const. 휏” scenario and to 7.7% in the “const. 휌” scenario in
2050.27 This magnitude is in line with results reported elsewhere in the literature, cf.,
e.g., Bo¨rsch-Supan et al. (2006) and Kru¨ger and Ludwig (2007), whereas Attanasio
et al. (2007) ﬁnd slightly larger eﬀects. On the contrary, in the two models with
endogenous human-capital adjustment, the rate of return is expected to fall by only
0.4 (0.2) percentage points in the “const. 휏” (“const. 휌”) scenario. This diﬀerence in
the decrease of the rate of return until 2050 between the exogenous and endogenous
human-capital models is large, at a factor of about 2.5.
In Figures 2.5(b) and 2.6(b), we depict the evolution of average hours worked by all
working-age individuals. Average hours worked increase both for the endogenous and
exogenous human-capital models. Observe that there are level diﬀerences between the
two model variants. This is mainly caused by diﬀerences in time invested in human-
capital formation.
Figures 2.5(c) and 2.6(c) show that time invested in human-capital formation increases
when agents are allowed to adjust their human capital. The reasons for this adjust-
ment are that both higher wage growth and a lower rate of return to physical capital
strengthen the incentive to accumulate human capital. Higher wage growth increases
the beneﬁt of a higher earning ability in the future relative to the opportunity cost of
investing in human capital today in the form of foregone labor income. A lower rate
of return to physical capital implies lower discounting of the future beneﬁts of human
capital and increases incentives to invest in human capital today. Speciﬁcally, with
endogenous human capital in the “const. 휏” (“const. 휌”) scenario, average human
capital per working hour increases by approximately 17% (11%) until 2050.
Finally, we focus on the evolution of the growth rate of GDP per capita, as shown in
Figures 2.5(d) and 2.6(d). When the U.S. aging process peaks in 2025 (cf. ﬁgure 2.1),
the growth rate of per-capita GDP falls in all scenarios to its lowest level. The drop
is least pronounced for the endogenous human capital model with a ﬁxed contribution
rate. There, the growth rate gradually declines from 2.2% in 2005 to 1.9% in 2025.28
Comparing the two “const. 휏” scenarios, it can be observed that not adjusting the
human-capital proﬁle entails a large drop in the growth rate. The maximum diﬀerence
27The high initial level of the rate of return is caused by the previous baby boom, which increased
the labor force and hence decreased capital intensity.
28The high initial growth rate is a consequence of the past baby boom, cf. footnote 27.
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Figure 2.5: Aggregate Variables for Constant Contribution-Rate Scenario
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(c) Average Human Capital
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Notes: Rate of return to physical capital, average hours worked of the working-age population, average
human capital per working hour and growth of GDP per capita in the constant contribution-rate social-
security scenario for two model variants. “endog. h.c.”: endogenous human-capital model. “exog.
h.c.”: exogenous human capital model.
circa 2025 is 0.4 percentage points. Although the diﬀerence across human-capital mod-
els is only 0.2 percentage points in the case that the replacement rate is held constant
(“const. 휌” scenarios), the same conclusion applies. The aging process induces relative
price changes, such that agents increase their time invested in human-capital forma-
tion and thereby cushion the negative eﬀects of demographic change on growth. The
cumulative eﬀect of the growth rate diﬀerences between the endogenous and exogenous
human-capital models on the level of GDP per capita is large. With human-capital
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Figure 2.6: Aggregate Variables for Constant Replacement-Rate Scenario
(a) Rate of Return to Physical Capital
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(c) Average Human Capital
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Notes: Rate of return to physical capital, average hours worked of the working-age population, average
human capital per working hour and growth of GDP per capita in the constant replacement-rate social-
security scenario for two model variants. “endog. h.c.”: endogenous human-capital model. “exog.
h.c.”: exogenous human-capital model.
adjustments, the detrended level of GDP per capita will increase by approximately
14% (10%) more until 2050 in the “const. 휏” (“const. 휌”) scenario than without these
adjustments.
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Welfare Eﬀects
In our model, a household’s welfare is aﬀected by two consequences of demographic
change. First, her lifetime utility changes because her own survival probabilities in-
crease. Second, households face a path of declining interest rates, increasing gross
wages and decreasing replacement rates (increasing contribution rates) relative to the
situation without a demographic transition.
We want to isolate the welfare consequences of the second eﬀect. To this end, we
compare for an agent born at time 푡 and of current age 푗 her lifetime utility when
she faces equilibrium factor prices, transfers and contribution (replacement) rates, as
documented in the previous section, with her lifetime utility when she instead faces
prices, transfers and contribution (replacement) rates that are held constant at their
2005 value. For both of these scenarios, we ﬁx the households’ individual survival
probabilities at their 2005 values.29 Following Attanasio et al. (2007) and Kru¨ger and
Ludwig (2007), we then compute the consumption-equivalent variation 푔푡,푗, i.e., the
percentage increase in consumption that needs to be given to an agent with charac-
teristics 푡, 푗 at each date in her remaining lifetime at ﬁxed prices to make her as well
oﬀ as she would be in the situation with changing prices. With our assumptions on
preferences, 푔푡,푗 can be calculated as
푔푡,푗 =
(
푉¯푡,푗
푉¯ 2005푗
) 1
휙(1−휎)
− 1, (2.10)
where 푉¯푡,푗 denotes lifetime utility at changing prices and 푉¯
2005
푗 at ﬁxed 2005 prices.
Positive numbers of 푔푡,푗 thus indicate that households obtain welfare gains from the
general-equilibrium eﬀects of demographic change, and negative numbers indicate wel-
fare losses.
Welfare of Generations Alive in 2005
Of particular interest is how the welfare of all generations already alive in 2005 will be
aﬀected by demographic change. This analysis allows for an inter-generational welfare
comparison of the consequences of demographic change in terms of well-being that
29Of course, they fully retain their age dependency. Welfare calculations based on varying survival
probabilities according to the underlying demographic projections leave our conclusions on welfare
in the comparison across the two models essentially unchanged.
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would not be possible using aggregate statistics such as per-capita GDP. Newborns
and young generations beneﬁt from increasing wages as well as decreasing returns,
if they borrow to ﬁnance their human-capital formation. However, older—and thus
asset-rich—generations are expected to lose lifetime utility. First, they beneﬁt less
from increasing wages because they do not signiﬁcantly adjust their human capital
and because their remaining working period is short. Second, falling returns diminish
their capital income. Third, retirement income decreases in our scenario with constant
contribution rates.
The results shown in Figure 2.7 can be summarized as follows: First, the welfare of
newborn agents is essentially unchanged in the “const. 휏” scenarios, whereas in the
“const. 휌” scenario, newborns experience welfare losses of roughly 4.4% (5.0%) in the
endogenous (exogenous) human-capital model. The fact that these welfare changes
are almost identical in the two human-capital models is due to a complex interaction
between the value of human-capital adjustments, which is positive, and diﬀerential
general-equilibrium eﬀects, which partially oﬀset this interaction.30 Second, middle-
aged agents incur the highest losses in the “const. 휏” scenarios: the maximum loss of
agents is much larger compared to a scenario with ﬁxed replacement rates. Clearly,
constant replacement rates decrease net wages of the young but keep pensions more
generous. This decreases lifetime utility of the young but narrows the loss of utility of
the old (compared to a situation with falling replacement rates). The redistribution
through the pension system shifts the balance somewhat in favor of the old. This also
explains why the maximum of the losses occurs at a much higher age in the “const.
휏” scenario in which agents close to retirement lose interest income and receive lower
pensions. Third, independent of future pension policy, agents lose relatively less in the
endogenous human-capital model. Younger agents can adjust their human capital in
response to higher wages, whereas older (asset-rich) households beneﬁt from a smaller
drop in the interest rate (cf. Figures 2.5(a) and 2.6(a)) and higher pension payments.
Table 2.2 ﬁnally provides numbers on the maximum welfare loss displayed in Figure 2.7
as a summary statistic. In the exogenous human-capital model, the maximum welfare
loss is approximately 12.5% (5.6%) of lifetime consumption in the “const. 휏” (“const.
30Speciﬁcally, the increase of wages and the associated decrease of interest rates is much stronger in
the exogenous human-capital model. As newborn households generally beneﬁt from the combined
eﬀects of increasing wages and decreasing returns, welfare gains from these general-equilibrium
eﬀects are higher in the exogenous human-capital model. This explains why the overall welfare
consequences for newborns across models do not diﬀer much, despite the fact that the value of
human-capital adjustments is positive.
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Figure 2.7: Consumption Equivalent Variation of Agents Alive in 2005
(a) Constant Contribution-Rate Scenario
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(b) Constant Replacement-Rate Scenario
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Notes: Consumption equivalent variation (CEV) in the two social-security scenarios.
휌”) scenario, while it is only 8.7% (4.4%) of lifetime consumption in the endogenous
human-capital model. This exempliﬁes that ignoring the adjustment channel through
human-capital formation leads to quantitatively important biases in the welfare assess-
ments of demographic change.
Table 2.2: Maximum Utility Loss for Generations alive in 2005
Human Capital
Endogenous Exogenous
Const. 휏 (휏푡 = 휏¯ ) -8.7% -12.5%
Const. 휌 (휌푡 = 휌¯) -4.4% -5.6%
Welfare of Future Generations
We next examine the welfare consequences for all future newborns. Figure 2.8 shows
the consumption-equivalent variation for the two models and the two social-security
scenarios. Agents born into a “const 휏”-world experience welfare gains of up to 1.1%
and losses of up to 1.7% of lifetime consumption, depending on how soon after 2005 they
are born. However, welfare losses for future generations may be quite large, despite the
human-capital channel, if the social-security system is not reformed (“const 휌”). These
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losses are between 5.2% and 10.7% of lifetime consumption with exogenous human
capital and not much lower with endogenous human-capital adjustments. Notice, again,
that in our comparison across models, diﬀerences are not large because the positive
value of human-capital adjustments is oﬀset by the more beneﬁcial general-equilibrium
eﬀects in the exogenous human-capital model. For this reason, welfare gains for some
cohorts may even be slightly higher in the exogenous human-capital model when the
contribution rate is held constant.
Figure 2.8: Consumption Equivalent Variation of Agents born in 2005-2050
(a) Constant Contribution-Rate Scenario
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(b) Constant Replacement-Rate Scenario
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Notes: Consumption-equivalent variation (CEV) in the two social-security scenarios.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper ﬁnds that increased investments in human capital may substantially mit-
igate the macroeconomic impact of demographic change, with profound implications
for individual welfare. As labor will be relatively scarce and capital will be relatively
abundant in an aging society, interest rates will fall. As we emphasize, these eﬀects
will be much smaller once we account for changes in human-capital formation. For the
U.S., our simulations predict that if contribution rates (replacement rates) are held
constant, then the rate of return will fall by only 0.5 (0.9) percentage points until
2025 with endogenous human capital, compared to 1.2 (1.3) percentage points in the
standard model with a ﬁxed human-capital proﬁle.
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We also document that the increase in wages, declines in rates of return and changes
to pension contributions and beneﬁts induced by demographic change have substantial
welfare consequences. When human capital cannot adjust, some of the agents alive in
2005 will experience welfare losses of up to 12.5% (5.6%) of lifetime consumption with
constant contribution (replacement) rates. However, importantly, we ﬁnd that these
maximum losses are only 8.7% (4.4%) of lifetime consumption when the human-capital
adjustment mechanism is taken into account.
However, we have operated in a frictionless environment, where all endogenous human-
capital adjustments are driven by relative price changes. If, instead, human-capital
formation is aﬀected by market imperfections, such as borrowing constraints, then
these automatic adjustments will be inhibited. In this case, appropriate education and
training policies in aging societies are an important topic for future research and the
policy agenda.
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Appendix 2.A Sensitivity Analysis
We now provide a sensitivity analysis with respect to the parameter 휎, the inverse of
the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution. In our benchmark model, we set 휎 = 2,
but we now also explore the cases of 휎 = 1 (log-utility) and 휎 = 3. We recalibrate the
model when we vary 휎, such that we match the same calibration targets as in the main
text.
This exercise serves two purposes. First, because 휎 is a predetermined parameter in
our calibration procedure, it is interesting to observe how much our results depend on
our choice of 휎. Second, we want to investigate how sensitive our results are to changes
of the theoretical Frisch labor-supply elasticities in our model. Table 2.3 shows how
varying 휎 generates variation in these elasticities in the diﬀerently calibrated versions
of our model.31 We observe that these experiments generate substantial variation in
labor-supply elasticities. With 휎 = 3 and a constant (variable) time investment, the
“macro” elasticity is approximately 15% (6%) lower than in the benchmark calibration,
while with 휎 = 1, it is approximately 46% (21%) higher than in the benchmark. A
limitation of this sensitivity check is, of course, that we cannot separately identify
the eﬀects of the inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution and the Frisch
labor-supply elasticity on our results.
Table 2.3: Sensitivity Analysis with respect to 휎: Mean Frisch Labor-Supply Elastici-
ties during 1960-1995
Time Investment Time Investment
Constant Variable
휎 = 1 휎 = 2 휎 = 3 휎 = 1 휎 = 2 휎 = 3
Age 30 to 50 1.2 0.8 0.7 1.6 1.3 1.2
Age 20 to 60 1.5 1.0 0.9 2.2 1.8 1.7
All Ages 2.0 1.3 1.2 3.3 2.8 3.0
“Macro” 1.6 1.1 0.9 2.3 1.9 1.8
The ﬁt of our model to the observed cross-sectional proﬁles of consumption, assets,
hours and wages is very similar for all values of 휎 considered here, so detailed ﬁgures are
omitted. Unfortunately, the failure of our model to match the observed consumption
proﬁle cannot be ﬁxed by varying 휎 in this way.
31Footnote 22 explains how the Frisch labor-supply elasticity depends on 휎.
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We next turn to the implications of the diﬀerent parameterizations on the transitional
dynamics of the macroeconomic variables. We omit the ﬁgures for the contribution
and replacement rates of the pension system because the dynamics for the alternative
values of 휎 are almost identical to the benchmark model.
Figure 2.9 presents the evolution of the four major macroeconomic variables for the
“const. 휏” social-security scenario, and Figure 2.10 does so for the “const. 휌” scenario.
We observe that for the alternative values of 휎, the broad dynamics of these variables
are very similar to the benchmark model. The most signiﬁcant diﬀerences are that for
log-utility (휎 = 1), when human capital is exogenous, average hours increase by more,
and the interest rate decreases by less than in the benchmark calibration with 휎 = 2
in the years after 2020.
For the diﬀerent values of 휎, the welfare analysis of demographic change for agents
alive in 2005 is presented in Figure 2.11 and Table 2.4. The welfare results can be
viewed as an important and convenient summary measure of all of the diﬀerences
between diﬀerently parameterized models. We ﬁnd that the welfare assessment of
demographic change does not depend much on the value of 휎 and the comparison
across models with endogenous and exogenous human capital is largely unaﬀected.
We thus conclude that our main quantitative result that human-capital adjustments
mitigate the macroeconomic and welfare eﬀects of demographic change is robust to the
changes of 휎 we considered here.
Table 2.4: Sensitivity Analysis with respect to 휎: Maximum Utility Loss for Genera-
tions Alive in 2005
휎 = 1 휎 = 2 휎 = 3
Human Capital Human Capital Human Capital
Endog. Exog. Endog. Exog. Endog. Exog.
Const. 휏 (휏푡 = 휏¯) -8.4% -11.4% -8.7% -12.5% -8.7% -13.3%
Const. 휌 (휌푡 = 휌¯) -4.4% -5.8% -4.4% -5.6% -4.3% -5.6%
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Figure 2.9: Sensitivity Analysis with respect to 휎: Aggregate Variables for the Constant
Contribution-Rate Scenario
(a) Rate of Return to Physical Capital
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(c) Average Human Capital
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(d) Growth of GDP per Capita in %
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Notes: Rate of return to physical capital, average hours worked of the working-age population, average
human capital per working hour and growth of GDP per capita in the constant contribution-rate social-
security scenario for two model variants and three diﬀerent values of 휎. “endog. h.c.”: endogenous
human-capital model. “exog. h.c.”: exogenous human-capital model.
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Figure 2.10: Sensitivity Analysis with respect to 휎: Aggregate Variables for the Con-
stant Replacement-Rate Scenario
(a) Rate of Return to Physical Capital
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(b) Average Hours Worked
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(c) Average Human Capital
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(d) Growth of GDP per Capita in %
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Notes: Rate of return to physical capital, average hours worked of the working-age population, average
human capital per working hour and growth of GDP per capita in the constant replacement-rate social-
security scenario for two model variants and three diﬀerent values of 휎. “endog. h.c.”: endogenous
human-capital model. “exog. h.c.”: exogenous human-capital model.
86
Figure 2.11: Sensitivity Analysis with respect to 휎: Consumption-Equivalent Variation
of Agents Alive in 2005
(a) Constant Contribution-Rate Scenario
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(b) Constant Replacement-Rate Scenario
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Notes: Consumption-equivalent variation (CEV) in the two social-security scenarios for three diﬀerent
values of 휎. “endog. h.c.”: endogenous human-capital model. “exog. h.c.”: exogenous human-capital
model.
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Appendix 2.B Demographic Model and Data
Our demographic data are based on the Human Mortality Database (2008). Population
of age 푗 in year 푡 is determined by four factors: (i) an initial population distribution in
year 0, (ii) age- and time-speciﬁc mortality rates, (iii) age- and time-speciﬁc fertility
rates and (iv) age- and time-speciﬁc migration rates. We describe here how we model
all of these elements and then brieﬂy compare results of our demographic predictions
with those of United Nations (2007).
Initial Population Distribution
We collect the age- and time-speciﬁc population data for the period 1950− 2004.
Mortality Rates
Our mortality model is based on sex-, age- and time-speciﬁc mortality rates. To simplify
notation, we suppress a separate index for sex. Using data from 1950− 2004, we apply
a Lee-Carter procedure (Lee and Carter 1992) to decompose mortality rates as
ln(1− 휑푡,푗) = 푎푗 + 푏푗푑푡, (2.11)
where 푎푗 and 푏푗 are vectors of age-speciﬁc constants, and 푑푡 is a time-speciﬁc index
that equally aﬀects all age groups. We assume that the time-speciﬁc index, 푑푡, evolves
according to a unit-root process with drift,
푑푡 = 휒 + 푑푡−1 + 휖푡. (2.12)
This implies that 푑푡 is a linear function of time. The estimate of the drift term is
휒ˆ = −1.2891. We then predict mortality rates into the future (until 2100) by holding
푎ˆ푗 , 푏ˆ푗 and 휒ˆ constant and setting 휖푡 = 0 for all 푡. For all years beyond 2100, we hold
survival rates constant at their respective year 2100 values. Figure 2.12 shows the
corresponding path of life expectancy at birth.
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Figure 2.12: Life Expectancy at Birth
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Notes: Our own predictions of life expectancy at birth based on Human Mortality Database (2008).
Fertility Rates
Fertility in our model is age and time speciﬁc. For our predictions, we assume that age-
speciﬁc fertility rates are constant at their respective year 2004 values for all periods
2005, . . . , 2100. For periods after 2100, we assume that the number of newborns is
constant. Because the U.S. reproduction rate is slightly above replacement levels,
this implies that the total fertility rate is slightly decreasing each year from 2100
onwards, until approximately year 2200, when the population converges to a stationary
distribution.
Population Dynamics
We use the estimated fertility and mortality data to forecast future population dynam-
ics. The transition of the population is accordingly given by
푁푡,푗 =
⎧⎨⎩푁푡−1,푗−1휑푡−1,푗−1 for 푗 > 0∑퐽
푖=0 푓푡−1,푖푁푡−1,푖 for 푗 = 0,
(2.13)
where 푓푡,푗 denotes age- and time- speciﬁc fertility rates. Population growth is then
given by 푛푡 =
푁푡+1
푁푡
− 1, where 푁푡 =
∑퐽
푗=0푁푡,푗 is total population in 푡.
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Migration
Migration is exogenous in our economic model. Setting migration equal to zero would
lead us to overestimate future decreases in the working-age population ratio and to
overstate the increases in old-age dependency. We therefore restrict migration to ages
푗 ≤ 15, such that migration plays a similar role as fertility in our economic model.
This simplifying assumption allows us to treat newborns and immigrants alike. We
compute aggregate migration from United Nations (2007) and distribute age-speciﬁc
migrants in each year equally across all ages 0, . . . , 15.
Evaluation
Figures 2.13(a) and 2.13(b) display the predicted working-age population and old-
age dependency ratios, according to our population model and according to United
Nations (2007). Compared to this benchmark, our population model is close to the
UN but predicts a slightly stronger decrease of the working-age population ratio and
a correspondingly stronger increase of the old-age dependency ratio until 2050.
Figure 2.13: Comparison to United Nations Population Data and Predictions
(a) Working-Age Population Ratio
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(b) Old-Age Dependency Ratio
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Notes: Population model: own predictions of the working-age population ratio and old-age dependency
ratio based on Human Mortality Database (2008). UN data: working-age population ratio and old-age
dependency ratio according to United Nations (2007).
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Appendix 2.C Computational Procedures
2.C.1 Household Problem
To simplify the description of the solution of the household model for given prices
(wages and interest rates), transfers and social-security payments, we focus on steady
states and therefore drop the time index 푡. Furthermore, we focus on a de-trended
version of the household problem in which consumption 푐, assets 푎, wages 푤 and
transfers, 푡푟, are transformed into 푐˜ = 푐
퐴
, 푎˜ = 푎
퐴
, 푤˜ = 푤
퐴
and 푡˜푟 = 푡푟
퐴
, where 퐴 is the
technology level growing at the exogenous rate 푔.32 Other variables are not transformed
because they are already stationary.
To understand our transformations of the value functions, notice that utility in the last
period, period 퐽 , takes the form
푢(푐퐽 , 1− 푒퐽 − ℓ퐽) = 푢(푐퐽 , 1) = 퐴
휙(1−휎)푢(푐˜), (2.14)
Observe that the homotheticity of the utility function is inherited by the value function
in period 퐽 and in all other periods. We consequently adjust the discount factor to
훽˜ = 훽휑(1 + 푔)휙(1−휎).
To understand the transformation of the budget constraint, notice that during the
retirement period, the budget constraint is
푎푡+1,푗+1 = (푎푡,푗 + 푡푟푡)(1 + 푟푡) + 휌푡푤푡+푗푟−푗ℎ¯푡+푗푟−푗
푠푡,푗
푗푟 − 1
− 푐푡,푗. (2.15)
Division by the trend component 퐴 then gives
푎˜푡+1,푗+1 =
1
1 + 푔
(
(푎˜푡,푗 + 푡˜푟푡)(1 + 푟푡) + 휌푡푤˜푡+푗푟−푗(1 + 푔)
푗푟−푗ℎ¯푡+푗푟−푗
푠푡,푗
푗푟 − 1
− 푐˜푡,푗
)
.
The term (1+ 푔)푗푟−푗 reﬂects the fact that pension income in the US is only indexed to
inﬂation and not to growth of nominal wages.
32These transformations are made for convenience, to simplify the structure of our computer code.
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Taking corresponding adjustments to the budget constraint during the working period,
the de-trended version of the household problem is then given by
푉 (푎˜, ℎ, 푠, 푗) = max
푐˜,ℓ,푒,푎˜′,ℎ′,푠′
{
푢(푐˜, 1− ℓ− 푒) + 훽˜푉 (푎˜′, ℎ′, 푠′, 푗 + 1)
}
s.t.
푎˜′ =
1
1 + 푔
(
(푎˜ + 푡˜푟)(1 + 푟) + 푦˜ − 푐˜
)
푦˜ =
⎧⎨⎩ℓℎ푤˜(1− 휏) if 푗 < 푗푟휌푤˜푗푟(1 + 푔)푗푟−푗ℎ¯푗푟 푠푗푟푗푟−1 if 푗 ≥ 푗푟
ℎ′ = 푔(ℎ, 푒) (2.16)
푠′ = 푠+ ℓ
ℎ
ℎ¯
(2.17)
ℓ ∈ [0, 1], 푒 ∈ [0, 1].
Here, 푔(ℎ, 푒) is the human-capital technology.
Using the budget constraints, now rewrite the above as
푉 (푎˜, ℎ, 푠, 푗) =
max
푐˜,ℓ,푒,푎˜′,ℎ′
{
푢(푐˜, 1− ℓ− 푒) + 훽˜푉
(
1
1 + 푔
(
(푎˜ + 푡˜푟)(1 + 푟) + 푦˜ − 푐˜
)
, 푔(ℎ, 푒), 푠+ ℓ
ℎ
ℎ¯
, 푗 + 1
)}
s.t.
ℓ ≥ 0.
In the above, we have also replaced the bounded support of time invested and leisure
with a one-side constraint on ℓ because the upper constraints, ℓ = 1, respectively 푒 = 1,
and the lower constraint, 푒 = 0, are never binding due to Inada conditions on the utility
function and the functional form of human-capital technology (see below). Recall that
ℓ = 0 for 푗 ≥ 푗푟.
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Denoting by 휇ℓ the Lagrange multiplier on the inequality constraint for ℓ, we can write
the ﬁrst-order conditions as
푐˜ : 푢푐˜ − 훽˜
1
1 + 푔
푉 ′푎˜′(⋅) = 0 (2.18a)
ℓ : − 푢1−ℓ−푒 + 훽˜
[
ℎ푤˜(1− 휏)
1
1 + 푔
푉 ′푎˜′(⋅) + 푉
′
푠′(⋅)
ℎ
ℎ¯
]
+ 휇ℓ = 0 (2.18b)
푒 : − 푢1−ℓ−푒 + 훽˜푔푒푉
′
ℎ′(⋅) = 0 (2.18c)
and the envelope conditions as
푎˜ : 푉푎˜(⋅) = 훽˜
1 + 푟
1 + 푔
푉 ′푎˜′(⋅) (2.19a)
ℎ : 푉ℎ(⋅) =
⎧⎨⎩훽˜
(
ℓ푤˜(1− 휏) 1
1+푔
푉 ′푎˜′(⋅) + 푔ℎ푉
′
ℎ′(⋅) + 푉
′
푠′(⋅)ℓ
1
ℎ¯
)
if 푗 < 푗푟
훽˜푉 ′ℎ′(⋅)푔ℎ if 푗 ≥ 푗푟
(2.19b)
푠 : 푉푠(⋅) =
⎧⎨⎩훽˜푉
′
푠′(⋅) if 푗 < 푗푟
훽˜
(
푉 ′푠′(⋅) + 휌푤˜푗푟(1 + 푔)
푗푟−푗ℎ¯푗푟
1
푗푟−1
1
1+푔
푉 ′푎˜′
)
if 푗 ≥ 푗푟
(2.19c)
Note that for the retirement period, i.e., for 푗 ≥ 푗푟, equations (2.18b) and (2.18c) are
irrelevant.
From (2.18a) and (2.19a) we obtain
푉푎˜ = (1 + 푟)푢푐˜ (2.20)
and, using the above in (2.18a), the familiar inter-temporal Euler equation for con-
sumption follows as
푢푐˜ = 훽˜
1 + 푟
1 + 푔
푢푐˜′. (2.21)
From (2.18a) and (2.18b) we get the intra-temporal Euler equation for leisure,
푢1−ℓ−푒 = 푢푐˜ℎ
(
푤˜(1− 휏) + (1 + 푔)
푉 ′푠′
푉 ′푎˜′
1
ℎ¯
)
+ 휇ℓ. (2.22)
From the human capital technology (2.3) we further have
푔푒 = 휉휓(푒ℎ)
휓−1ℎ (2.23a)
푔ℎ = (1− 훿
ℎ) + 휉휓(푒ℎ)휓−1푒. (2.23b)
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We loop backwards on 푗 from 푗 = 퐽 − 1, . . . , 1 by taking an initial guess of [푐˜퐽 , ℎ퐽 ] as
given and by initializing 푉푎˜′(⋅, 퐽) = 푉ℎ′(⋅, 퐽) = 푉푠′(⋅, 퐽) = 0. During retirement, that
is, for all ages 푗 ≥ 푗푟, our solution procedure is standard backward shooting using the
ﬁrst-order conditions. However, during the period of human-capital formation, that
is, for all ages 푗 < 푗푟, the ﬁrst-order conditions would not be suﬃcient if the problem
is not a convex-programming problem. Thus, our backward-shooting algorithm will
not necessarily ﬁnd the true solution. In fact, this may be the case in human-capital
models such as ours because the eﬀective wage rate is endogenous (it depends on the
human-capital investment decision). For a given initial guess [푐˜퐽 , ℎ퐽 ], we therefore ﬁrst
compute a solution and then consider variations of initial guesses of [푐˜퐽 , ℎ퐽 ] on a large
grid and check whether we converge to the same unique solution. In all of our scenarios,
we never ﬁnd any multiplicities. The details of our steps are as follows:
1. In each 푗, ℎ푗+1, 푉푎˜′(⋅, 푗 + 1), 푉ℎ′(⋅, 푗 + 1), and 푉푠′(⋅, 푗 + 1) are known.
2. Compute 푢푐˜ from (2.18a).
3. For 푗 ≥ 푗푟, compute ℎ푗 from (2.3) by setting 푒푗 = ℓ푗 = 0 and by taking ℎ푗+1 as
given. Compute 푐˜푗 directly from Equation (2.26) below.
4. For 푗 < 푗푟:
a) Guess ℎ푗
b) Compute 푒푗 from (2.3) as
푒푗 =
1
ℎ푗
(
ℎ푗+1−ℎ푗(1−훿
ℎ)
휉
) 1
휓
. (2.24)
c) Compute 푙푐푟푗 =
1−푒푗−ℓ푗
푐˜푗
, the leisure-to-consumption ratio, from (2.22), as
follows: From our functional-form assumption on utility, marginal utilities
are given by
푢푐˜ =
(
푐˜휙(1− ℓ− 푒)1−휙
)
−휎
휙푐˜휙−1(1− ℓ− 푒)1−휙
푢1−ℓ−푒 =
(
푐˜휙(1− ℓ− 푒)1−휙
)
−휎
(1− 휙)푐˜휙(1− ℓ− 푒)−휙
Hence, we obtain from (2.22) the familiar equation:
푢1−ℓ−푒
푢푐˜
= ℎ
(
푤˜(1− 휏) + (1 + 푔)
푉 ′푠′
푉 ′푎˜′
1
ℎ¯
)
=
1− 휙
휙
푐˜
1− ℓ− 푒
,
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and therefore:
푙푐푟푗 =
1− 푒푗 − ℓ푗
푐˜푗
=
1− 휙
휙
(
ℎ
[
푤˜(1− 휏) + (1 + 푔)
푉 ′푠′
푉 ′푎˜′
1
ℎ¯
])
−1
. (2.25)
d) Next, compute 푐˜푗 as follows. Notice ﬁrst that one may also write marginal
utility from consumption as
푢푐˜ = 휙푐˜
휙(1−휎)−1(1− ℓ− 푒)(1−휎)(1−휙). (2.26)
Using (2.25) in (2.26), we then obtain
푢푐˜ = 휙푐˜
휙(1−휎)−1(푙푐푟 ⋅ 푐˜)(1−휎)(1−휙)
= 휙푐˜−휎 ⋅ 푙푐푟(1−휎)(1−휙). (2.27)
Because 푢푐˜ is given from (2.18a), we can now compute 푐˜ as
푐˜푗 =
(
푢푐˜푗
휙 ⋅ 푙푐푟
(1−휎)(1−휙)
푗
)
−
1
휎
. (2.28)
e) Given 푐˜푗, 푒푗 , compute labor, ℓ푗, as
ℓ푗 = 1− 푙푐푟푗 ⋅ 푐˜푗 − 푒푗 .
f) If ℓ푗 < 0, set ℓ푗 = 0 and recompute 푐˜푗 from (2.26) as
푐˜ =
(
푢푐˜
휙(1− 푒)(1−휎)(1−휙)
) 1
휙(1−휎)−1
.
g) Finally, use (2.23a) in (2.18c) and deﬁne the resulting equation as a distance
function 푓(ℎ). We solve for the root of 푓 to obtain ℎ푗 by a non-linear solver
iterating steps 4a through 4g until convergence. The following proposition
establishes that this solution is unique.
Proposition 1. For given values of human capital next period, ℎ푗+1, and
marginal values next period, 푉 ′푎˜′, 푉
′
ℎ′ and 푉
′
푠′, a solution ℎ푗 to the ﬁrst-order
conditions (2.18a), (2.18b), (2.18c), and the human-capital constraint (2.3)
exists and is unique.
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We present the proof of Proposition 1 after the description of our algorithm.
5. Update as follows:
a) Update 푉푎˜ using either (2.19a) or (2.20).
b) Update 푉ℎ using (2.19b).
c) Update 푉푠 using (2.19c).
Next, loop forward on the human-capital technology (2.3) for given ℎ0 and {푒푗}
퐽
푗=1 to
compute an update of ℎ퐽 denoted by ℎ
푛
퐽 . Compute the present discounted value of
consumption, 푃푉 퐶, and, using the previously computed values {ℎ푛푗 }
퐽
푗=1, {ℓ
푛
푗 }
퐽
푗=1, and
{푝푛푗 }
퐽
푗=푗푟 compute the present discounted value of income, 푃푉 퐼. Use the relationship
푐˜푛0 = 푐˜0 ⋅
푃푉 퐼
푃푉 퐶
(2.29)
to form an update of initial consumption, 푐˜푛0 , and next use the Euler equations for
consumption to form an update of 푐˜퐽 , denoted as 푐˜
푛
퐽 . Deﬁne the distance functions
푔1(푐˜퐽 , ℎ퐽) = 푐˜퐽 − 푐˜
푛
퐽 (2.30a)
푔2(푐˜퐽 , ℎ퐽) = ℎ퐽 − ℎ
푛
퐽 . (2.30b)
In our search for general-equilibrium prices, constraints of the household model are
occasionally binding. Therefore, solution of the system of equations in (2.30) using
Newton-based methods, e.g., Broyden’s method, is unstable. We solve this problem by
a nested Brent algorithm, that is, we solve two nested univariate problems, an outer
one for 푐˜퐽 and an inner one for ℎ퐽 .
Check for uniqueness: Observe that our nested Brent algorithm assumes that the func-
tions in (2.30) exhibit a unique root. What is computed above is a candidate solution
under the assumption that the ﬁrst-order conditions are necessary and suﬃcient. As a
consequence of potential non-convexities of our programming problem, ﬁrst-order con-
ditions may, however, not be suﬃcient, and our procedure may therefore not give the
unique global optimum. To systematically check whether we also always converge to
the unique optimum, we ﬁx, after convergence of the household problem, a large box
around the previously computed [푐˜퐽 , ℎ퐽 ]. Precisely, we choose as boundaries for this
box ±50% of the solutions in the respective dimensions. For these alternative starting
values, we then check whether there is an additional solution to the system of equations
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(2.30). For all of these combinations, our procedure always converged, and we never
detected any such multiplicities.
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider the cases with and without a binding constraint on
labor supply separately.
1. Consider an interior solution for labor supply, i.e., ℓ푗 > 0 and 휇ℓ = 0. In this
case, one can ﬁnd the values of 푒푗 and ℎ푗 satisfying the ﬁrst-order conditions
independently of 푐푗 and 푙푗. Combining the ﬁrst-order conditions for labor supply
(2.18b) and human-capital investment (2.18c) yields
푒푗ℎ푗 =
(
휉휓(1 + 푔)푉ℎ′(⋅)
푤˜(1− 휏)푉푎˜′(⋅) + (1 + 푔)푉
′
푠′
1
ℎ¯
) 1
1−휓
. (2.31)
Note that the term on the right-hand side does not depend on ℎ푗 . Finally,
substituting 푒푗ℎ푗 in Equation (2.3) gives
ℎ푗+1 = ℎ푗(1− 훿
ℎ) + 휉
(
휉휓(1 + 푔)푉ℎ′(⋅)
푤˜(1− 휏)푉푎˜′(⋅) + (1 + 푔)푉 ′푠′
1
ℎ¯
) 휓
1−휓
. (2.32)
Clearly, this equation has a unique solution for ℎ푗. Given this value for ℎ푗,
Equation (2.31) determines a unique value for 푒푗 .
2. Consider a binding constraint on labor supply, i.e., ℓ푗 = 0 and 휇ℓ > 0. In this
case, the values of 푒푗 and ℎ푗 satisfying the ﬁrst-order conditions depend on 푐˜푗.
The ﬁrst-order condition for human-capital investment (2.18c) reads as
(1− 휙)푐˜
휙(1−휎)
푗 (1− 푒푗)
(1−휙)(1−휎)−1 = 훽˜휉휓푒휓−1푗 ℎ
휓
푗 푉
′
ℎ′, (2.33)
and the ﬁrst-order condition for consumption is given by
휙푐˜
휙(1−휎)−1
푗 (1− 푒푗)
(1−휙)(1−휎) = 훽˜
1
1 + 푔
푉 ′푎˜′ . (2.34)
Combining these two equations to eliminate 푐˜푗 yields
ℎ푗 = 푒
1−휓
휓
푗 (1− 푒푗)
1
휓
휎
휙(1−휎)−1Φ
1
휓 , (2.35)
where
Φ = (1− 휙)
(
휙훽˜
1
1 + 푔
푉 ′푎˜′
) 휙(1−휎)
휙(1−휎)−1
(훽˜휉휓푉 ′ℎ′)
−1. (2.36)
The (푒푗 ,ℎ푗) combination we are seeking needs to satisfy Equation (2.35) and the
human-capital constraint (2.3). This means we have a system of two equations
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in the two unknowns, 푒푗 and ℎ푗. Because both equations (2.35) and (2.3) are
continuous, and the admissible values of 푒푗 are in the range 0 ≤ 푒푗 ≤ 1,
∙ existence of a solution follows from the fact that in Equation (2.35), ℎ푗 = 0,
if 푒푗 = 0, and ℎ푗 → ∞, if 푒푗 → 1 because 휙(1 − 휎) < 1; and in Equation
(2.3), ℎ푗 = ℎ푗+1/(1− 훿
ℎ) > 0, if 푒푗 = 0, and ℎ푗 is ﬁnite if 푒푗 = 1.
∙ uniqueness of the solution to these two equations follows because in the
relevant range of 푒푗 ,
∂ℎ푗
∂푒푗
< 0 in Equation (2.3) by the implicit-function
theorem, and
∂ℎ푗
∂푒푗
> 0 in Equation (2.35) because the derivative of ℎ푗 w.r.t.
푒푗 in Equation (2.35) is given by
푒
1−휓
휓
−1
푗 (1− 푒푗)
1
휓
휎
휙(1−휎)−1
(
1− 휓
휓
−
1
휓
휎
휙(1− 휎)− 1
(1− 푒푗)
−1
)
Φ
1
휓 ,
and the second term in brackets is positive for 휙(1− 휎) < 1.
2.C.2 The Aggregate Model
For a given 푟×1 vector Ψ⃗ of structural model parameters, we ﬁrst solve for an “artiﬁcial”
initial steady state in period 푡 = 1, which gives initial distributions of assets and human
capital. We thereby presume that households assume prices to remain constant for all
periods 푡 ∈ {1, . . . , 푇} and are then surprised by the actual price changes induced by
the transitional dynamics. Next, we solve for the ﬁnal steady state of our model, which
is reached in period 푇 and supported by our demographic projections (see Appendix
2.B). For both steady states, we solve for the equilibrium of the aggregate model by
iterating on the 푚 × 1 steady-state vector 푃⃗푠푠 = [푝1, . . . , 푝푚]
′. In our case, 푚 = 4. 푝1
is the capital intensity, 푝2 are transfers (as a fraction of wages), 푝3 are social-security
contribution (or replacement) rates, and 푝4 is the average (hours weighted) human-
capital stock. Notice that all elements of 푃⃗푠푠 are constant in the steady state.
The solution for the respective initial and ﬁnal steady states of the model involves the
following steps:
1. In iteration 푞 for a guess of 푃⃗ 푞푠푠 solve the household problem.
2. Update variables in 푃⃗푠푠 as follows:
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a) Aggregate across households to obtain aggregate assets and aggregate labor
supply to form an update of the capital intensity, 푝푛1 .
b) Calculate an update of bequests to get 푝푛2 .
c) Using the update of labor supply, update social-security contribution (or
replacement) rates to get 푝푛3 .
d) Use labor supply and human-capital decisions to form an update of the
average human-capital stock, 푝푛4 .
3. Collect the updated variables in 푃⃗ 푛푠푠 and notice that 푃⃗
푛
푠푠 = 퐻(푃⃗푠푠) where 퐻 is a
vector-valued non-linear function.
4. Deﬁne the root-ﬁnding problem 퐺(푃⃗푠푠) = 푃⃗푠푠 −퐻(푃⃗푠푠), and iterate on 푃⃗푠푠 until
convergence. We use Broyden’s method to solve the problem and denote the ﬁnal
approximate Jacobi matrix by 퐵푠푠.
Next, we solve for the transitional dynamics by the following steps:
1. Use the steady-state solutions to form a non-linear interpolation to obtain the
starting values for the 푚(푇−2)×1 vector of equilibrium prices, 푃⃗ = [푝⃗′1, . . . , 푝⃗
′
푚]
′,
where 푝푖, 푖 = 1, . . . , 푚 are vectors of length (푇 − 2)× 1.
2. In iteration 푞 for guess 푃⃗ 푞, solve the household problem. We do so by iterating
backwards in time for 푡 = 푇 − 1, . . . , 2 to obtain the decision rules and forward
for 푡 = 2, . . . , 푇 − 1 for aggregation.
3. Update variables as in the steady-state solutions, and denote by
˜⃗
푃 = 퐻(푃⃗ ) the
푚(푇 − 2)× 1 vector of updated variables.
4. Deﬁne the root-ﬁnding problem as 퐺(푃⃗ ) = 푃⃗ −퐻(푃⃗ ). Because 푇 is large, this
problem is substantially larger than the steady-state root-ﬁnding problem, and
we use the Gauss-Seidel-Quasi-Newton algorithm suggested in Ludwig (2007)
to form and update guesses of an approximate Jacobi matrix of the system of
푚(푇 −2) non-linear equations. We initialize these loops with a scaled-up version
of 퐵푠푠.
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2.C.3 Calibration of Structural Model Parameters
We split the 푟 × 1 vector of structural model parameters, Ψ⃗, as Ψ⃗ =
[
(Ψ⃗푒)′, (Ψ⃗푓)′
]
′
.
Ψ⃗푓 is a vector of predetermined (ﬁxed) parameters, whereas the 푒 × 1 vector Ψ⃗푒 is
estimated by minimum distance (unconditional matching of moments using 푒 moment
conditions). Denote by
푢푡(Ψ⃗
푒) = 푦푡 − 푓(Ψ⃗
푒) for 푡 = 1, . . . , 푇0 (2.37)
the GMM error as the distance between actual values, 푦푡, and model-simulated (pre-
dicted) values, 푓(Ψ⃗푒).
Under the assumption that the model is correctly speciﬁed, the restrictions on the
GMM error can be written as
퐸[푢푡(Ψ⃗
푒
0)] = 0, (2.38)
where Ψ˜푒0 denotes the vector of true values. Denote sample averages of 푢푡 as
푔푇0(Ψ⃗
푒) ≡
1
푇0 + 1
푇0∑
푡=0
푢푡(Ψ⃗
푒). (2.39)
We estimate the elements of Ψ⃗푒 by setting these sample averages to zero (up to some
tolerance level).
In our economic model, only two parameters are pre-determined, and we therefore
have
Ψ⃗푓 = [휎, ℎ0]
′ . (2.40)
The vector Ψ⃗푒 is given by
Ψ⃗푒 =
[
푔, 훼, 훿, 훽, 휙, 휓, 휉, 훿ℎ
]
′
. (2.41)
We estimate the structural model parameters using data from various sources for the
period 1960, ..., 2004. Hence 푇0 = 45. The parameters Ψ⃗
푒
1 = [푔, 훼]
′ are directly deter-
mined using NIPA data on GDP, ﬁxed assets, wages and labor supply. The remaining
structural model parameters, Ψ⃗푒2 = [훿, 훽, 휙, 휓, 휉, 훿
ℎ]′ are estimated by simulation. Our
calibration targets are summarized in Table 2.5.
Determining the subset of parameters Ψ⃗푒2 along the transition is a computationally
complex problem that we translate into an equivalent simple problem. The point of
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Table 2.5: Calibration Targets
Parameter Target Moment
Ψ⃗푓
휎 predetermined parameter
ℎ0 predetermined parameter
Ψ⃗푒1
푔퐴 growth rate of Solow residual 0.018
훼 share of wage income 0.33
Ψ⃗푒2
훿 investment output ratio 0.2
훽 capital output ratio 2.8
휙 average hours worked 0.33
휓, 휉, 훿ℎ coeﬃcients of wage polynomial (from PSID)
departure of our procedure is the insight that calibrating the model for a steady state is
easy and fast. However, simulated steady-state moments may diﬀer quite substantially
from simulated averages along the transition, even when the steady state is chosen to
lie in the middle of the calibration period, in our case, year 1980. We therefore proceed
as follows.
1. Initialization: Choose a vector of scaling factors, 푠⃗푓 , of length 푒2 that appropri-
ately scales the steady-state calibration targets (see below).
2. Calibrate the model in some steady-state year, e.g., 1980, by solving the system
of equations
푦¯푒2,푖
푠푓푖
− 푓 푒,푠푠2,푖 (Ψ⃗) (2.42)
for all 푖 = 1, . . . , 푒2 to get
ˆ⃗
Ψ푒2. Here, 푦¯
푒
2,푖 is the average of moment 푖 in the data for
the calibration period (1960-2004), e.g., the investment-output ratio for 푖 = 1.
3. For the estimated parameter vector,
ˆ⃗
Ψ푒2, solve the model along the transition.
4. Compute the relevant simulated moments for the transition, 푓 푒2 (Ψ⃗).
5. Update the vector of scaling vectors as
푠푓푖 =
푓 푒2,푖(Ψ⃗)
푓 푒,푠푠2,푖 (Ψ⃗)
(2.43)
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for all 푖 = 1, . . . , 푒2.
6. Continue with step 2 until convergence on scaling factors (ﬁxed-point problem).
We thereby translate a complex root-ﬁnding problem into a combination of a simple
root-ﬁnding problem (steady-state calibration) and a ﬁxed-point iteration on scaling
factors. Because scaling factors are relatively insensitive to Ψ푒2, convergence is fast
and robust. The resulting scaling factors range from 0.94 to 1.29, which means that
diﬀerences between simulated moments in the artiﬁcial steady-state year (1980) and
averages during the transition are large (up to 30%). This also implies that calibrat-
ing the model in some artiﬁcial steady-state year would lead to signiﬁcantly biased
estimates of structural model parameters.
102
3 Factor Misallocation in Dual
Economies
3.1 Introduction
The idea of a dual economy, understood as a dualism between the agricultural and
non-agricultural sector, has played a central role in economic thought on the develop-
ment process and the characteristics of developing countries. A particular asymme-
try between sectors might be caused by factor market imperfections or distortionary
policies that drive a wedge between the marginal products in agriculture and non-
agriculture, thus leading to factor misallocation. The research question of this paper
is, how severely are physical and human capital misallocated between the agricul-
tural and non-agricultural sector in diﬀerent economies? Thus, this paper is concerned
with estimating the cumulative eﬀect of markets, institutions and transaction costs
on allocative eﬃciency by investigating whether marginal value products are equalized
across the two sectors.
A stylized fact, that motivates the question, is that the ratio of the average product
of labor in non-agriculture to the one in agriculture is larger in poor, dominantly
agricultural countries. Figure 3.1 plots the logarithm of this ratio, sometimes also
called relative labor productivity, 푅퐿푃 1, against the employment share in agriculture
for a cross-section of countries in 1985. It is striking that countries with the largest
1The ratio of average products, 푅퐿푃 , can be calculated as 푅퐿푃 = 푝푚푌푚/퐿푚푝푎푌푎/퐿푎 =
1−푠
푠
푙
1−푙 , where 푝
refers to prices, 푌 to output and 퐿 to the labor force in the two sectors 푎 and 푚, and 푠 denotes
the output share of agriculture at domestic prices and 푙 is the employment share of agriculture.
While this paper always uses output in domestic prices, Caselli (2005) provides purchasing power
parity (PPP) adjusted output numbers for agriculture and non-agriculture in 1985. Interestingly,
a comparison between these two reveals that RLP is even higher in developing countries when it is
evaluated at PPP prices. But for the purpose of this paper using domestic prices seems appropriate
since factor allocation is determined by domestic prices.
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average product diﬀerential employ most of their labor force in a sector where they have
a relatively low productivity. However, these facts do not directly imply that factor
allocation is ineﬃcient in poor countries since an eﬃcient allocation is characterized by
equating marginal value products and not average products. Additional assumptions
are necessary to justify such a conclusion. For example, the ﬁnding is inconsistent with
marginal product equalization and Cobb-Douglas production functions in both sectors
that are identical across countries. The reason is that for the Cobb-Douglas function
average products are proportional to marginal products. This property implies that
if marginal products are equalized between sectors in all countries then the average
product ratio will be a constant and should not vary across countries. In contrast, for
more general production functions one cannot directly draw such strong conclusions.
Another possible explanation for the RLP variation is that skill diﬀerences between
workers in the two sectors could be greater in poor than in rich countries.2
Figure 3.1: Logarithm of the ratio of non-agricultural to agricultural output per worker
in domestic prices versus the agricultural employment share in 1985
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Notes : Based on data on nominal value added shares from the World Development Indicators of
the World Bank (2007) and sectoral employment shares obtained from the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (2004). For the calculation see footnote 1.
2Another possible explanation is that output and labor input are mismeasured in poor countries and
particularly in the agricultural sector. But in the absence of hard evidence on the magnitudes of
such measurement problems, I take the data at face value in this paper and try to explain the
variation across countries observed in ﬁgure 3.1. Gollin, Parente, and Rogerson (2004), Temple
(2005) and Temple and Wo¨ßmann (2006) provide further discussion of the average product ratio,
its potential weaknesses, how it evolves over time and diﬀers across world regions.
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This paper contributes to the literature by providing a novel way to identify the degree
of factor misallocation between the agricultural and non-agricultural sector based on
formal econometric methods and cross-country panel data on output and factor allo-
cations. The analytical framework addresses the diﬀerent points of criticism of RLP
as a measure of factor misallocation discussed above and clariﬁes the relation between
the two. The approach is independent of the assumption that factor prices are equal
to marginal products, which has formed the basis of a prior literature that identiﬁes
misallocation by factor price diﬀerentials.3 The derivation of a meaningful relation-
ship between RLP, the production functions in both sectors and the marginal value
product diﬀerential forms the basis of the analysis. This relation as well as one for
relative capital productivity, RKP, can be used to estimate the relevant parameters
of the production functions in both sectors and the marginal product diﬀerentials by
non-linear regressions. For the production functions this paper employs a very ﬂexible
functional form, the Translog production function, instead of a simple Cobb-Douglas.
The possibility that human capital diﬀerences are responsible for the observed pattern
of RLP is addressed by attempting to appropriately account for the labor input in
eﬃciency units. A sensitivity analysis investigates the role of the critical assumptions
concerning technologies and human capital diﬀerences.
The empirical ﬁndings of the paper are that there is evidence for signiﬁcant capital
and labor misallocation. In most developing countries, the marginal product of labor
is around 1.5 to 5 times higher in non-agriculture than in agriculture, while the one
of capital is around 1.2 to 3 times higher in agriculture than in the non-agricultural
sector. Most industrialized countries are closer to marginal product equalization, but
also tend to have a higher marginal product of labor in non-agriculture, while the
conclusions for capital vary more across countries. A sensitivity analysis reveals that
technological assumptions play an important role for the identiﬁcation of misallocation.
In particular, when Cobb-Douglas functions are used then estimated marginal product
of labor diﬀerentials in developing countries are between 50 and 200 percent higher
compared to the Translog case. The use of Cobb-Douglas functions can thus lead
3This approach is for instance prominent in the literature on implied output losses such as Dougherty
and Selowsky (1973), de Melo (1977) and Williamson (1987), among others. The central drawbacks
of this approach are the obvious need to control for skill diﬀerences and the possibility that factor
prices depart from marginal value products at least in one of the sectors. The latter possibility
has traditionally played an important role in development economics as discussed by Rosenzweig
(1988) in his survey on agricultural and non-agricultural labor markets in developing countries.
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to quantitatively important biases. It is also shown that the assumptions concerning
human capital stocks in the two sectors aﬀect the results, but in a more limited way.
The question and analytical framework of this paper relate to and are motivated by
several strands of the literature. First, it is related to a long history of thought in
development economics on economic dualism, the structural transformation and the
role of agriculture for economic development. Recent studies in this vein that ab-
stract from marginal product diﬀerentials or misallocation are Caselli and Coleman
(2001), Caselli (2005), Gollin, Parente, and Rogerson (2002, 2004, 2007) and Duarte
and Restuccia (2010), among others. Some papers that investigate the role of ineﬃ-
cient factor allocations are Chanda and Dalgaard (2008), Co´rdoba and Ripoll (2006),
Hayashi and Prescott (2008), Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu (2008), Temple (2002), Temple
and Wo¨ßmann (2006) and Vollrath (2009), also see Temple (2005) for a survey. Most
of these studies employ calibrated models and virtually all of them are based on Cobb-
Douglas production functions. This paper contributes to that literature by providing
an econometric framework for the estimation of marginal product diﬀerentials and by
allowing for more general production functions.
The most closely related paper is the one of Vollrath (2009). Based on a cross-country
calibration exercise of Cobb-Douglas production functions he ﬁnds substantial marginal
product diﬀerentials between agriculture and non-agriculture particularly in develop-
ing countries. He also shows that this can explain a large fraction of the aggregate
eﬃciency variation found by the development accounting literature, see for example
Hall and Jones (1999) and Caselli (2005). In contrast to Vollrath’s study, my econo-
metric procedure can allow for general production functions and thus employs the more
ﬂexible Translog instead of a Cobb-Douglas production function. Accordingly, I ﬁnd
much lower labor misallocation in developing countries.
A second line of related research is concerned with misallocation on the microeconomic
level between diﬀerent ﬁrms in the economy or within an industry. There is extensive
evidence on a great heterogeneity of rates of return to the same factor between diﬀer-
ent ﬁrms in the microeconomic development literature surveyed by Banerjee and Duﬂo
(2005). Furthermore, the role of misallocation between ﬁrms for aggregate eﬃciency
is studied by Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) and within the manufacturing sector in
China and India by Hsieh and Klenow (2009). My paper complements this strand of
research by providing macroeconomic evidence on economic dualism and factor misal-
location between diﬀerent broad sectors of the economy.
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The next section develops the framework and estimation procedure for the analysis
of factor misallocation. Section 3.3 describes the data set of a panel of developed
and developing countries. The results are presented in section 3.4 and section 3.5
concludes.
3.2 Analytical Framework
3.2.1 The Relationship between the Average and Marginal
Product Ratio
Consider an economy comprised of two sectors, agriculture and manufacturing4. Total
Output in domestic prices 푌 is given by 푌 = 푝푎푌푎 + 푝푚푌푚, where 푝푎, 푌푎 and 푝푚, 푌푚
refer to prices and output in agriculture and manufacturing. Let 퐾푎, 퐿푎 and 퐾푚, 퐿푚
denote capital and labor employed in the two sectors. Of prime interest to this paper is
the question whether marginal value products are equalized across sectors, i.e. whether
the marginal product ratios 푑푘 ≡
푝푚∂푌푚/∂퐾푚
푝푎∂푌푎/∂퐾푎
and 푑푙 ≡
푝푚∂푌푚/∂퐿푚
푝푎∂푌푎/∂퐿푎
are equal to one. The
following key equations of the paper show that a meaningful relationship between the
average product ratio of a factor and the corresponding marginal product ratio exists
as5
푅퐾푃 ≡
푝푚
푌푚
퐾푚
푝푎
푌푎
퐾푎
=
푝푚
∂푌푚
∂퐾푚
푝푎
∂푌푎
∂퐾푎
∂푌푎
∂퐾푎
퐾푎
푌푎
∂푌푚
∂퐾푚
퐾푚
푌푚
=
∂푌푎
∂퐾푎
퐾푎
푌푎
∂푌푚
∂퐾푚
퐾푚
푌푚
푑푘 (3.1)
푅퐿푃 ≡
푝푚
푌푚
퐿푚
푝푎
푌푎
퐿푎
=
푝푚
∂푌푚
∂퐿푚
푝푎
∂푌푎
∂퐿푎
∂푌푎
∂퐿푎
퐿푎
푌푎
∂푌푚
∂퐿푚
퐿푚
푌푚
=
∂푌푎
∂퐿푎
퐿푎
푌푎
∂푌푚
∂퐿푚
퐿푚
푌푚
푑푙. (3.2)
The equations show that one can only draw conclusions from data on 푅퐾푃 or 푅퐿푃 on
the marginal product diﬀerential if one also uses information and assumptions on the
ratio of the output elasticity in agriculture to the one in manufacturing at the present
allocation. From here, there are at least two ways to proceed with the analysis - an
econometric and a calibration approach. Both of them have their respective advantages
and require diﬀerent identifying assumptions.
4I follow the convention in the literature and name the second sector manufacturing even though it
is meant to represent the total non-agricultural part of the economy.
5The equation uses the simple fact that average products are equal to marginal products times the
inverse of the elasticity.
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This paper employs an econometric approach that rests on assumptions ensuring that
the output elasticity of a factor does only depend on observable factors and not on
unobservable technology terms. Two well-known cases that have these properties are
general production functions with factor-neutral (Hicks-neutral) technological change
and the Cobb-Douglas production function irrespective of whether technology is factor-
neutral, labor or capital augmenting since the output elasticity of the Cobb-Douglas is
in all cases simply a constant. The ﬁrst case will be used for the following derivation
since it essentially also covers the second one. Assume output in the two sectors is
produced according to
푌푎 = 퐴푎퐹 (퐾푎, 퐿푎, 푇푎) (3.3)
푌푚 = 퐴푚퐺(퐾푚, 퐿푚), (3.4)
where 푇푎 denotes land, which is only used in agricultural production. 퐴푎 and 퐴푚
refer to the level of TFP in agriculture and manufacturing. The functions 퐹 and 퐺
are assumed to satisfy the standard neoclassical properties. The output elasticity of a
factor is then equal to the respective elasticity of 퐹 or 퐺. Accordingly, the equations
for 푅퐾푃 and 푅퐿푃 read as
푅퐾푃 =
∂퐹
∂퐾푎
퐾푎
퐹
∂퐺
∂퐾푚
퐾푚
퐺
푑푘 (3.5)
푅퐿푃 =
∂퐹
∂퐿푎
퐿푎
퐹
∂퐺
∂퐿푚
퐿푚
퐺
푑푙. (3.6)
The elasticities on the right hand side only depend on the allocation of factors of
production, but no longer on unobservable technology levels. This property simpliﬁes
the following econometric analysis considerably and enables me (together with addi-
tional identifying assumptions that are explained in the next section) to use standard
non-linear estimation methods6. Intuitively, this approach decomposes the variation of
푅퐾푃 and 푅퐿푃 into a part that is due to the variation of observable factors of pro-
duction and an unobservable part that is attributed to marginal product diﬀerentials.
The details will be explained in the following section.
6In principle, to the extend that the technology level does aﬀect the output elasticity, variation in
the relative technology level in the two sectors between countries could explain part of the 푅퐾푃
and 푅퐿푃 variation across countries and time periods. This means that it is theoretically possible
that there is a purely technological explanation for the observed variation of average product ratios
even without marginal product diﬀerentials. At the same time more general forms of technology
could also have the opposite eﬀect and be consistent with true marginal product diﬀerentials that
are larger than the ones identiﬁed by this paper.
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We can also relate the two equations back to the discussion of Figure 3.1 in the intro-
duction and the example of Cobb-Douglas production functions. For a Cobb-Douglas,
the output elasticity of a factor is a constant and equal to the exponent to the factor in
the production function.7 Accordingly, any variation of 푅퐾푃 or 푅퐿푃 across countries
or time periods must be attributed to changes of the marginal product diﬀerential.
One could visualize this by drawing a horizontal line in Figure 3.1 at a level equal to
the logarithm of the output elasticity ratio (even though we do not know it yet) and
any deviations from the line would then represent the logarithm of the marginal prod-
uct diﬀerential. This illustrates again how restrictive the Cobb-Douglas production
function is in this context. Accordingly, this paper allows for more ﬂexible produc-
tion functions where the output elasticity may depend on the allocation of factors of
production.
In contrast to an econometric procedure, a calibration approach could rely on the the-
oretical prediction that under perfect competition factor prices are equal to marginal
value products. This in turn implies that the output elasticity of a factor is equal to
the factor income share8. The marginal product diﬀerentials could then be calculated
directly from data on 푅퐾푃 , 푅퐿푃 and sector-speciﬁc factor income shares for each
country and time period. From this discussion it is clear that both approaches have
their beneﬁts. While the calibration approach is independent of a speciﬁc functional
form of the production functions, restrictions on technological change and further iden-
tifying assumptions described in the next section, the econometric approach does not
rely on factor prices being equal to marginal value products. Given the controversial
discussion in development economics on factor price formation and especially wages
in agriculture, the independence of the econometric approach from the way factor
prices are related to marginal products is an important advantage. Another compli-
cation of the calibration approach is that reported data on labor income shares tends
to underestimate the true labor income share due to the fact that labor income of
the self-employed is often treated as capital income as argued by Gollin (2002). This
measurement problem might be particularly severe in the agricultural sector in poor
countries due to the existence of small-scale subsistence farming. Though I do not
7Therefore, Cobb-Douglas production functions are also immune to the “purely technological” criti-
cism mentioned in the previous footnote. A Cobb-Douglas can only explain variation in 푅퐾푃 and
푅퐿푃 when the share parameters vary.
8For example for labor, if the wage rate 푤 is given by 푤 = 푝∂푌∂퐿 then the labor income share
푤퐿
푝푌 is
given by 푤퐿푝푌 =
∂푌
∂퐿
퐿
푌 .
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follow the calibration approach here, I am planning to investigate it in more detail in
future work.
3.2.2 The Econometric Model
This section discusses the estimation method and further identifying assumptions. This
paper follows a standard practice in applied economics by ﬁrst deriving an economic
model and then adding a stochastic error term to the equations. Taking logarithms of
equations (3.5) and (3.6) and adding error terms 휀푘 and 휀푙 yields
ln(푅퐾푃푖푡) = 푓(푋푖푡, 훽) + 훿푘푖 + 휀푘푖푡 (3.7)
ln(푅퐿푃푖푡) = 푔(푋푖푡, 훽) + 훿푙푖 + 휀푙푖푡, (3.8)
where
푓(.) ≡ ln
(
∂퐹
∂퐾푎
퐾푎
퐹
/
∂퐺
∂퐾푚
퐾푚
퐺
)
,
푔(.) ≡ ln
(
∂퐹
∂퐿푎
퐿푎
퐹
/
∂퐺
∂퐿푚
퐿푚
퐺
)
,
푋푖푡 ≡ (퐾푎푖푡, 퐿푎푖푡, 푇푎푖푡, 퐾푚푖푡, 퐿푚푖푡),
훿푘푖 ≡ ln(푑푘푖),
훿푙푖 ≡ ln(푑푙푖),
and 훽 are the parameters of the two production functions, 푖 is a country index and 푡
a time index. The error terms 휀푘 and 휀푙 are assumed to have mean zero and are iid
across countries and time periods and strictly exogenous with respect to the explana-
tory variables of the model. But the errors of the two equations may be correlated.
Accordingly, (휀푘푖푡, 휀푙푖푡)
′ may have a general variance-covariance matrix Σ.
The country-speciﬁc marginal value product diﬀerentials 푑푘 and 푑푙, and hence the terms
훿푘푖 and 훿푙푖, are assumed to be constant over time. This assumption is based on the view
that institutional features of a country tend to be very persistent over time. Examples
of such institutions that could drive a wedge between marginal products include tax
rates on wage income or expropriation risk of capital returns that diﬀer between the
two sectors, or there could be intersectoral mobility barriers like migration costs or
costly education requirements in the urban sector. Though it seems plausible that
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these institutions are unlikely to change very much from year to year, I also allow the
marginal product diﬀerentials to vary over time in the sensitivity analysis of section
3.4.2. There I ﬁnd that the results obtained in the baseline speciﬁcation with constant
wedges are relatively robust. The prime interest of the paper is to identify the terms
훿푘푖 and 훿푙푖 (and consequently 푑푘푖 and 푑푙푖) for each country and to check whether they
are zero (one).9
The choice of the production functions is also an important identifying assumption.
This choice could in principle be guided by evidence from past studies, but essentially
it is to a certain extent arbitrary. One could address this issue by experimenting with
diﬀerent functional forms and reporting their robustness or by adopting very general
production functions that nest diﬀerent well-known cases. This paper uses to some
extend both approaches by employing the ﬂexible Translog production function which
can be interpreted as a second order approximation to a general production function10
and by also reporting results for the Cobb-Douglas as a sensitivity analysis. Speciﬁcally,
the production function in agriculture is given by
ln퐹 = 훼퐾푎 ln퐾푎 + 훼퐿푎 ln퐿푎 + 훼푇푎 ln푇푎 +
1
2
훽퐾퐾푎(ln퐾푎)
2 +
1
2
훽퐿퐿푎(ln퐿푎)
2
+
1
2
훽푇푇푎(ln푇푎)
2 + 훽퐾퐿푎(ln퐾푎)(ln퐿푎) + 훽퐾푇푎(ln퐾푎)(ln푇푎) + 훽퐿푇푎(ln퐿푎)(ln푇푎),
and the one in manufacturing by
ln퐺 = 훼퐾푚 ln퐾푚 + 훼퐿푚 ln퐿푚 +
1
2
훽퐾퐾푚(ln퐾푚)
2 +
1
2
훽퐿퐿푚(ln퐿푚)
2
+훽퐾퐿푚(ln퐾푚)(ln퐿푚).
The relevant functions for the estimation, the ratios of the output elasticities, 푓 and
푔, in equations (3.7) and (3.8) then read as
푓(푋푖푡, 훽) = ln
(
훼퐾푎 + 훽퐾퐾푎 ln퐾푎푖푡 + 훽퐾퐿푎 ln퐿푎푖푡 + 훽퐾푇푎 ln푇푎푖푡
훼퐾푚 + 훽퐾퐾푚 ln퐾푚푖푡 + 훽퐾퐿푚 ln퐿푚푖푡
)
푔(푋푖푡, 훽) = ln
(
훼퐿푎 + 훽퐿퐿푎 ln퐿푎푖푡 + 훽퐾퐿푎 ln퐾푎푖푡 + 훽퐿푇푎 ln푇푎푖푡
훼퐿푚 + 훽퐿퐿푚 ln퐿푚푖푡 + 훽퐾퐿푚 ln퐾푚푖푡
)
.
9Note that the speciﬁcations in this paper do not include time eﬀects. Exploring the possibility that
there are shocks aﬀecting all countries in the same way in a given year could be interesting, but is
left for future research.
10Greene (2003, pp. 12-13) provides a derivation and Berndt and Christensen (1973) discuss some
properties of the Translog.
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These two equations reveal two related identiﬁcation problems associated with pro-
duction functions of the Translog form. First, one can multiply all parameters in the
numerator and denominator of the ratio by the same constant without changing the ra-
tio. Second, numerator and denominator implicitly contain an additive constant term
in addition to the country-speciﬁc terms 훿푘푖 and 훿푙푖 reﬂecting the marginal product dif-
ferentials. Rewriting the two equations of the model in terms of identiﬁable parameters
yields
ln(푅퐾푃푖푡) = ln
(
휋푘1 + ln퐾푎푖푡 + 휋푘2 ln퐿푎푖푡 + 휋푘3 ln푇푎푖푡
휋푘4 + ln퐾푚푖푡 + 휋푘5 ln퐿푚푖푡
)
+ 훼푘푖 + 휀푘푖푡 (3.9)
ln(푅퐿푃푖푡) = ln
(
1 + 휋푙1 ln퐿푎푖푡 + 휋푙2 ln퐾푎푖푡 + 휋푙3 ln푇푎푖푡
휋푙4 + ln퐿푚푖푡 + 휋푙5 ln퐾푚푖푡
)
+ 훼푙푖 + 휀푙푖푡, (3.10)
where11
휋푘0 =
훽퐾퐾푎
훽퐾퐾푚
, 휋푘1 =
훼퐾푎
훽퐾퐾푎
, 휋푘2 =
훽퐾퐿푎
훽퐾퐾푎
, 휋푘3 =
훽퐾푇푎
훽퐾퐾푎
, 휋푘4 =
훼퐾푚
훽퐾퐾푚
, 휋푘5 =
훽퐾퐿푚
훽퐾퐾푚
,
휋푙0 =
훼퐿푎
훽퐿퐿푚
, 휋푙1 =
훽퐿퐿푎
훼퐿푎
, 휋푙2 =
훽퐾퐿푎
훼퐿푎
, 휋푙3 =
훽퐿푇푎
훼퐿푎
, 휋푙4 =
훼퐿푚
훽퐿퐿푚
, 휋푙5 =
훽퐾퐿푚
훽퐿퐿푚
,
훼푘푖 = ln 휋푘0 + 훿푘푖, 훼푙푖 = ln휋푙0 + 훿푙푖.
Accordingly, one cannot identify the distortion terms 훿푘푖 and 훿푙푖 independently from
휋푘0 and 휋푙0, but only the ﬁxed eﬀects 훼푘푖 = ln 휋푘0+ 훿푘푖 and 훼푙푖 = ln 휋푙0+ 훿푙푖 are identi-
ﬁed. Nevertheless, the diﬀerence between the ﬁxed eﬀects estimates of two countries is
meaningful. If one is able to choose a reference country, say country 1, with perfectly
integrated factor markets then 훼ˆ푗푖−훼ˆ푗1 is an unbiased estimate of country 푖’s distortion
term 훿푗푖 for factor 푗 = 푘, 푙, and the implied 푑푗푖 = exp(훼ˆ푗푖 − 훼ˆ푗1) estimates country 푖’s
marginal value product diﬀerential. Of course, this means that the ﬁnal estimates of
the marginal product diﬀerentials depend to a certain extend on the preconceptions of
the researcher12. This paper will use the United States as the reference country with
11This transformation implicitly rests on the assumption that the parameter ratios 훽퐾퐾푎훽퐾퐾푚 and
훼퐿푎
훽퐿퐿푚
are positive. If they are negative one will need minus signs at the appropriate places inside the
log functions. The implementation of the estimation problem allows for this possibility. Also note
that no restrictions such as constant returns to scale are imposed on the parameters.
12We can again relate this ﬁnding back to the discussion of the Cobb-Douglas production function,
which is a special case of a Translog. Consider drawing a ”no marginal product diﬀerential” line
in Figure 3.1. It is obvious now that data on output and factor allocations in the two sectors
alone do not inform us about the location of this line. Instead one needs additional information
or assumptions. Standard calibration exercises based on the Cobb-Douglas production function
as the one of Vollrath (2009) typically rely on the assumption that wages are equal to marginal
products (in the U.S.) and thus estimate the relevant parameter by factor income shares from the
United States.
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presumably undistorted factor markets. But the reader is welcome to choose another
country. In case the reference country should not have perfectly integrated factor mar-
kets, i.e. have true 훿’s equal to zero, one still estimates the distortion of country 푖
relative to the one of the reference country in an unbiased way.
Equations (3.9) and (3.10) form a system of two nonlinear seemingly unrelated regres-
sion equations13. The production function parameters 휋 and country ﬁxed-eﬀects 훼푖
are estimated by a two-step feasible generalized least squares procedure. The ﬁrst step
uses the identity matrix as an initial weighting matrix for the errors of the two equa-
tions. In the absence of cross-equation parameter restrictions, as is the case here, this
is equivalent to equation-by-equation nonlinear least squares (NLLS). From the esti-
mated ﬁrst step residuals one can compute a consistent estimate of the error covariance
matrix Σ, which is then used as the weighting matrix in the second step.
3.3 Data Sources
The data set used in this study is a panel of 49 developed and developing countries
observed between 1967 and 1992.14 The panel is unbalanced and the observed time
periods range from 3 to 26 years with the average being approximately 21.5 years.
The total number of country-year observations is 1055. The remainder of this section
describes the data sources and provides a discussion of how this paper attempts to
control for human capital diﬀerences between the two sectors.
The ratio of non-agricultural to agricultural output in domestic prices, 푝푚푌푚
푝푎푌푎
, can be
computed as 1−푠
푠
, where 푠 is the share of agriculture in nominal value added obtained
from the World Bank’s (2007) World Development Indicators.
13Gallant (1987) provides an excellent discussion of non-linear estimation methods including system
estimation.
14The observed countries and time periods are: Argentina 1967-1992, Australia 1971-1992, Aus-
tria 1971-1992, Canada 1971-1992, Chile 1967-1992, Colombia 1967-1992, Costa Rica 1967-1992,
Cyprus 1975-1992, Denmark 1971-1992, Dominican Republic 1967-1992, Egypt 1975-1992, El Sal-
vador 1990-1992, Finland 1971-1992, France 1971-1992, Greece 1971-1992, Guatemala 1967-1992,
Honduras 1967-1992, India 1967-1992, Indonesia 1967-1992, Iran 1967-1992, Ireland 1971-1992,
Italy 1971-1992, Japan 1971-1992, Kenya 1967-1992, Malawi 1967-1992, Malta 1967-1992, Mau-
ritius 1977-1992, Netherlands 1971-1992, New Zealand 1971-1992, Norway 1971-1992, Pakistan
1967-1992, Peru 1970-1979&1986-1992, Philippines 1967-1992, Poland 1985-1992, Portugal 1971-
1992, South Africa 1967-1992, South Korea 1967-1992, Sri Lanka 1967-1992, Sweden 1971-1992,
Syria 1985-1992, Tanzania 1990-1992, Trinidad & Tobago 1984-1992, Tunisia 1967-1992, Turkey
1968-1992, United Kingdom 1971-1992, United States 1971-1992, Uruguay 1983-1992, Venezuela
1967-1992, Zimbabwe 1967-1992.
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The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2004) provides data on
the number of economically active in agriculture and in total, that is used to determine
the number of workers in agriculture, 푁푎, and non-agriculture, 푁푚.
Data on physical capital is taken from Crego, Larson, Butzer, and Mundlak (1998), who
have constructed a database on agricultural, manufacturing and economy-wide ﬁxed
capital. For the capital stock in agriculture, 퐾푎, I use their series on total agricultural
capital that contains ﬁxed capital, as well as livestock and tree capital. Non-agricultural
capital stocks, 퐾푚, are calculated as economy-wide ﬁxed capital minus agricultural
ﬁxed capital.
For agricultural land, 푇푎, I use data on the amount of arable land in hectares from the
World Development Indicators.
Following the literature, this paper determines the amount of labor input in eﬃciency
units as the product between the number of workers and their average human capital
stock. Human capital stocks of workers are modeled as a function of years of schooling.
Years of education by sector are obtained from Timmer (2002), who provides a panel
data set of 65 developing countries on average years of education per person over the
age of 25 for the rural and urban population. I apply the rural years of education to
all agricultural workers and the urban years to all non-agricultural workers. Since the
data set only contains developing countries and only has data at a ﬁve year frequency
from 1960 to 1985 I follow Vollrath (2009) and rely on an extra- and interpolation
technique to construct sectoral years of schooling for other countries and time periods.
There exists a regularity between the sectoral education data and data on the level of
overall education provided by Barro and Lee (2001). Speciﬁcally, one can observe that
rural years of education converge towards urban years of education as total years of
education increase. This relationship is then used to construct years of schooling for
mainly industrialized countries that only have data on the overall level of education as
well as for all countries for the time periods 1990 and 1995 that are not covered by the
sectoral data. Finally, a linear interpolation between the real and imputed data points
at a ﬁve year frequency is used to get annual data. Details on the applied procedure
are provided in appendix 3.A.
Average years of schooling by sector, 푠, are translated into sectoral human capital
stocks, ℎ, using a Mincerian technique, speciﬁcally ℎ = exp(휙(푠)). Hall and Jones
(1999) assume that 휙(푠) is piecewise linear and that the return to schooling is 13.4%
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for the ﬁrst four years, 10.1% for the next four years and 6.8% for subsequent years15.
The baseline speciﬁcation of this paper follows Vollrath (2009) in using this functional
form, but applying these rates of return only to the non-agricultural sector and only
one half of them to the agricultural sector. Essentially, this choice of a relative return
to schooling in agriculture is arbitrary. Accordingly, a sensitivity analysis explores
the robustness of the baseline results with respect to the two polar cases of either the
relative return being equal to one or zero, i.e. returns to schooling being identical
in both sectors and the case where schooling does not increase labor productivity in
agriculture. These robustness checks will reveal that the choice of a relative return
does aﬀect the results, but this eﬀect is limited.16
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Baseline Speciﬁcation
This section presents the results of my baseline speciﬁcation which is characterized
by the use of Translog production functions, constant marginal product wedges and
returns to schooling in agriculture that are only one half of those in non-agriculture
as described above. The next section then performs a sensitivity analysis concerning
changes to production technologies, assumptions on the wedges and the human capital
calibration.
Table 3.1 columns (1) and (2) present the marginal value product diﬀerentials of labor
and capital implied17 by the ﬁxed eﬀects estimates for the baseline speciﬁcation. For
15Speciﬁcally, 휙(푠) = 0.134 ⋅ 푠 if 푠 ≤ 4, 휙(푠) = 0.134 ⋅ 4 + 0.101 ⋅ (푠 − 4) if 4 < 푠 ≤ 8, 휙(푠) =
0.134 ⋅ 4 + 0.101 ⋅ 4 + 0.068 ⋅ (푠 − 8) if 푠 > 8. Bils and Klenow (2000) also use Mincer regression
coeﬃcients to construct human capital stocks and provide evidence of diminishing returns to
schooling.
16Another potential concern with the used numbers for the return to schooling is that they are
based on wage regressions (Psacharopoulos 1994) that not always included industry dummies.
If wage diﬀerentials between sectors exist and the well-educated workers work in the high-wage
sector then one would overestimate the pure human capital eﬀect of schooling that makes workers
more productive. This might be inconsequential if one is only interested in the individual return to
schooling such that the possibility to work in a high-wage sector could be regarded as an important
component of this return. But if the primary interest lies in appropriately accounting for the labor
input in eﬃciency units then one would make a mistake. As a robustness check, returns to schooling
were scaled down by a factor of 0.75. The (not reported) results of this exercise revealed that the
absolute level of returns to schooling does not aﬀect the baseline results in a signiﬁcant way.
17As explained above, the reported estimates are based on choosing the United States as the reference
country whose factor markets are suspected to be perfectly integrated. In case the reference country
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purposes of clarity, ﬁgure 3.2 plots the estimated marginal product diﬀerentials against
the employment share of agriculture, which may be considered as a measure of eco-
nomic development, and contrasts the ﬁndings for capital and labor. In 44 countries
the marginal value product of labor is higher in non-agriculture than in agriculture
indicating that factor markets might be distorted towards agriculture. For 5 countries
the opposite holds. Marginal value products of capital are higher in agriculture than
in non-agriculture in 30 countries and lower in 19 countries. For most countries, the
deviation of marginal product diﬀerentials from one is statistically signiﬁcant. This
ﬁnding suggests that labor markets seem to be mostly distorted towards agriculture
and capital markets in favor of non-agriculture. In addition to the type of distortions it
is also interesting to compare the magnitude of the marginal product diﬀerentials. The
wedges between marginal products of labor seem to be higher and more common than
those of capital. For example, there are 16 countries with marginal product of labor
diﬀerentials above 2, but only ﬁve countries with marginal product of capital diﬀeren-
tials below 0.5. Using the agricultural employment share as a measure for development,
many industrialized countries seem to be relatively close to marginal product of labor
equalization across sectors, while in developing countries the marginal product of labor
is higher in non-agriculture. In developing countries, the marginal product of capital
tends to be higher in agriculture than in non-agriculture. In contrast, for industrial-
ized countries the results for capital vary more across countries. When considering the
combination of distortions to capital and labor markets there are two main groups of
countries. One group distorts both labor and capital markets in favor of agriculture,
while the other one distorts labor markets in favor of agriculture and capital markets
in favor of non-agriculture. Most developing countries in the data set except the least
developed ones are members of the latter group. A third smaller group seems to dis-
tort both capital and labor markets in favor of non-agriculture. These results support
the view that economic dualism, understood as imperfectly integrated factor markets,
might be an important characteristic of developing countries.
should not have perfectly integrated factor markets, i.e. have true 훿’s equal to zero, one still
estimates the distortion of country 푖 relative to the one of the reference country in an unbiased
way. For convenience, I will base most of the following discussion on the assumption that the
United States indeed have perfectly integrated factor markets. But the reader is welcome to insert
the caveat at the appropriate places. Table 3.1 provides all necessary information for the reader
to compute the implied marginal product diﬀerentials choosing another country as the reference
country.
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Table 3.1: Marginal Value Product Diﬀerentials
Sensitivity Analysis
Baseline Speciﬁcation Cobb-Douglas Time Trends Zero Return in Agric. Same Return
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Country MPLm
MPLa
MPKm
MPKa
MPLm
MPLa
MPKm
MPKa
MPLm
MPLa
MPKm
MPKa
MPLm
MPLa
MPKm
MPKa
MPLm
MPLa
MPKm
MPKa
Argentina 1.30 (0.07) 1.16 (0.08) 1.68 (0.07) 1.39 (0.11) 1.38 (0.08) 1.18 (0.06) 1.46 (0.07) 1.18 (0.08) 1.17 (0.06) 1.14 (0.07)
Australia 0.77 (0.04) 0.74 (0.04) 0.97 (0.05) 0.89 (0.04) 0.84 (0.05) 0.90 (0.04) 0.75 (0.04) 0.73 (0.04) 0.81 (0.05) 0.76 (0.04)
Austria 1.67 (0.09) 1.11 (0.05) 1.91 (0.06) 1.00 (0.03) 1.79 (0.14) 0.81 (0.05) 1.82 (0.11) 1.17 (0.05) 1.51 (0.08) 1.06 (0.05)
Canada 1.11 (0.05) 1.12 (0.04) 1.24 (0.05) 1.33 (0.04) 1.19 (0.05) 1.24 (0.04) 1.09 (0.04) 1.12 (0.04) 1.15 (0.05) 1.14 (0.04)
Chile 2.19 (0.13) 1.40 (0.07) 3.18 (0.19) 1.55 (0.07) 2.36 (0.19) 1.15 (0.07) 2.52 (0.15) 1.47 (0.08) 1.86 (0.11) 1.34 (0.07)
Colombia 1.54 (0.09) 0.81 (0.04) 2.38 (0.10) 0.70 (0.04) 1.63 (0.14) 0.50 (0.04) 2.02 (0.12) 0.90 (0.05) 1.15 (0.07) 0.72 (0.04)
Costa Rica 1.53 (0.13) 1.02 (0.08) 2.31 (0.11) 1.14 (0.06) 1.80 (0.23) 0.68 (0.06) 1.76 (0.17) 1.17 (0.10) 1.28 (0.11) 0.91 (0.07)
Cyprus 1.50 (0.13) 0.85 (0.07) 2.60 (0.13) 0.82 (0.04) 1.85 (0.24) 0.58 (0.05) 1.46 (0.13) 0.92 (0.08) 1.44 (0.12) 0.82 (0.06)
Denmark 1.34 (0.06) 1.07 (0.05) 1.32 (0.06) 1.16 (0.03) 1.51 (0.09) 0.92 (0.05) 1.34 (0.06) 1.10 (0.05) 1.34 (0.07) 1.06 (0.04)
Dominican Rep. 1.37 (0.09) 0.52 (0.03) 2.59 (0.15) 0.48 (0.02) 1.52 (0.14) 0.38 (0.03) 1.74 (0.12) 0.59 (0.04) 1.04 (0.06) 0.48 (0.03)
Egypt 2.32 (0.16) 0.84 (0.06) 4.33 (0.27) 0.39 (0.01) 2.40 (0.22) 0.36 (0.04) 3.49 (0.27) 1.05 (0.08) 1.49 (0.10) 0.66 (0.04)
El Salvador 1.56 (0.12) 0.56 (0.05) 3.00 (0.16) 0.42 (0.03) 1.73 (0.17) 0.33 (0.03) 2.06 (0.16) 0.67 (0.06) 1.14 (0.09) 0.49 (0.04)
Finland 1.12 (0.06) 0.77 (0.04) 1.50 (0.06) 0.74 (0.03) 1.23 (0.09) 0.65 (0.03) 1.17 (0.06) 0.79 (0.04) 1.06 (0.06) 0.75 (0.03)
France 1.39 (0.05) 0.96 (0.03) 1.64 (0.06) 0.85 (0.02) 1.40 (0.06) 0.81 (0.04) 1.63 (0.07) 1.00 (0.03) 1.20 (0.05) 0.92 (0.03)
Greece 1.45 (0.08) 0.61 (0.03) 2.87 (0.15) 0.47 (0.02) 1.53 (0.12) 0.47 (0.03) 1.67 (0.10) 0.63 (0.03) 1.23 (0.07) 0.59 (0.03)
Guatemala 1.77 (0.11) 0.63 (0.04) 3.83 (0.15) 0.54 (0.03) 1.98 (0.19) 0.46 (0.04) 2.39 (0.16) 0.73 (0.04) 1.27 (0.08) 0.56 (0.03)
Honduras 1.93 (0.14) 0.85 (0.07) 3.91 (0.20) 1.18 (0.11) 2.24 (0.23) 0.83 (0.06) 2.36 (0.17) 0.91 (0.07) 1.53 (0.11) 0.80 (0.06)
India 2.20 (0.12) 0.81 (0.06) 3.59 (0.13) 0.58 (0.02) 2.25 (0.15) 0.66 (0.06) 3.25 (0.18) 0.83 (0.06) 1.46 (0.08) 0.72 (0.04)
Indonesia 2.11 (0.13) 0.54 (0.04) 4.03 (0.23) 0.25 (0.01) 2.20 (0.16) 0.36 (0.04) 3.02 (0.21) 0.54 (0.04) 1.43 (0.09) 0.49 (0.03)
Iran 1.46 (0.15) 0.47 (0.04) 3.72 (0.39) 0.34 (0.03) 1.47 (0.13) 0.45 (0.03) 2.26 (0.24) 0.50 (0.04) 0.96 (0.10) 0.43 (0.04)
Ireland 1.20 (0.08) 0.96 (0.05) 1.48 (0.06) 1.07 (0.04) 1.38 (0.13) 0.77 (0.05) 1.23 (0.08) 1.00 (0.05) 1.15 (0.08) 0.93 (0.05)
Italy 2.04 (0.11) 1.37 (0.06) 2.37 (0.08) 1.13 (0.04) 2.05 (0.13) 1.00 (0.06) 2.58 (0.15) 1.47 (0.06) 1.63 (0.09) 1.26 (0.05)
Japan 2.74 (0.20) 1.45 (0.08) 2.85 (0.10) 0.88 (0.05) 2.59 (0.24) 0.77 (0.06) 3.29 (0.31) 1.55 (0.09) 2.18 (0.14) 1.32 (0.07)
Kenya 4.18 (0.28) 1.21 (0.07) 10.17 (0.50) 0.84 (0.05) 4.62 (0.45) 0.87 (0.08) 5.69 (0.40) 1.31 (0.08) 2.99 (0.20) 1.07 (0.06)
Malawi 3.37 (0.24) 0.83 (0.09) 9.71 (0.55) 0.35 (0.02) 3.91 (0.42) 0.62 (0.08) 4.33 (0.33) 0.89 (0.10) 2.49 (0.18) 0.78 (0.08)
Malta 0.68 (0.07) 0.29 (0.04) 1.10 (0.08) 0.29 (0.01) 0.91 (0.12) 0.19 (0.02) 0.64 (0.08) 0.36 (0.05) 0.61 (0.06) 0.28 (0.03)
Mauritius 0.80 (0.06) 0.33 (0.03) 1.58 (0.07) 0.30 (0.01) 0.95 (0.11) 0.21 (0.02) 0.89 (0.07) 0.39 (0.04) 0.67 (0.05) 0.30 (0.03)
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Table 3.1 (Continued)
Sensitivity Analysis
Baseline Speciﬁcation Cobb-Douglas Time Trends Zero Return in Agric. Same Return
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Country MPLm
MPLa
MPKm
MPKa
MPLm
MPLa
MPKm
MPKa
MPLm
MPLa
MPKm
MPKa
MPLm
MPLa
MPKm
MPKa
MPLm
MPLa
MPKm
MPKa
Netherlands 1.67 (0.13) 1.02 (0.05) 1.20 (0.05) 0.86 (0.03) 1.75 (0.19) 0.64 (0.04) 1.89 (0.19) 1.11 (0.06) 1.43 (0.10) 0.95 (0.05)
New Zealand 1.12 (0.07) 1.11 (0.06) 1.04 (0.05) 1.40 (0.07) 1.33 (0.10) 1.01 (0.06) 1.04 (0.06) 1.12 (0.06) 1.20 (0.08) 1.11 (0.06)
Norway 1.80 (0.11) 1.13 (0.06) 1.82 (0.07) 1.03 (0.03) 2.02 (0.18) 0.84 (0.05) 1.91 (0.14) 1.18 (0.06) 1.66 (0.11) 1.09 (0.05)
Pakistan 2.07 (0.11) 0.76 (0.04) 3.60 (0.12) 0.68 (0.03) 2.19 (0.16) 0.60 (0.04) 3.10 (0.18) 0.84 (0.04) 1.35 (0.07) 0.66 (0.03)
Peru 2.18 (0.15) 0.67 (0.04) 4.58 (0.22) 0.45 (0.02) 2.26 (0.18) 0.49 (0.03) 2.81 (0.18) 0.70 (0.04) 1.65 (0.12) 0.63 (0.04)
Philippines 1.87 (0.11) 0.76 (0.04) 3.09 (0.12) 0.48 (0.03) 1.96 (0.16) 0.33 (0.03) 2.27 (0.15) 0.78 (0.04) 1.48 (0.08) 0.72 (0.04)
Poland 2.15 (0.26) 1.34 (0.16) 2.85 (0.32) 1.16 (0.10) 2.21 (0.18) 1.01 (0.09) 2.36 (0.32) 1.36 (0.17) 1.90 (0.21) 1.30 (0.15)
Portugal 0.92 (0.06) 0.40 (0.02) 1.68 (0.09) 0.34 (0.02) 1.01 (0.08) 0.32 (0.02) 1.21 (0.08) 0.44 (0.03) 0.69 (0.05) 0.37 (0.02)
South Africa 2.28 (0.11) 1.09 (0.04) 3.81 (0.20) 1.01 (0.04) 2.38 (0.15) 1.03 (0.04) 2.93 (0.15) 1.13 (0.04) 1.77 (0.09) 1.04 (0.04)
South Korea 1.45 (0.09) 0.63 (0.05) 2.29 (0.08) 0.31 (0.02) 1.50 (0.13) 0.26 (0.03) 1.73 (0.12) 0.67 (0.05) 1.17 (0.08) 0.57 (0.05)
Sri Lanka 1.66 (0.11) 0.81 (0.08) 2.83 (0.10) 0.41 (0.05) 1.77 (0.17) 0.24 (0.03) 2.03 (0.15) 0.94 (0.09) 1.30 (0.08) 0.68 (0.06)
Sweden 1.10 (0.05) 0.73 (0.04) 1.26 (0.05) 0.70 (0.03) 1.19 (0.06) 0.62 (0.03) 1.15 (0.05) 0.75 (0.04) 1.03 (0.05) 0.72 (0.03)
Syria 0.67 (0.06) 0.30 (0.02) 1.38 (0.14) 0.29 (0.02) 0.71 (0.06) 0.28 (0.02) 0.83 (0.07) 0.31 (0.02) 0.53 (0.05) 0.29 (0.02)
Tanzania 3.38 (0.23) 1.08 (0.08) 6.61 (0.31) 0.85 (0.04) 3.70 (0.35) 0.51 (0.07) 4.80 (0.35) 1.33 (0.12) 2.30 (0.15) 0.82 (0.06)
Trinidad & Tobago 1.72 (0.13) 0.66 (0.06) 4.33 (0.16) 0.40 (0.01) 2.04 (0.25) 0.38 (0.03) 1.78 (0.14) 0.74 (0.07) 1.56 (0.12) 0.63 (0.05)
Tunisia 1.91 (0.13) 0.84 (0.04) 4.14 (0.30) 0.93 (0.04) 2.16 (0.19) 0.87 (0.05) 2.54 (0.17) 0.91 (0.05) 1.43 (0.10) 0.79 (0.04)
Turkey 2.27 (0.13) 0.64 (0.03) 5.10 (0.21) 0.49 (0.02) 2.39 (0.17) 0.66 (0.04) 3.18 (0.18) 0.66 (0.03) 1.61 (0.09) 0.61 (0.03)
United Kingdom 1.26 (0.05) 1.09 (0.04) 1.03 (0.04) 1.05 (0.03) 1.30 (0.07) 0.82 (0.04) 1.36 (0.06) 1.15 (0.04) 1.14 (0.05) 1.05 (0.04)
United States 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Uruguay 1.14 (0.09) 0.91 (0.08) 1.36 (0.09) 1.38 (0.12) 1.34 (0.11) 0.82 (0.06) 1.21 (0.09) 0.96 (0.09) 1.05 (0.08) 0.89 (0.08)
Venezuela 2.31 (0.21) 1.43 (0.15) 3.41 (0.30) 1.35 (0.16) 2.42 (0.19) 1.10 (0.07) 3.04 (0.29) 1.57 (0.17) 1.77 (0.17) 1.31 (0.14)
Zimbabwe 5.40 (0.42) 1.50 (0.10) 14.77 (0.81) 1.12 (0.06) 6.19 (0.66) 1.30 (0.11) 7.02 (0.54) 1.59 (0.10) 4.04 (0.32) 1.39 (0.09)
Notes : Marginal value product diﬀerentials between non-agriculture and agriculture are calculated as 푑ˆ푗푖 = exp (훼ˆ푗푖 − 훼ˆ푗푈푆) , 푗 = 푙, 푘, where 훼ˆ푗푖
are the country ﬁxed eﬀects from an estimation of equations (3.9) and (3.10). A value above (below) one means that the marginal value product
is higher (lower) in non-agriculture than in agriculture. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Figure 3.2: Baseline Results
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Notes : Estimates of marginal value product diﬀerentials between non-agriculture and agriculture for
baseline speciﬁcation.
3.4.2 Sensitivity Analysis
The sensitivity analysis investigates the eﬀect of alternative production technologies,
assumptions on the wedges and human capital calibrations on estimated marginal
product diﬀerentials. Four main cases are considered. First, the production technology
is changed from Translog to standard Cobb-Douglas production functions. Second,
the marginal product diﬀerentials are allowed to vary over time. Third, the relative
return to schooling in agriculture is set to zero, which means that only non-agricultural
workers increase their productivity by schooling and the agricultural schooling data is
neglected in the estimation. Fourth, this relative return is set to one implying that
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returns to schooling are identical in both sectors. Table 3.1 columns (3) to (10) contain
the estimated marginal product diﬀerentials for all these scenarios.
For Cobb-Douglas technologies, estimated marginal product of labor diﬀerentials are
much higher for most countries, cf. ﬁgure 3.3 Increases by more than 50% are rel-
atively common and are stronger in developing countries. In contrast, changes to
marginal product of capital diﬀerentials are less pronounced and diﬀer more across
countries. In industrialized countries marginal product of capital diﬀerentials increase
by up to 50% or decrease slightly, while they decrease in developing countries by up
to 50%. Accordingly, using Cobb-Douglas technologies one considerably overestimates
labor market distortions in favor of agriculture in most countries compared to Translog
technologies and overestimates capital market distortions in favor of non-agriculture
at least in many developing countries. This ﬁnding conﬁrms the role of diﬀering factor
combinations for output elasticities that the Translog production function takes into
account.
Figure 3.3: Cobb-Douglas
MPL-Diﬀerential vs. Agricultural Employment
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Notes : Estimates of marginal value product diﬀerentials between non-agriculture and agriculture
assuming Cobb-Douglas production functions.
One of the main identifying assumptions so far was that the marginal product diﬀeren-
tials are constant over time. However it is likely that in the long-run the institutional
framework that causes non-equalization of marginal products does change. Here I check
how sensitive the results are when the wedges between marginal products are allowed
to vary over time. Speciﬁcally, I allow for country-speciﬁc time trends of the marginal
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product diﬀerential terms. The constant terms 푑푘푖 and 푑푙푖 are then replaced by
푑푘푖푡 = 푑푘푖0 × (1 + 푔푘푖)
푡 (3.11)
푑푙푖푡 = 푑푙푖0 × (1 + 푔푙푖)
푡. (3.12)
Accordingly, the estimated equations (3.9) and (3.10) now also include 훾푘푖×푡 and 훾푙푖×푡
terms, where 훾푘푖 ≡ ln(1 + 푔푘푖) and 훾푙푖 ≡ ln(1 + 푔푙푖). I include these time trends for
all countries except for the United States for which the assumption of eﬃcient factor
markets is maintained. Figure 3.4 reports the estimated diﬀerential for the middle of the
time period during which each country is observed in the data set. The estimated labor
diﬀerentials are similar to the baseline results. But the estimated capital diﬀerential
decreases somewhat for many countries such that capital markets appear to be more
distorted towards non-agriculture. However, overall the results seem to be relatively
robust to a change of this assumption.
Figure 3.4: Time Trends
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MPK-Diﬀerential vs. Agricultural Employment
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Notes : Estimates of marginal value product diﬀerentials between non-agriculture and agriculture
allowing for time trends of the marginal product wedges. The ﬁgure reports the estimated diﬀerential
for the middle of the time period during which each country is observed in the data set.
Figure 3.5 shows that imposing a zero return to schooling in agriculture, i.e. neglecting
data on agricultural years of schooling, also leads to higher estimated marginal product
of labor diﬀerentials relative to the baseline scenario. But the magnitude of the eﬀect
is on average much lower than in the Cobb-Douglas case such that the maximum
increase is below 60%. Again the marginal product diﬀerential of developing countries
increases the most. The intuition for this ﬁnding is the following. Since the agricultural
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schooling data is eﬀectively neglected in this speciﬁcation, industrialized countries with
their higher absolute schooling levels in non-agriculture (and agriculture) now have the
greatest diﬀerence in human capital stocks between sectors. This reduces their 푅퐿푃
relative to developing countries and accordingly this greater cross-country variation of
푅퐿푃 is at least partly accounted for by a higher marginal product of labor diﬀerential.
Marginal product of capital diﬀerentials generally increase by up to 25%. Accordingly,
distortions go up in countries that were found to distort the capital market in favor of
agriculture in the baseline speciﬁcation and go down in countries that were found to
distort it in favor of non-agriculture. This result must come purely from the eﬀect of
intersectoral human capital diﬀerences on the ratio of output elasticities.
Figure 3.5: Zero Human Capital Return in Agriculture
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Notes : Estimates of marginal value product diﬀerentials between non-agriculture and agriculture
assuming a return to schooling of zero in the agricultural sector.
Finally, the relative return to schooling in the two sectors is set to one, i.e. returns to
schooling are made identical in both sectors. Marginal product of labor diﬀerentials
reported in ﬁgure 3.6 then decrease by up to 40% and the strongest in developing
economies. The intuition follows the same line of reasoning as before, but in the op-
posite direction. Now developing countries have the greatest intersectoral diﬀerence
in human capital stocks because of their intersectoral schooling diﬀerences. Marginal
product of capital diﬀerentials decrease as well by up to 25% implying that distor-
tions go up in countries that were found to distort the capital market in favor of
non-agriculture and go down in countries that were found to distort it in favor of
agriculture.
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Figure 3.6: Same Human Capital Return in Both Sectors
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Notes : Estimates of marginal value product diﬀerentials between non-agriculture and agriculture
assuming identical returns to schooling in the two sectors.
The analysis of these four alternative cases have shown that the results are sensitive to
certain changes of the assumptions. But the sensitivity of the result is limited and the
main results of the paper still hold - in many countries marginal products between the
agricultural and non-agricultural sector are not equalized. In particular, for labor the
ﬁrst and third case have shown that the baseline estimates of factor misallocation are
relatively modest compared to the ones implied by other assumptions. Adopting the
fourth case would diminish the estimates to some extent, but still not imply marginal
product of labor equalization. This suggests that from the perspective of identifying
factor misallocation, investigations of returns to schooling in agriculture would be an
important area for future research. The sensitivity analysis has also shown that the
results for capital are less sensitive compared to those of labor.
3.4.3 Discussion
While this paper ﬁnds sizeable marginal product diﬀerentials, the estimates are lower
than the ones found by Vollrath (2009), which is the only other study I am aware of
with a similar cross-country focus. In a calibration exercise of Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion functions Vollrath (2009) found marginal product of labor diﬀerentials18 in excess
of two even in many industrialized economies and higher ones up to eight or even twelve
18This refers to his marginal product of human capital diﬀerentials, which are the ones corresponding
to my estimates.
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in developing countries. The reasons why the estimates diﬀer are numerous, so I will
name some that I suspect to be important. First, I employ the more ﬂexible Translog
production function compared to the relatively restrictive Cobb-Douglas. As the sen-
sitivity analysis has shown my methodology would also yield much higher estimates
under a Cobb-Douglas assumption. The factor combinations that are in operation in
developing countries seem to aﬀect output elasticities and explain a substantial part of
the cross-country 푅퐿푃 variation. Second, the production parameters in my paper are
estimated from the whole sample and not only from the United States. Third, since
Vollrath is ultimately interested in a development accounting question, he uses output
evaluated at purchasing power adjusted prices, while this paper uses domestic prices,
which seem to be the appropriate choice for the analysis of factor allocation. This
diﬀerence alone leads to lower levels of 푅퐿푃 in developing countries. Fourth, he only
considers a cross-section in 1985, while this paper uses panel data from 1967 to 1992.
Overall, the ﬁnding of this paper that marginal product diﬀerentials are smaller than
the ones found by Vollrath (2009) might also diminish how much of the cross-country
income distribution and the variation in aggregate eﬃciency can be explained by this
form of factor misallocation. But such a conclusion would have to be based on further
analysis.
3.5 Conclusions
This paper has developed a framework for the estimation of the degree of factor misal-
location between agriculture and non-agriculture from cross-country panel data. The
ﬁndings are that there is evidence for sizeable marginal product diﬀerentials and fac-
tor misallocation. The marginal product of labor is higher in non-agriculture than
in agriculture in most countries of the world. In developing countries the marginal
product of labor diﬀerential is around 1.5 to 5. In contrast, the allocation of capital
does not allow such a clear distinction between countries. In most developing countries
the marginal product of capital is around 1.2 to 3 times higher in agriculture than
in non-agriculture. Industrialized countries tend to be closer to marginal product of
capital equalization, but there are also countries where the marginal product is higher
in non-agriculture. Thus, this paper provided macroeconomic evidence supporting the
view that economic dualism, understood here as non-equalized marginal products, is
an important characteristic of developing countries. Even though this study has not
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investigated speciﬁc institutions or sources of market failure, the results indirectly sug-
gest that factor markets for the agricultural and non-agricultural sector might not
be well-integrated in developing countries. An obvious question for future research is
then, what are the deeper economic reasons for the marginal product diﬀerentials in
developing countries? Are there policies or institutions that distort factor markets?
Alternatively, are at low levels of development migration and reallocation costs so high
that factor mobility is eﬀectively very limited? Answering these questions is a key step
towards formulating policy implications of the ﬁndings.
When thinking about the welfare implications of this paper one needs to keep in mind
that it is very likely that people in poor countries do in fact take optimal decisions
given the institutional framework they face. The results of this study can thus not
be used to argue that deliberately moving people out of agriculture is a good idea.
However, to the extent it is possible to identify the institutions that are responsible
for misallocation, changing these institutions could be an important area for policy
reforms in poor countries.
Factor misallocation could contribute to our understanding of several phenomena of
the world economy. If factor misallocation is more severe in developing countries then
the associated output losses might partly explain why these countries are poor. Fur-
thermore, the existence of wedges between marginal products of labor would imply that
the sectoral reallocation of workers from a low marginal product to a high marginal
product sector might be an important source of economic growth during the structural
transformation. Finally, the existence of wedges could be part of the explanation why
some developing countries are still so dominantly agricultural. I hope that my quan-
titative results on the degree of factor misallocation in diﬀerent countries can form a
basis for future research on these questions.
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Appendix 3.A Construction of Missing Sectoral
Schooling Data
Following Vollrath (2009) I exploit a regularity between the sectoral education measures
of Timmer (2002) and average years of schooling of persons over the age of 25 for
the total population provided by Barro and Lee (2001). This relationship is that
rural years of education converge towards urban years of education as total years of
education increase. Vollrath uses this relationship until total years of education are
greater than 6.6 years because for higher total education levels rural and urban school
years become very similar. The empirical justiﬁcation for this assumption is relatively
weak since there are only few observations with available sectoral education data and
total years of schooling greater than 6.6. But I also adopt this procedure since it
generates human capital stocks that are more unequally distributed between the two
sectors in developing countries compared to industrialized countries and so eﬀectively
biases the results against ﬁnding labor misallocation in developing countries.19 A simple
OLS regression of rural education years, 푆푅, on urban years, 푆푈 , for all observations
with total education smaller than 6.6 years yields
푆푅푖푡 = 0.912푆푈푖푡 − 0.847, 푅
2 = 0.87, 푁 = 388, (3.13)
(49.96) (−10.99)
where t-statistics are in parentheses. These estimates diﬀer from Vollrath’s20 since I use
all observations with available sectoral education data while he only uses the countries
that are in his ﬁnal data set and only the time periods from 1970 to 1985 resulting in
77 observations. Furthermore, average years of schooling of the overall population, 푆푇
are a weighted average of rural and urban years of schooling given by
푆푇 푖푡 = 푙푎푖푡푆푅푖푡 + (1− 푙푎푖푡)푆푈푖푡, (3.14)
where 푙푎푖푡 is the rural share of the population. Equations (3.13) and (3.14) can be solved
simultaneously to ﬁnd expressions for 푆푅푖푡 and 푆푈푖푡 as functions of years of education
of the total population and the rural population share. Total years of schooling for
19The eﬀect of not using the cutoﬀ of 6.6 years on the results of the baseline speciﬁcation are negligible
(results not reported).
20His estimates are
푆푅푖푡 = 1.071푆푈푖푡 − 1.518, 푅
2 = 0.78, 푁 = 77.
(16.18) (5.17)
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persons over the age of 25 are taken from Barro and Lee (2001)21 and the share of
economically active in agriculture is used as the rural population share22. I construct
sectoral education years for the countries that are not in Timmer’s data set every ﬁve
years from 1965-1985 and for all countries for the time periods 1990 and 1995. For the
observations with less than 6.6 years of overall education the expressions derived above
are used and for the observations with more than 6.6 years the total level of education
is used for both rural and urban sectors. Finally, I interpolate linearly between the
real and imputed data points that are available at ﬁve year frequency to get annual
data.
21For Tanzania I use average years of schooling of persons over the age of 15 instead since these were
the only ones available.
22This is exact if as assumed for the human capital calibration the rural population constitutes the
agricultural and the urban population the non-agricultural labor force and the participation rates
in both areas are identical.
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